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ABSTRACT 
 
This project examined the evolution of human cognitive and behavioural 
traits that vary across societies, drawing mainly on findings in the field of cultural 
psychology. While this field has made great advances in rigorously documenting 
cultural variation in human cognition and behaviour, relatively less work has 
examined how and why these cultural differences exist. This thesis aimed to 
contribute to the latter question by exploring connections among contemporary 
culturally variable traits and investigating the long-term historical dynamics of 
culturally variable traits. A novel method using artistic style to index changes in 
cognition through history found a dynamic pattern spanning the last six centuries in 
three Western countries, contradicting the assumption often found in the literature 
that cultural traits remain stable over long periods of time. This finding also 
contradicts the ecocultural hypothesis, which posits that culturally variable cognition 
emerged in Ancient Greece and Ancient China in response to differing subsistence 
methods, and suggests instead that cognition varies with levels of intergroup conflict. 
Further tentative evidence against the ecocultural hypothesis is found in a priming 
experiment, in which primes designed to simulate the aforementioned subsistence 
differences had no effect on participants’ cognition. Finally, an analysis of cultural 
variation in experimentally determined cooperation and real-life tax evasion suggests 
that the latter may be driven by uncertainty avoidance, a hypothesis that was also 
tested experimentally. Future directions of work are discussed that would be 
conducive to our understanding of human normative cultural evolution. 
 
3 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Foremost, I am very grateful to Alex Mesoudi for his consistent guidance, 
help, and patience throughout the years. He has let me explore all these wonderful 
topics and work in my own way, yet always was there to make sure I was on track. I 
am much indebted to Alex for giving me the opportunity to learn from his stellar 
academic skills and insights. 
Thank you to my examiners Ryan McKay and Justin Park, for their careful 
reading and thoughtful comments. Discussing my thesis with you was a joy. 
Many thanks also go to my PhD panel members Lars Chittka, Nathan Emery 
and Magda Osman for their guidance, helpful comments, and advice. 
I am indebted to several people who contributed to experiments presented 
here: to Poyani Desai and Thoko Dlami who helped collect English and German 
portraits in Chapter 3, to Charandeep Khaira for help collecting data in Chapter 4, 
and to Liam Pollock and Keith Jensen who helped design, set-up and run the 
experiment in Chapter 6. 
Daily life over these last years was so much more fun than I anticipated when 
I came to London, thanks to our wonderful group on the second floor of the Fogg 
building! The relaxed inclusive atmosphere my lovely colleagues provided has 
helped me through everything, and lighted up my life at QM. 
A special note of thanks goes to Elodie Briefer, for being such a good friend 
and valued colleague. All the nights out dancing, chats over coffee and science 
discussions have kept me smiling! Besides that I have learned so much from you on 
the how-to-work front. I hope there will be many trips between London and Zurich 
to come. 
My Dear Mister Pete LeMay, you were a most wonderfully lovely person to 
live with. You made our house into a home, which was invaluable for me, living in a 
strange country. Thank you for patiently tutoring me in the many ways of the 
English. 
Mijn lieve vrienden waar ik al zolang op steun en bouw: jullie vriendschap is 
mij goud waard. Ik ben ontzettend dankbaar dat, ondanks dat ik ben verkast naar een 
ander land, jullie nog steeds een belangrijk deel van mijn leven zijn. 
4 
 
Kees van der Vlugt, de avondjes kletsen op de bank slepen mij erdoorheen! 
Geen emotionele zaak is jou te zwaar en samen praten we de wereld weer recht. 
Dankje voor je lieve attenties. 
Edwin Hoekstra, je bent een vriend in raad en daad. Je staat altijd voor me 
klaar met een biertje, Star Trek en een slaapplaats. Ik hoop nog talloze concerten met 
je te zien. Dankjewel voor al je steun! 
Marie-Louise Goudeau die mij altijd aan het lachen maakt! Dank voor de 
lichte noot. Hopelijk zien we elkaar wat vaker nou we beiden (bijna) klaar zijn. 
Mijn lieve familie, die ik vooral op het laatst veel en veel te weinig gezien 
heb maar waar ik altijd aan denk: Anne, Eli, Maarten, Mielke, Alex, Dayenne, 
Naomi en Nala. Ik hoop jullie in de toekomst veel vaker te zien en te spreken. Dank 
jullie wel voor jullie onvoorwaardelijke steun. Zonder het vangnet dat jullie vormen 
zou ik dit nooit gedurfd hebben. 
Mijn slimme onconventionele moeder Anne van Weerden, zoals altijd: 
dankjewel voor al het praten! Vanaf dat ik 6 was herinner ik me 
wetenschapsgesprekken met jou, en die hebben mij geleerd altijd door te vragen. Ik 
heb het tot hier gebracht dankzij jouw aanmoediging. 
And lastly: Phil Zacharias. You have stood by me during this long process 
and helped me through with conversation, laughter, music and good food. I am 
immensely grateful for having you in my life. 
 
 
Contents 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................... 2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................... 3 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................... 8 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................... 11 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 12 
CHAPTER 2: PATTERNS IN CULTURALLY VARIABLE COGNITION ... 15 
2.1 ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................... 15 
2.2 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 15 
2.3 LINKS BETWEEN CULTURALLY VARIABLE COGNITIONS, TRAITS AND BEHAVIOURS
 ........................................................................................................................... 19 
2.3.1 Analytic and holistic cognition ............................................................... 19 
2.3.2 Tightness/looseness ................................................................................ 23 
2.3.3 Hofstede’s multi-dimensional model ....................................................... 26 
2.3.4 Personality differences ........................................................................... 35 
2.3.5 Public Goods Game variation ................................................................ 39 
2.3.6 Conclusion: Relationships between dimensions and gaps ....................... 48 
2.4 THEORIES FOR THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURALLY VARIABLE COGNITION ........... 50 
2.4.1 Possible explanations for cultural differences ........................................ 50 
2.4.2 The ecocultural hypothesis ..................................................................... 55 
2.4.3 The pathogen-stress hypothesis .............................................................. 58 
2.4.4 Cultural adaptations to environmental variability .................................. 62 
2.4.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................... 64 
2.5 POINTS OF CONSIDERATION FOR MOVING FORWARD ........................................ 65 
CHAPTER 3: THE DYNAMIC CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF TWO 
COGNITIVE STYLES – EVIDENCE FROM ART HISTORY ....................... 72 
3.1 ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................... 72 
3.2 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 73 
3.3 METHODS ...................................................................................................... 79 
3.3.1 Collection .............................................................................................. 79 
3.3.2 Analyses ................................................................................................. 80 
3.4 RESULTS ....................................................................................................... 81 
3.4.1 Dutch portraits ....................................................................................... 81 
3.4.2 English portraits .................................................................................... 84 
3.4.3 German portraits ................................................................................... 86 
3.4.4 Dutch landscapes ................................................................................... 89 
3.4.5 English landscapes ................................................................................. 92 
3.4.6 German landscapes ................................................................................ 94 
  
6 
 
3.5 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................. 101 
3.5.1 Findings for analytic/holistic cognition ................................................ 101 
3.5.2 Findings for tightness/looseness ........................................................... 104 
3.5.3 Methodological issues .......................................................................... 104 
3.5.4 Historical analysis in view of the data .................................................. 106 
3.5.5 Conclusions ......................................................................................... 111 
CHAPTER 4: MORE AGREEABLE PEOPLE PREFER LARGER FACES - 
PERSONALITY AND ANALYTIC/HOLISTIC MODE ................................. 112 
4.1 ABSTRACT ................................................................................................... 112 
4.2 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 112 
4.3 METHODS .................................................................................................... 115 
4.3.1 Participants ......................................................................................... 115 
4.3.2 Materials.............................................................................................. 116 
4.3.3 Procedure ............................................................................................ 116 
4.3.4 Analysis ............................................................................................... 117 
4.4 RESULTS ..................................................................................................... 118 
4.5 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................. 122 
CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECT OF EXPERIMENTALLY INDUCED 
COOPERATION ON COGNITIVE MODE .................................................... 126 
5.1 ABSTRACT ................................................................................................... 126 
5.2 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 126 
5.3 METHODS .................................................................................................... 130 
5.3.1 Design .................................................................................................. 130 
5.3.2 Materials.............................................................................................. 130 
5.3.3 Participants ......................................................................................... 133 
5.3.4 Procedure ............................................................................................ 133 
5.3.5 Coding ................................................................................................. 133 
5.4 RESULTS ..................................................................................................... 134 
5.4.1 Main effects .......................................................................................... 135 
5.4.2 Task concurrence ................................................................................. 138 
5.4.3 Effects of earnings ................................................................................ 139 
5.5 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................. 139 
CHAPTER 6: CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEMS
 ............................................................................................................................ 144 
6.1 ABSTRACT ................................................................................................... 144 
6.2 STUDY 1: PGG AND TAXATION - CULTURAL RESPONSES TO PUBLIC GOODS 
PROBLEMS ......................................................................................................... 145 
6.2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 145 
6.2.2 PGG contributions and tax evasion ...................................................... 147 
6.2.3 Cultural influences on the PGG and tax evasion .................................. 150 
6.2.4 Discussion ............................................................................................ 153 
  
7 
 
6.3 STUDY 2: INDIVIDUAL-CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON PGG CONTRIBUTIONS ...... 155 
6.3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 155 
6.3.2 Methods ............................................................................................... 156 
6.3.3 Results ................................................................................................. 158 
6.3.4 Discussion ............................................................................................ 158 
6.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION ................................................................................. 160 
CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION ......................................................... 161 
CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................... 167 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 172 
APPENDICES .................................................................................................... 203 
APPENDIX I: IPIP-NEO-PI PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE................................. 204 
APPENDIX II: FIVE TASKS IN TWO VERSIONS ....................................................... 209 
APPENDIX III: PGG WITH PUNISHMENT SCREENSHOTS ........................................ 225 
APPENDIX IV: MAB SCREENSHOTS ................................................................... 228 
APPENDIX V: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL UAI QUESTIONNAIRE ..................................... 229 
APPENDIX VI: DESIRABILITY OF CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE ................................ 230 
APPENDIX VII: PGG WITHOUT PUNISHMENT SCREENSHOTS ................................ 232 
 
 
8 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: A categorisation task using pictures, to distinguish reasoning styles 
(Markman & Hutchinson, 1984). Participants are asked: “Which does cow 
belong with: chicken or grass?”. If the answer is chicken, the participant has 
used taxonomic reasoning by thinking of the category ‘animals’, which reflects 
an analytic mind set. The grouping of cow with grass is a thematic choice (cow 
eats grass) which is a mark of a holistic thought. Based on Ji, Zhang and Nisbett 
(2004). ............................................................................................................ 20 
Figure 2: Cross-cultural differences in contributions in the PGG without (N-
condition) and with (P-condition) punishment. Cultural regions are Inglehart & 
Baker’s (2000) regions. From: (Gächter, et al., 2010) ...................................... 44 
Figure 3: Change over time (1981–98) in Inglehart’s (1997) dimensions 
traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression (see section 2.3.3). 
From: Inglehart & Baker (2000) ...................................................................... 71 
Figure 4: Within-country variation of Inglehart’s (1997) dimensions 
traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression (see section 2.3.3).From: 
Inglehart and Baker (2000). ............................................................................ 71 
Figure 5: Predictions for analyticism and holism in Western Europe, leading up to 
the present day. ............................................................................................... 77 
Figure 6: Change over time in face-to-frame ratio for Dutch portraits, indicative of 
changes in cognitive style. A high face-to-frame ratio indicates a more analytic 
cognitive style typical of modern Western people, and a low face-to-frame ratio 
indicates a holistic cognitive style typical of modern East Asian people. The line 
represents the best-fit quadratic model specified in the text. ............................ 82 
Figure 7: Visualisation of face-to-frame ratios in Dutch portraits. Periods encompass 
20 portraits from the earliest measured time (period 1), the last measured time 
(period 3), and around the lowest point found (period 2). Error bars represent 
minimum and maximum values. ..................................................................... 83 
Figure 8: Dutch portraits in period 3 differ significantly more from their mean than 
portraits in periods 1 and 2. Portraits in period 2 differ significantly less from 
their mean than portraits in period 1. Error bars represent minimum and 
maximum values. ............................................................................................ 84 
Figure 9: Change over time in face-to-frame ratio for English portraits, indicative of 
changes in cognitive style. A high face-to-frame ratio indicates a more analytic 
cognitive style typical of modern Western people, and a low face-to-frame ratio 
indicates a holistic cognitive style typical of modern East Asian people. The line 
represents the best-fit quadratic model specified in the text. ............................ 85 
Figure 10: Visualisation of face-to-frame ratios in English portraits. Periods 
encompass 20 portraits from the earliest measured time (period 1), the last 
measured time (period 3), and around the lowest point found (period 2). Error 
bars represent minimum and maximum values. ............................................... 85 
 
9 
 
Figure 11: English portraits in period 3 differ significantly more from their mean 
than portraits in periods 1 and 2. The middle of the boxplot is the mean 
difference from the mean of the period ratios. Error bars represent minimum and 
maximum values. ............................................................................................ 86 
Figure 12: Change over time in face-to-frame ratio for German portraits, indicative 
of changes in cognitive style. A high face-to-frame ratio indicates a more 
analytic cognitive style typical of modern Western people, and a low face-to-
frame ratio indicates a holistic cognitive style typical of modern East Asian 
people. The line represents the best-fit quadratic model specified in the text. .. 87 
Figure 13: Visualisation of face-to-frame ratios in German portraits. Periods 
encompass 20 portraits from the earliest measured time (period 1), the last 
measured time (period 3), and around the lowest point found (period 2). Error 
bars represent minimum and maximum values. ............................................... 88 
Figure 14: German portraits in period 2 differ significantly less from their mean than 
portraits in periods 1 and 3. The middle of the boxplot is the mean difference 
from the mean of the period ratios. Error bars represent minimum and maximum 
values. ............................................................................................................ 89 
Figure 15 Change over time in relative horizon height for Dutch landscapes, 
indicative of changes in cognitive style. Values are depicted in reverse order to 
indicate analyticism at the top and holism at the bottom. A low relative horizon 
height indicates a more analytic cognitive style typical of modern Western 
people, and a high relative horizon height indicates a holistic cognitive style 
typical of modern East Asian people. The line represents the best-fit quadratic 
model specified in the text. ............................................................................. 90 
Figure 16: Visualisation of relative horizon heights in Dutch landscapes. Periods 
encompass 20 portraits from the earliest measured time (period 1), the last 
measured time (period 3), and around the lowest point found (period 2). Error 
bars represent minimum and maximum values. ............................................... 91 
Figure 17: Dutch landscapes in period 3 differ significantly more from their mean 
than landscapes in periods 1 and 3. Error bars represent minimum and maximum 
values. ............................................................................................................ 92 
Figure 18: Change over time in relative horizon height for English landscapes, which 
shows no significant change in cognitive style. Values are represented in reverse 
order to indicate analyticism at the top and holism at the bottom. Contrary to 
expectation, relative horizon height is consistently as high as has been measured 
before for East Asian art. The line represents the best-fit quadratic model 
specified in the text. ........................................................................................ 93 
Figure 19: Visualisation of the relative horizon heights in English landscapes. 
Periods encompass 20 portraits from the earliest measured time (period 1), the 
last measured time (period 3), and around the lowest point found (period 2). 
Error bars represent minimum and maximum values. ...................................... 93 
Figure 20: English landscapes show no significantly different variations. The middle 
of the boxplot is the mean difference from the mean of the period ratios. Error 
bars represent minimum and maximum values. ............................................... 94 
 
10 
 
Figure 21: Change over time in relative horizon height for German landscapes, 
which shows no significant change in cognitive style. Values are depicted in 
reverse order to indicate analyticism at the top and holism at the bottom. 
Contrary to expectation, relative horizon height is consistently as high as has 
been measured before for East Asian art. The line represents the best-fit 
quadratic model specified in the text. .............................................................. 95 
Figure 22: Visualisation of the relative horizon heights in German landscapes. 
Periods encompass 20 portraits from the earliest measured time (period 1), the 
last measured time (period 3), and around the lowest point found (period 2). 
Error bars represent minimum and maximum values. ...................................... 96 
Figure 23: German landscapes in period 3 differ significantly more from their mean 
than landscapes in period 2. The middle of the boxplot is the mean difference 
from the mean of the period ratios. Error bars represent minimum and maximum 
values. ............................................................................................................ 97 
Figure 24: Comparison of Masuda et al’s (2008) findings for Western (14.65%, 
dashed line) and East Asian (4.28%, uninterrupted line) portraits from museums, 
and the findings for the Dutch (D), English (E) and German (G) first (1), middle 
(2) and last (3) periods. Error bars represent minimum and maximum values. . 98 
Figure 25: Comparison of Masuda et al’s (2008) findings for Western (38.83%, 
dashed line) and East Asian (56.15%, uninterrupted line) landscapes from 
museums, and the findings for the Dutch (D), English (E) and German (G) first 
(1), middle (2) and last (3) periods. Error bars represent minimum and 
maximum values. ............................................................................................ 99 
Figure 26: No significant correlation between Extraversion and Face-to-Frame ratio
 ..................................................................................................................... 119 
Figure 27: No significant correlation between Extraversion and relative horizon 
height. ........................................................................................................... 119 
Figure 28: No significant correlation between Extraversion and additional items . 120 
Figure 29: Significant and positive correlation between Agreeableness and face-to-
frame ratio .................................................................................................... 121 
INTRODUCTION 
11 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Links between culturally diverging human cognitions, traits and behaviours.
 ....................................................................................................................... 49 
Table 2: Comparison of Masuda et al’s (2008) findings for Western and East Asian 
portrait paintings from museums, and the relevant findings for the Dutch, 
English and German timelines. Underscored = typical Western ratios, bold = 
typical East Asian ratios. *x = significant difference with period x. ................. 98 
Table 3: Comparison of Masuda et al’s (2008) findings for Western and East Asian 
landscape paintings from museums, and the relevant findings for the Dutch, 
English and German timelines. Underscored = typical Western ratios, bold = 
typical East Asian ratios. *,x = significant difference with period x. ................. 99 
Table 4: Summary of ranges of ratios for portraits and landscapes, for all three 
measured  periods. The relative position of the number indicates the width of the 
range.         p<.05;          p<.01;          p<.001. ................................................ 100 
Table 5: Parameters in the public goods game. ..................................................... 132 
Table 6: Differences in tasks before and after playing the game, cooperative 
condition. ...................................................................................................... 136 
Table 7: Difference in tasks before and after playing the game, solitary condition. 137 
Table 8: Difference in change after playing the game between cooperative and 
solitary condition. ......................................................................................... 138 
Table 9: Tax evasion measures (Schneider, 2004) and contributions in the public 
goods game (Herrmann, et al., 2008). N = game with no punishment, P = game 
with punishment option. ................................................................................ 149 
Table 10: Contributions in the public goods game (Herrmann, et al., 2008) and tax 
evasion measures (Schneider, 2004). N = game with no punishment, P = game 
with punishment option. Reported are Spearman r values. N = 15, namely 
Australia, Belarus, China, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Korea, Switzerland/StGallen, Switzerland/Zurich (both tax evasion 
measures for Switzerland), Turkey, UK Ukraine and US. Significance levels: * 
p<.05, ** p<.005. .......................................................................................... 149 
Table 11: Correlations between contributions in the public goods game (Herrmann, 
et al., 2008), Hofstede dimensions (Hofstede, et al., 2010) and tax evasion 
(Schneider, 2004). N = game with no punishment, P = game with punishment. 
IDV = individualism, UAI = uncertainty avoidance, PD = power distance Mas = 
masculinity. Reported are Pearson r values, except for Tax evasion and Mas 
where Spearman rs values are reported. N = 13, namely Australia, China, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Russia, Saudi Arabia (Hofstede dimensions for 
Arab countries), South Korea, Switzerland/StGallen, Switzerland/Zurich (both 
Hofstede dimensions for German speaking Switzerland, each weighted .5), 
Turkey, UK and US. Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.005, a trend 
of p<.06. ....................................................................................................... 152 
INTRODUCTION 
12 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
When some of my international friends came to visit me in Amsterdam, we 
walked into a narrow alley in the city centre, where about 100 other people were also 
trying to get through. To good Dutch custom there was much pushing and shoving, 
accompanied by loud complaints about elbows in the back. We had no choice but to 
adjust, so we elbowed our way through as well. Having lived in England for a few 
years at that point, I was aware of the lack of courteousness and orderly cues and felt 
embarrassed about this blunt Dutch behaviour. But, rather than being annoyed, my 
friends remarked that they liked the Dutch rudeness, because they felt that things get 
done a lot faster. 
There is no question that people from some cultures value efficiency over 
courteousness, while people from other cultures would not dream of sacrificing 
harmony for haste. How did people from different parts of the world come to feel 
differently about such topics? Despite the enormous advances cultural psychology 
has made in the mapping of differences in human cultures, the question of how and 
why these differences came about remains unanswered (Heine & Norenzayan, 2006; 
Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). 
Evolutionary theory derived from biology can be incorporated to answer 
these why questions (Mesoudi, 2011). However, before attempting to develop 
separate evolutionary accounts for each of the uncovered cultural dimensions, 
cognitions, modes, traits and behaviours, it should be established if there are patterns 
in the available data. If part of the large number of known cultural factors can be 
synthesised into internally coherent patterns, evolutionary theories for these patterns 
instead of separate factors could be developed. Such an approach would greatly 
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reduce the number of variables under investigation and thus increase efficiency. 
Then cultural evolutionary theory, which has already made great progress in more 
tangible areas of human culture, can be incorporated to explain the origin and 
evolution of culturally diverse psychological constructs (Mesoudi, 2011). 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to evolutionary research in cultural 
psychology, by (i) deducing patterns between contemporary cultural traits and 
behaviours between which synthesis could be enhanced, and (ii) investigating 
timescales on which cultural constructs play out, in order to elucidate the origins of 
those patterns. Both of these aims ultimately promote the goal of fostering greater 
integration between the fields of cross-cultural psychology and cultural evolution, 
which will facilitate the study of how culturally variable cognitions evolved. 
These two core topics are reflected in the two parts of Chapter 2. The first 
part of Chapter 2 focuses on the current state of the field of cultural psychology and 
describes findings in some of the main cultural dimensions studied in the field. The 
goal is to identify links between these dimensions and gaps in our knowledge. In the 
second part of Chapter 2 three current evolutionary theories for the divergence of 
culture are discussed: the parasite-stress hypothesis, the environmental variability 
hypothesis, and most importantly for this thesis the ecocultural hypothesis. Chapter 2 
concludes with considerations for theorising about the evolution of culturally 
variable psychological constructs. Using a novel method, Chapter 3 maps the 
temporal change in two cultural dimensions between the 15th century and the present. 
This method allows for testing patterns predicted by the ecocultural hypothesis, as 
well as an implicit assumption often encountered in cultural psychology: that cultural 
constructs remain stable over long periods of time. Chapter 4 uses a laboratory based 
method to test overlap between two constructs discussed in Chapter 2: personality 
INTRODUCTION 
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and mode of thought. The first laboratory based test of the ecocultural hypothesis to 
date is presented in Chapter 5, which uses a priming paradigm to test if cognitive 
mode can be shifted as the hypothesis predicts. Novel primes are used for this test, 
namely two economic games: the public goods game and the multi-armed bandit. 
The first part of Chapter 6 investigates how well cultural variation in the public 
goods game models the real life public goods situation of tax system. Further 
parallels are drawn between the public goods game and the tax system in terms of 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. A hypothesis based on this finding is formed, which 
is experimentally tested in the second part of Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes by 
drawing together results across chapters and indicating how findings support a group 
of interconnected cultural constructs found in Chapter 2. Finally, future directions 
are presented, in which findings in this thesis may help to develop internally 
coherent evolutionary theories of culturally variable cognitive traits.
PATTERNS IN CULTURALLY VARIABLE COGNITION 
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CHAPTER 2: PATTERNS IN CULTURALLY VARIABLE 
COGNITION 
2.1 ABSTRACT 
The first part of this chapter reviews the most researched dimensions that 
have been proposed to capture cross-cultural variation in human cognition and 
behaviour – analytic/holistic cognition, tightness/looseness of norm following, 
Hofstede’s multi-dimensional model, and variation in personality, as well as one not 
often considered by cultural psychologists: economic behaviour in the public goods 
game. The focus is not so much on in-depth analyses of these dimensions but rather 
on qualitative connections between them. The second part of the chapter discusses 
some recent hypotheses for the origin of culturally variable cognition. In order to 
develop good evolutionary hypotheses, I argue that we need a wider view of the 
whole of human culture, with emphasis on temporal changes, more so than further 
analysis and differentiating between dimensions. 
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Across the globe there is much variability in human psychology. Variability 
between individuals is readily noticeable: everyone knows someone chattier and 
someone less chatty than themselves. But variability exists also on a societal level, 
where people belonging to that society commonly understand the local variant, but 
not outsiders. For instance in not all societies do people feel it is morally right to 
make a profit when lending out money, or feel uncomfortable with silence in social 
situations. Understanding where the variation comes from is of vital importance if 
we want to understand our evolution; how the human species got to its current state, 
where it is going next, and more importantly: how we can make sure that the future 
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state is one where the whole of humanity is at a high and stable level of well-being. 
For this goal we need to learn the ramifications of changing parts of the system: 
analogous to how using DDT as insecticide caused detrimental changes in places of 
the ecosystem that we did not expect,1 tweaking some parts of culture through social 
policies and political intervention may, without us realising it, cause unwanted side-
effects. 
The first stage of inquiry into cultural psychology, that of observing 
phenomena, has reached maturity and has given us a wealth of global data on a wide 
range of psychological constructs (Heine & Norenzayan, 2006). However, merely 
describing the differences between cultures has not led us to answer the questions as 
to why these differences exist at all (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006), which is the goal of 
the second stage of inquiry. For the second stage to proceed we need to first 
understand which of the hitherto observed constructs overlap, find the most 
parsimonious way (i.e. using the smallest number of variables) in which the 
observed cultural differences can be accurately described (Heine & Norenzayan, 
2006), and to find the patterns in cultural differences; the way different variables 
interact. Then stage two can be fruitfully advanced through incorporating 
evolutionary theory derived from biology (Mesoudi, 2011). 
The particular branch of evolutionary theory that is appropriate here is 
“cultural evolution” (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981), 
which contends that cultural change constitutes a Darwinian evolutionary process 
that shares fundamental features with genetic evolution (although also differs in key 
aspects). Consequently, many of the same concepts, tools and methods that 
evolutionary biologists use to study genetic evolution can, and have, been used to 
                                                                
1 Rachel Carson – Silent Spring, 1962 
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improve understanding of cultural change and diversity (Mesoudi, 2011). For many 
aspects of cultural evolution great advances are already being made, for example in 
material culture (arrow heads, Mesoudi & O'Brien, 2008; textile weaving; Tehrani, 
Collard, & Shennan, 2010); languages (Atkinson, Meade, Venditti, Greenhill, & 
Pagel, 2008); social organisation (Currie, Greenhill, Gray, Hasegawa, & Mace, 
2010); and cultural practices such as consuming milk (Holden & Mace, 1997). 
Cultural evolutionary theory seems ideally suited to contribute to the second 
“explanatory” stage of cultural psychology, given that evolutionary theory is geared 
to answering “why” questions: why did a particular trait (genetic or cultural) emerge, 
why did it spread, and how can past selective and non-selective forces explain 
current distributions of traits (genetic or cultural)? 
Cultural psychology, however, seems to be lagging behind in this goal of 
explaining, as well as describing, patterns of behaviour, as have other branches of 
psychology (van de Vijver & Leung, 2000). Possibly this is because the subject 
matter of psychology – internal cognition – is relatively intangible. Whereas material 
culture leaves artifacts (e.g. arrowheads), and even language often leaves written 
records, cognition does not generally leave traces and therefore is more difficult to 
reconstruct in hindsight. Furthermore, the nature of the between-society variation of 
psychological traits is not the same as that of the more tangible aspects of culture. 
Knowledge of tool use and language for example are acquired skills: they require a 
learning period and variants are not likely to spontaneously emerge in the individual. 
Conversely, in general people will naturally have access to different variants of 
cultural psychological traits but learn that some variants are socially more acceptable 
than others. This distinction makes the boundaries of cultural psychological traits 
much less clear than for cultural artifacts, complicating the study of their evolution. 
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The common method of quantifying psychological traits is through 
approximation via questionnaires with Likert-scales, which has been a successful 
approach. However, for comparing traits between societies this method has been 
criticised because people compare themselves to different outsiders whilst filling out 
their questionnaire (the reference group effect; Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 
2002), and because people respond differently to scales (e.g. Chen, Lee, & 
Stevenson, 1995). Despite its flaws the questionnaire has nevertheless been an 
invaluable tool to uncover extensive cultural variation (e.g. the World Values 
Survey, 2006).  
Encouragingly, over the last few years there has been a rise of more direct 
measuring of culturally variable cognition with eye tracking studies (e.g. Goh, et al., 
2010) and neuroscience techniques (e.g. Chiao, Harada, et al., 2010; Jenkins, Yang, 
Goh, Hong, & Park, 2010). Another promising development is the study of proxies 
for these constructs in the form of cultural artefacts (Lamoreaux & Morling, 2012; 
Masuda, Gonzalez, Kwan, & Nisbett, 2008), which observe the result of culturally 
variable cognition displayed in the natural environment instead of the lab. These last 
methods in particular may provide invaluable data for reconstructing past cultural 
variation in cognition, and addressing ultimate cultural evolutionary hypotheses. 
With the goal in mind of fostering greater integration between the fields of 
cross-cultural psychology and cultural evolution, the first part of this chapter 
discusses relationships between some major themes of human cognition, traits and 
behaviours that vary across the world. The goal is not to be exhaustive (there are 
many reviews on these individual topics) but to see what gaps in the research still 
exist before we can apply evolutionary theory to culturally variable cognition. For 
this goal I will include cultural psychology, personality and economic behaviour. I 
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feel justified in taking all these factors into account since synthesis in some form or 
another is called for by psychologists, biologists and economists alike (Ariely & 
Norton, 2007; Gintis, 2007; Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland, 2006; Wilson, 1998). The 
second part of this chapter discusses several of the current hypotheses for the 
emergence of the globally variable cognitions described, and the last part gives 
recommendations for future research, several of which are pursued in the rest of the 
thesis. 
2.3 LINKS BETWEEN CULTURALLY VARIABLE COGNITIONS, TRAITS AND 
BEHAVIOURS 
Psychologists and other social scientists have been trying to reduce the 
number of variables found in the huge complex field of cultural constructs (Georgas, 
van de Vijver, & Berry, 2004). The links between a few cultural dimensions have 
been indicated before (Triandis, 1989), but the exercise is due renewal. Here I 
discuss a few prominent culturally divergent constructs, and the links between them. 
2.3.1 Analytic and holistic cognition 
Numerous studies have shown there are strong differences in perception and 
thinking styles between Western and East Asian societies (Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; 
Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). People from Western societies 
preferentially use analytic cognition which includes focusing on categories and 
elements, while people in East Asian societies use a holistic cognition and are more 
attentive towards context and relationships. Differences in analytic and holistic mode 
of thought have been found in many laboratory studies. One example of a laboratory 
test for cognitive mode is the rod-and-frame task (e.g. Witkin & Goodenough, 
1977), in which a participant is asked to rotate a rod surrounded by a frame until it is 
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vertical. The frame is tilted itself, which will lead field-dependent, holistic people to 
misjudge the angle of the rod, but field-independent, analytic people are not 
influenced by the surrounding frame. Chinese participants doing this test made more 
errors than American participants, indicating they were more field-dependent and 
thus more holistic than the Americans (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000). Another test 
which shows distinctions in cognitive mode is the change blindness task. 
Participants are shown two almost identical pictures in sequence the second of which 
has only a slight difference with the first. In one test (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006) 
Americans noticed changes in the focal object faster than changes in the background, 
while East Asians noticed changes in the background faster than Americans. East 
Asians did not differentiate between changes in focal or background objects. These 
results indicate that East Asians were more attentive to the context, or more holistic, 
than were Americans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A categorisation task using pictures, to distinguish reasoning 
styles (Markman & Hutchinson, 1984). Participants are asked: “Which 
does cow belong with: chicken or grass?”. If the answer is chicken, the 
participant has used taxonomic reasoning by thinking of the category 
‘animals’, which reflects an analytic mind set. The grouping of cow with 
grass is a thematic choice (cow eats grass) which is a mark of a holistic 
thought. Based on Ji, Zhang and Nisbett (2004). 
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Other examples include the categorisation task (Figure 1), the framed-line 
test (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003), attention to focal object vs. 
background in pictures (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005; Kuwabara & Smith, 2012; 
Masuda, et al., 2008; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), detection of co-variation (Ji, et al., 
2000) and rule- versus exemplar-based category learning (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, 
& Nisbett, 2002). 
Thinking styles do not only differ between Western and East Asian 
participants, but also between other societies. Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama and 
Nisbett (2010) review that Russians and Croats are more holistic than Americans, 
and Germans are more analytic than Russians. Hunter gatherers have been found to 
be more analytic than farmers (Witkin and Berry, 1975 in Witkin & Goodenough, 
1981). Groups within societies can also differ in cognitive style. For instance in one 
Turkish region herders were found to use a more analytic mode of thought than 
farmers from the same region (Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008). When comparing 
Jewish boys from Orthodox or secular backgrounds, the former were found to be 
more field-dependent than the latter (Dershowitz, 1971 in Nisbett, 2003). These 
findings indicate that being dependent on the group influences cognitive style and 
makes one more field-dependent or holistic, while being socially independent goes 
together with independent cognition in general (Nisbett, 2003). 
These findings cannot be taken to mean that all people in these societies are 
equally holistic or analytic, or that their use of cognitive mode for one thing indicates 
they will use the same mode for something else. When Na et al. (2010) gave 
participants a battery of laboratory tests, it was found that individuals showed little 
between-task agreement. It was also found that one group’s mean might be higher 
than the mean from another group, but this does not mean that each individual from 
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the first group also scores higher than each individual from the second group (to 
assume so would be to commit the ‘ecological fallacy’). There can be considerable 
overlap (Na, et al., 2010). 
Neither should the societal levels of analytic or holistic mode of thought be 
taken to mean that people in the same instance consistently use one mode of thought 
rather than another. In one experiment (Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006), 
participants were primed with photographs of New York and Tokyo, after which 
they were asked to do a change blindness test. Both Americans and East Asians 
reported more changes in background after seeing New York street scenes than after 
pictures from Tokyo. The difference between the two cities was the amount of 
contextual information in the pictures: New York street scenes were less complex 
and ambiguous than Tokyo street scenes, showing that i) a person’s mode of thought 
is not a stable trait but can be changed, and ii) the environment can prime people 
towards one mode of thought rather than another (Miyamoto, et al., 2006). Another 
priming study confirmed this using a method to increase or decrease people’s sense 
of power (Miyamoto & Ji, 2011). Participants were asked to write down a personal 
event in which they had successfully influenced another person (increased power), or 
one in which they adjusted to the wishes of another person (decreased power). 
Participants primed for increased power were found to become more analytic, and 
participants in the decreased power condition were found to become more holistic 
(Miyamoto & Ji, 2011). Language has an effect as well. Among bilingual people Ji, 
Zhang and Nisbett (2004) found that people who think in both languages have access 
to both cognitive styles: if they are tested in English they are more analytic than if 
they are tested in Chinese. A prerequisite for this effect is how much both languages 
are integral to the test subjects’ thought process. If a language is too unfamiliar the 
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person will translate to their mother tongue, bypassing the effect of language (Ji, et 
al., 2004). 
An important factor in individual-level cognitive style is socioeconomic 
status (SES), which is an indicator for a person’s level of education, income, control 
over resources and subsequent constraints (e.g. Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000). In 
subjective psychological terms it is marked by a feeling of power (Miyamoto & Ji, 
2011). In a within-society test people with high SES were observed to have an 
analytic mode of thought (Na, et al., 2010). Miyamoto and Ji (2011) showed that this 
correlation is mediated by feeling of power. They argue that people who feel 
powerful have the capacity to disregard irrelevant information, i.e. focus on subject 
instead of context. 
2.3.2 Tightness/looseness 
Recently another cultural dimension has been brought back to the forefront of 
cultural psychology: the dimension of tightness-looseness (Chan, Gelfand, Triandis, 
& Tzeng, 1996; Gelfand, 2012). This dimension describes how strict societal norms 
are, and how strongly people are expected to adhere to these norms. In tight societies 
the rules are clear and there is low tolerance of deviation, for which harsh 
punishment is incurred, while in loose societies there is either an unclear norm or 
people are sanctioned less for deviating from the norm (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 
2006). These societal differences were first observed in agricultural (farming and 
herding) societies on the one hand and hunter/gatherer societies on the other hand, 
where the former were found to be tighter than the latter (Barry, Child, & Bacon, 
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1959).2 The presence of tightness in both farming and herding societies was thought 
to be an effect of the time delay between the daily necessities of caring for the food 
stock and the eventual yield of that stock, in order to ensure a food supply far into 
the future. Therefore members of the society should eschew individual innovation, 
since there was no way of knowing the outcome and risking a famine was too 
dangerous. On the other hand, hunting and fishing peoples relied solely on the day’s 
work for their food supply on that same day, which means individuals taking 
initiative did not risk much, and stood the chance of a high reward for their 
innovation. Indeed, child rearing practices were in line with these expectations 
across 104 societies with a range of subsistence methods (Barry, et al., 1959). 
Recently a large-scale study showed differences in tightness/looseness for 33 
countries (Gelfand, et al., 2011). Nearly 7000 participants were asked to respond to a 
tightness/looseness scale which asked questions on strictness of social norms on a 6 
point Likert-scale (ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree). Questions 
were, for example, “There are many social norms that people are supposed to abide 
by in this country”, or “In this country, if someone acts in an inappropriate way, 
others will strongly disapprove”. Participants also rated a set of 12 behaviours (e.g. 
laugh, kiss, eat) for appropriateness across 15 situations (e.g. classroom, funeral 
ceremony, public park), and were asked questions such as “to what extent does the 
situation require that people monitor their own behaviour or ‘watch what they do’?”. 
The results gave a scale of countries ranging from Ukraine being the loosest society, 
and Pakistan the tightest. Western societies scored intermediate on this scale.  
                                                                
2 Often the work of Pelto (1968) is cited as the forebear of contemporary research into tightness/looseness, but 
definitions of what marks a tight or loose society are markedly different. Pelto’s criteria were concrete, e.g. 
communal ownership of economic resources, central rule, taxation, theocracy, etc. He wrote that criteria like 
“deviant behaviour is easily tolerated” were too vague. 
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Investigating their 33 country scores on this dimension for a range of 
historical and ecological factors (controlling for GNP3), Gelfand et al. (2011) found 
positive correlations between tightness and population densities in 1500 and 2000, 
territorial threat from their neighbours during the period 1918–2001, historical 
prevalence of pathogens, contemporary food deprivation, lower protein supply, more 
natural disasters, and higher infant and child mortality. Also found were positive 
correlations between tightness and autocratic rule that suppresses dissent, less open 
media, fewer political rights and civil liberties, more police per capita, and less 
crime. As expected based on conceptual unrelatedness, there was no statistical 
relationship with GNP. 
Even though in general we may expect some within-country similarities 
because of shared institutions, politics, language and shared narratives (Hofstede, 
2001), again we find some within-country differences. When comparing two cities in 
the USA, Protestant-founded traditional Boston and Spanish-settled progressive San 
Francisco, it was found that Bostonians scored significantly higher in tightness than 
San Franciscans (Plaut, Markus, Treadway, & Fu, 2012). 
One factor that has been suggested as a cause for tightness/looseness is 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of the population (Triandis, 1989). Compare for 
instance Japan which is tight, with Thailand which is loose. Japan is an island, 
isolating it from other areas and thus having a homogenous population. Because of 
the homogeneity inhabitants may expect each other to know and understand the rules 
and abide by them, resulting in tightness. On the other hand Thailand lies in an area 
that feels the pull between major cultures India and China. Therefore people from 
Thailand have had to learn to tolerate different people with different ideas, making it 
                                                                
3 GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is roughly the total value added by all residents in the country. GNP (Gross 
National Product, renamed GNI) is roughly the total value added by all residents of the country plus that of 
nationals abroad. (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
PATTERNS IN CULTURALLY VARIABLE COGNITION 
26 
 
a heterogeneous and thus loose society. The differences between tight Boston and 
loose San Francisco support this idea: San Francisco has a much higher immigrant 
population than Boston does, which makes San Francisco less homogenous and less 
tight than Boston (Plaut, et al., 2012). 
 Tightness/looseness and analytic/holistic cognition 
There is no clear conceptual relationship between tightness/looseness and the 
analytic/holistic mode of thought discussed in the previous section. Gelfand et al. 
(2006) discuss the pioneering works of Berry (1966; 1967) among others, who found 
that children in societies with strict discipline were more field-dependent (holistic) 
than children in societies with loose child-rearing practices. However, it is not 
specifically discussed how work on field-(in)dependence relates to 
tightness/looseness. These constructs seem conceptually unrelated. 
2.3.3 Hofstede’s multi-dimensional model 
The two previous sections described dimensions that aimed to account for 
some human cultural variation in cognition and behaviour, but there have been 
several efforts to encapsulate all human cognitive and behavioural variation in just a 
few dimensions. One of the most influential attempts is Hofstede’s model (Hofstede, 
2001; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). A social psychologist working in the 
field of organisational studies and management, Hofstede based his model on 
approximately 90,000 questionnaires from respondents at all job levels of IBM, a 
global technology and consulting business. This data from over 70 countries led 
Hofstede to originally distinguish 4 dimensions: individualism/collectivism (IDV), 
uncertainty avoidance (UAI), power distance (PD) and masculinity (Mas). Later 
additions were long-term orientation (LTO) and indulgence versus restraint (IVR) 
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(Hofstede, et al., 2010), which have not yet been much used in the literature and 
shall therefore not be discussed here. 
Of these dimensions, IDV has been by far the most researched (Taras, 
Kirkman, & Steel, 2010). Hofstede defined it as follows: “Individualism stands for a 
society in which the ties between individuals are loose: Everyone is expected to look 
after him/herself and her/his immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a 
society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-
groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty.” (Hofstede, 2001; p. 225). This can be rephrased as a focus on 
the self in individualism, versus a focus on the group in collectivism (Berry, 
Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002). The group in question can be family, where 
collectivists are more likely for instance to live with and take care of elderly parents 
than individualists, but it can also be country or the organisation where one works. In 
individualistic countries people move companies more easily than in collectivistic 
countries, and are hired to a greater extent based on previous performance. In 
collectivistic countries it is more important how many years of education one has 
and also who one knows: business is done with people who one has a personal bond 
with, and is less based on contracts. People in individualistic societies also do not 
shy away from confrontational arguments and speak their mind relatively freely, 
while in collectivistic cultures people would rather maintain harmony by not 
disagreeing with each other, and save face by being seen to honour their social 
responsibilities (for a meta-analysis on IDV, see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 
2002). 
IDV has been most inspiring to researchers, and in comparison the other 
three dimensions have been neglected. This is a problem because UAI, PD and Mas 
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also explain a great deal of cultural variation (Lamoreaux & Morling, 2012; Taras, et 
al., 2010) and there have been calls for more attention to these dimensions (Kirkman, 
Lowe, & Gibson, 2006; Tsui, Nifadkar, & Yi Ou, 2007). 
UAI, the second dimension, describes “The extent to which the members of a 
culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations” (Hofstede, 2001, pp. 
161). People in countries with high UAI experience greater anxiety when not 
knowing what a situation entails, or when not knowing the future, than people in 
countries with low UAI. This explains the greater need for rules, rituals and 
moralism which are social constructs that negate these anxieties. High UAI is also 
paired with a stronger belief in absolute truth, and a lower tolerance for breaking the 
rules. UAI should not be confused with risk avoidance, since one might be faced 
with a risky situation that is still very clear and not ambiguous. 
The third dimension, PD, has to do with sensitivity to authority: “The extent 
to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a 
country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 2001, pp. 
98). In countries with high PD there are large gaps between ranks in the hierarchy, 
with large differences in power, wealth and privileges. Another more descriptive 
definition is: “The power distance between a boss B and a subordinate S in a 
hierarchy is the difference between the extent to which B can determine the 
behaviour of S and the extent to which S can determine the behaviour of B.” 
(Mulder, 1977 in Hofstede, 2001 p 83). One aspect of PD should not be confused 
with UAI: in high UAI countries people respect the rules, while in high PD countries 
people respect the boss. 
The fourth dimension is Mas, with extremes Masculinity and Femininity. A 
masculine society is one where “emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are 
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supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success, whereas women 
are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. A 
society is called feminine when emotional gender roles overlap: both men and 
women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.” 
(Hofstede, et al., 2010, pp. 140). The Mas dimension is also expressed in valuing 
assertiveness and excellence over modesty and not bragging (through being 
average). In the Netherlands several sayings illustrate the extreme Femininity of the 
country: “don’t stick your head out above the mowing plane”, “high trees catch a lot 
of wind”, or “just be normal, that’s crazy enough”, meaning those who stick out get 
cut off. One is not supposed to strive for excellence or high status, because this is 
seen as arrogant. People vote for the underdog in talent shows, and for the politician 
who looks like “a normal guy”. 
Hofstede’s model has been much criticised (e.g. Ailon, 2008; Kitayama, 
2002; McSweeney, 2002; for an early review of reviews, see Søndergaard, 1994) but 
overall has been largely validated and proven useful (Jones, 2007; Kirkman, et al., 
2006; Taras, et al., 2010). There are other models using different dimensions of 
culture, also based on questionnaires, for example those of Schwartz (1994) and 
Inglehart (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Inglehart’s model should be 
highlighted since he investigated change through time in his dimensions, and 
therefore is important. Using data from the World Values Survey for 65 societies, 
Inglehart found two major dimensions: traditional vs. secular-rational and survival 
vs. self-expression (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The first dimension is characterised by 
such items as: “Respondent has a strong sense of national pride”, and “God is very 
important in respondent’s life”. People scoring high on these questions are 
traditional, people scoring low are secular-rational. The second dimension has items 
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like: “Respondent has not signed and would not sign a petition”, and “Respondent 
gives priority to economic and physical security over self-expression and quality of 
life”. People scoring high on these questions emphasise survival, and low-scorers 
emphasise self-expression. Inglehart (1971) found that societies can change in some 
respects and that economic growth and GNP have a large influence on these changes. 
Nevertheless, countries are bound by their past, and the amount and direction of 
change are influenced by history (Inglehart, 1997). Five world-regions (with flexible 
boundaries) were distinguished based on these factors: Protestant, Roman Catholic, 
Orthodox, Confucian and Communist, and sometimes Islamic is added. 
Although Inglehart’s model has given interesting insights into the role of 
economy on cultural values, the two dimensions seem to be very broad and not 
specific. Furthermore Hofstede’s model has been pervasive throughout social 
research, for example in personality studies (van Hemert, van de Vijver, Poortinga, 
& Georgas, 2002), health psychology (Rudmin, Ferrada-Noli, & Skolbekken, 2003), 
business studies (Morris, Davis, & Allene, 1994), advertising (Han & Shavitt, 1994), 
group creativity (Goncalo & Staw, 2006) and happiness research (Rego & Cunha, 
2009). It also has data for the largest number of countries; therefore I have used 
Hofstede’s model throughout the rest of the thesis. 
As also found in the previously discussed constructs of analytic/holistic 
cognitive mode and tightness/looseness, the level of IDV is not an immovably stable 
trait. People can be primed for IDV, for instance with the pronoun-circling task 
(Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999). In this task participants are asked to read a piece of 
text and circle all pronouns (I, he, we, etc.). Two versions of the same text are used, 
one with only singular pronouns, and one with only plural pronouns. Participants 
given the first text are afterwards more individualistic, while participants given the 
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plural pronoun text become more collectivistic (for a meta-analysis, see Oyserman & 
Lee, 2008). 
Further evidence comes from migration studies. Families who have migrated 
to another country take over their host country’s values slowly over time: after a few 
generations there are no discernible differences between migrants and the local 
population (Heine, 2008). As commonly found among Asian people, Japanese 
people living in Japan score very low on self-esteem, much lower than Westerners. 
Asian people who have just moved to Canada score higher than Japanese living in 
Japan. Second generation Asian-Canadians score a little higher, and third generation 
people score as high as European-Canadians (Heine & Lehman, 2004). There is also 
a developmentally sensitive time for learning culture (Minoura, 1992). Japanese 
children who moved to the US before the age of 9 felt American, those who moved 
between the ages of 9 and 15 felt both Japanese and American, and those who moved 
after 15 always felt Japanese. Among Chinese who immigrated to Canada a similar 
effect of age was found (Cheung, Chudek, & Heine, 2011): if immigration took place 
before the age of 14.5, participants felt they identified with Canadian culture much 
more than if they had immigrated at an older age. 
Both the priming and migration studies show that a person’s cultural style is 
most likely not entirely genetically encoded (though genetic differences may 
contribute, see section 2.4.3) but mostly formed through a developmental period. 
Furthermore, people will be continuously primed for the country’s level of IDV 
through the physical products one encounters in daily life, such as magazine adverts 
(Han & Shavitt, 1994) or school textbooks (Imada, 2012). Indeed, cultural 
dimensions can be detected more strongly in cultural artefacts than in participant 
responses in laboratory tasks (Lamoreaux & Morling, 2012; Morling & Lamoreaux, 
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2008). There is also the possibility that a country’s GDP, if it results in money being 
easily available leads to higher IDV because the mere mention of money primes 
people for independence (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). 
As Inglehart (1971) already noted, economy has a large influence on culture. 
Recently these findings have been updated (Tang & Koveos, 2008). It was found that 
GDP has curvilinear relationships with IDV and PD, where IDV is high for low GDP 
countries, then decreases at intermediate GDP, and then increases again to high 
values at high GDP. The inverse is true for PD. This is thought to be due to effects of 
income inequality, ecological patterns and savings within the country. These 
dimensions change over time for a country: as GDP for a country goes up, the 
culture’s sense of group vs. individual, and strictness of hierarchy change too. UAI 
and Mas however do not have strong relationships with GDP but rather with more 
stable features of society (Tang & Koveos, 2008). The importance of IDV for GDP 
is concurred in other reports: looking at Hofstede’s and Schwartz’ model, and 
relevant items of the WVS, it was found that IDV and dimensions closely related to 
IDV have a positive effect on GDP (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2011). This IDV-
centred cluster consists of Hofstede’s PD; Schwartz’ affective and intellectual 
autonomy, egalitarianism, and to a lesser extent embeddedness; and WVS’ ‘trust’ 
and ‘tolerance’ items, which are all correlated with IDV, and none of these 
dimensions have as robust an effect as IDV does. The only dimension that has an 
effect but is not related to IDV is UAI, which has an enhancing effect when 
combined with IDV (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2011). On an individual-level it was 
found that people with higher SES also have increased IDV and Mas, and decreased 
UAI and PD (Steel & Taras, 2010). 
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Correlations within the model 
Worldwide, PD correlates negatively with IDV (Hofstede, 2001), meaning 
individualistic countries are mostly egalitarian, while collectivistic countries are 
more likely to have despotic rule. This may be a consequence of measuring modern 
societies since Aborigines were thought to have a high PD and high IDV (Hofstede, 
et al., 2010). In Western countries UAI correlates positively with PD (people in 
authoritarian countries do not tolerate ambiguity very well), but this is not the case in 
the rest of the world (but Aborigines were thought to also have high UAI, with high 
PD) (Hofstede, et al., 2010). 
IDV and analytic/holistic cognition 
Some researchers have assumed that analytic and holistic modes of thought 
are similar to individualism and collectivism (Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008), 
although until recently Nisbett and colleagues steered clear from this link (Nisbett, et 
al., 2001). They did repeatedly argue that analytic and holistic modes were closely 
related to self-construal (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Nisbett, et al., 
2001), which in the West is independent, meaning people view themselves as 
separate from the group, whereas in East Asia self-construal is interdependent, 
meaning people see themselves as part of the group (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
Priming experiments showed the possibility of this connection: priming for self-
construal influenced analytic/holistic mode of thought (Kühnen, Hannover, & 
Schubert, 2001; Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002), and also individualism/collectivism 
(Gardner, et al., 1999). Recently this link has been made explicitly (Ishii, 2013), 
arguing that analytic and holistic modes of thought, and individualism and 
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collectivism both stem from independent and interdependent self-construal which 
promotes low-contextual vs. high contextual communication styles.4 
IDV and tightness/looseness 
A connecting factor between IDV and tightness/looseness might be 
conformity. Tightness has been considered to be very closely related or even 
identical to conformity as measured with Asch’s line judgement task (Berry, 1967). 
However, Gelfand et al. (2006) argue conformity is an outcome of tightness, and is 
not the same construct. Conformity has been shown to correlate negatively with 
individualism (Bond & Smith, 1996), but tightness is only moderately negatively 
(but significantly) correlated to individualism and therefore both constructs are 
argued to be distinct dimensions (Gelfand, et al., 2011 supporting material). Triandis 
makes the argument on conceptual grounds: “collectivism = common fate, limited 
resources that must be divided in order to survive; tightness = cultural homogeneity, 
isolation from external cultural influences” (Triandis, 1989, p 511), though both 
definitions include structural elements of society that have not definitively been 
proven to be related to the terms. Tightness also shows a moderately positive 
significant correlation with PD but no relation to UAI or Mas (Gelfand, et al., 2011 
supporting material). 
The link between tightness/looseness and IDV might also be made via self-
construal. Through subjective content analysis of academic texts on 16 cultures (e.g. 
Hokkien Taiwan, Lozi, Kurds and highland Scots), focusing on tightness/looseness, 
collectivism and self-construal, Carpenter (2000) found a strong positive correlation 
between collectivism and interdependent self-construal, a weak just-significant 
                                                                
4 Note then when investigating self-construal and cognitive style on an individual level, no correlation between 
the two was found (Na, et al., 2010). 
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correlation between tightness and collectivism, and a trend in tightness and 
interdependent self-construal. Because of the subjective nature of her approach we 
cannot put too much confidence in these correlations, but they do show that IDV, 
self-construal and tightness might be part of a loosely interconnected whole. 
Arguably the most logical relationship that tightness/looseness has on other 
cultural dimensions is that variation around the norm within a society will be smaller 
in tight cultures and larger in loose cultures. For this reason, Taras et al. (2010) 
found significantly stronger effects of Hofstede’s cultural value dimensions on 
behavioural outcomes in tighter rather than looser countries, where larger effect sizes 
indicate less individual deviation from the mean. 
2.3.4 Personality differences 
The next factor that I will describe is that of personality. Although not 
traditionally considered a cultural dimension, personality has been shown to vary 
across cultures (see below). Understanding personality in a cultural context is also 
important because of the on-going discussion as to what extent groups of people 
make culture, or culture makes people (Church, 2010). Most scholars ascribe a 
stronger impact of culture on individual behaviour than vice versa, and consider 
culture to be not just the mean of characteristics of its individuals (Terracciano, et 
al., 2005). From the field of economic games we already know that group behaviour 
is not always just a scaling up of individual behaviour. When groups are competing 
with each other, group decisions tend to be more selfish and less trusting than when 
individuals are competing (Wildschut & Insko, 2007). Group composition in terms 
of personalities also plays an important role in the type of group decisions (e.g. 
Gächter & Christian, 2005). The question of how micro-level social processes link to 
macro-level social processes is one that should be investigated (Mesoudi, 2009). 
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Personality is defined as a set of dispositional traits: relatively consistent 
tendencies and temperaments that are biologically based, and are variations within 
the range of evolved universal human nature. A person with a certain personality in a 
certain culture will then develop characteristic adaptations to the cultural 
environment to navigate life and social relations (Church, 2010). 
The set of dispositional traits measured in the Five Factor Model has been the 
most successful way of studying personality and has led to a plethora of data. The 
Big Five for short, consists of the factors Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness 
to experience, Neuroticism and Agreeableness (McCrae & Costa, 1987). A much 
used free alternative is the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg, et al., 
2006), which is equivalent to the original test (Gow, Whiteman, Pattie, & Deary, 
2005; Lim & Ployhart, 2006; Mõttus, Pullmann, & Allik, 2006). Extraversion stands 
for how much attention from others one likes to attract (sample statement: “I am the 
life of the party”). Conscientiousness is the level of organisation and attention to 
detail one puts forth (“I am always prepared”). Intellect/Imagination (called 
Openness to experience in the Big Five test) is curiosity or the level of complexity 
one likes (“I have a rich vocabulary”). Emotional Stability (called Neuroticism in the 
Big Five test) indicates how prone one is to negative moods and emotions (“I get 
stressed out easily”), and finally, Agreeableness means how much one is willing to 
accommodate others (“I sympathize with others’ feelings”). 
These factors are usually measured by self-questionnaire, which may be 
criticised for leading to biases if people tend to see themselves as socially preferable 
personality types. Other criticism includes that it is based on questionnaires which 
suffer from reference-group effects, meaning people fill out the questionnaires while 
comparing themselves to different others (Heine, et al., 2002), or that personality 
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factors developed in Western countries do not translate to factors in other parts of the 
world (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis & Suh, 2002). 
However, the internal structure of the model holds up when questionnaires 
from 26 countries are compared (McCrae, 2001), indicating that people’s 
personalities are indeed accurately described by the Big Five dimensions. Further 
evidence comes from questionnaires filled out for other people, which results in the 
same structure as when questionnaires are filled out for the self (McCrae, 
Terracciano, & 78 members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005b). 
Twin studies have shown that personality is approximately 40–60% heritable, 
suggesting that a large part of variation in personality is the result of developmental 
and life history effects. The Big Five model has also been found to result in parallel 
sex-differences across cultures, with women on average scoring higher on 
Agreeableness and Neuroticism then men (Costa, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001) and 
similar age differences where people’s Conscientiousness increases, Neuroticism and 
Extraversion decreases, and sometimes Agreeableness increases with age across 
different cultures (McCrae, et al., 2000), regardless of cohort differences in history 
and situation. 
Personality and cultural dimensions 
As already mentioned, mean scores for personality have been found to differ 
across societies (Schmitt, Allik, McCrae, & Benet-Martínez, 2007). In a large-scale 
study involving almost 18,000 individuals from 56 countries – and 78 researchers – 
it was found that people from the main world regions scored significantly different 
from one another. For instance, Asians scored exceptionally low on Extraversion and 
South Americans scored somewhat lower than other regions. People from Africa 
scored high and from East Asia low on both Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. 
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For Neuroticism it is the other way around, where Africans scored very low and East 
Asians very high. For Openness to experience East Asia and Africa scored very low 
while South America scored higher than others. 
These measures correlate to country-level scores for Hofstede’s cultural 
model. Hofstede and McCrae (2004) found that IDV correlates positively with 
Extraversion; PD correlates negatively with Extraversion and Openness to 
experience, and positively with Conscientiousness; Mas correlates positively with 
Openness and Neuroticism, and negatively with Agreeableness; and UAI correlates 
positively with neuroticism and negatively with Agreeableness (Hofstede & McCrae, 
2004). 
There is also a link between SES and personality. Though not often 
investigated for its own sake, many health and life-outcome studies control for either 
SES or personality when investigating the other factor (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, 
Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007), which indicates a likely relationship between the factors. 
One study that expressly reported relations found that in the upper quartile of SES 
personality measures showed relatively high ratings for Conscientiousness, and in 
decreasing order of magnitude Extraversion, Openness, Neuroticism, to the lowest, 
Agreeableness, and approximately the reverse is found for the lower quartile of SES, 
i.e. highest scores on Neuroticism, then Agreeableness, Extraversion, Openness and 
last, low Conscientiousness (Chapman, Fiscella, Kawachi, & Duberstein, 2010). The 
same main relationship between high Neuroticism and low SES was found in 
another study, where SES was measured in three factors: occupational status, 
education and income (Jokela & Keltikangas-Järvinen, 2011). The common pattern 
seems to be that low SES often occurs together with negative affect (Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). 
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There are alternative models of personality, for example Cloninger’s 4 
dimensions of temperament and 3 dimensions of character which do not differ much 
from the Big Five model (De Fruyt, Van De Wiele, & Van Heeringen, 2000). More 
recently a six-factor model (HEXACO) was developed which is based on adjectives 
describing characteristics of personality in 7 different languages (Ashton, et al., 
2004). This model has the same factors for Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and 
Openness as does the Big Five model, but differs in how traits of pro-social 
behaviour are factored. Both models have advantages: the Cloninger model may be 
more useful than the Big Five model for doing comparative psychology research, 
and the HEXACO model may be better for understanding language effects on 
cultural differences in personality composition, but since most research is done with 
the Big Five questionnaires and both models show striking similarities to the Big 
Five model, I have used this model in this thesis. 
2.3.5 Public Goods Game variation  
Although usually not considered by cross-cultural psychologists, another 
form of culturally variable behaviour is found in economic experiments which aim to 
measure people’s propensity for cooperation. A staple of these experiments is the 
Public Goods Game (PGG), which is devised to recreate the circumstances of a 
group which collectively owns a commodity (e.g. Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). In 
order to make maximum use of the commodity the group members have to 
individually practice restraint so as not to exhaust it and give it time to replenish 
after each use. The group is then at the risk of being duped by members who over-
use the commodity for their own benefits. In the experiment a small group of people 
are given individual endowments. Each participant decides whether or not to put 
some or all of their endowment into a group-owned pot. The experimenter multiplies 
PATTERNS IN CULTURALLY VARIABLE COGNITION 
40 
 
what is in the pot by a certain factor and divides the results among all players, 
irrespective of their contributions. Players therefore receive both their equal share of 
the group pot, as well as whatever portion (if any) of the individual endowment that 
they chose not to put into the group pot (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). 
Through mathematical analysis using the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950) it is 
found that the dominant strategy should be to contribute nothing, since if everyone 
plays this strategy no player should unilaterally change their own strategy (Hardin, 
1971). Therefore keeping the endowment for oneself is the safest option, plus one 
has the chance to receive additional money from the pot. By that logic no rational 
person should contribute, thus the pot should remain empty and no one should 
increase their initial endowment. However, this is not the Pareto-optimal strategy, 
which would be for everyone to contribute since that would mean each individual 
earns more than if all participants play the safe strategy (Hardin, 1971). 
In real life both of these outcomes of group behaviour can be found. For 
instance environmental problems could be seen as instances of PGGs played 
rationally: individuals avoid the short term cost of responsibly disposing their waste 
or investing in green energy, which leads to the pollution and exhaustion of our 
environment for which the whole population will pay the price (Hardin, 1968; 
Milinski, Semmann, Krambeck, & Marotzke, 2006). In other real life situations 
people have found ways to counteract the individual temptations and work 
collectively towards a greater benefit for all (Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992). 
The question of why in some cases humans overcome the free-rider problem and in 
other cases they do not, has been extensively researched in the laboratory. 
Generally it is found that participants start off contributing between 40 and 
60% of their endowment (Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995). This is not according to 
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either mathematically predicted strategy but most likely due to some norm or 
expectation derived from the framing of the experiment or the social norms the 
players have learned in real life (Binmore & Shaked, 2010; Henrich, et al., 2005). In 
repeated games cooperation gradually breaks down until eventually 90% of the 
participants fail to contribute (Ledyard, 1995). Break down of cooperation can be 
staved off with varying success and duration through different additions to the game: 
e.g. communication, (Bochet, Page, & Putterman, 2006), reputation 
building(Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002), and group norm establishment 
(Baum, Paciotti, Richerson, Lubell, & McElreath, 2012; Chaudhuri, Graziano, & 
Maitra, 2006). Playing against new people every round (Keser & Van Winden, 2000) 
and pure anonymity where people do not see each other both result in less 
cooperation (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Lamba & Mace, 2010). Interestingly, when 
players know they will play a long game of 60 or 40 rounds, the decline of 
cooperation slows down so that the start and end points are similar to when players 
know the game will last 10 rounds, yet the absolute amount that is withheld per 
round is less (Isaac, Walker, & Williams, 1994). This suggests players do strategise 
in some way. 
Often punishment is offered as a solution to the free-riding problem in the 
PGG (Ostrom, et al., 1992; Yamagishi, 1986). In a PGG with punishment each 
player sees individualised but anonymous data on how much contribution each group 
member made after the group pot is distributed. Then they can choose to pay some of 
their money (in the form of monetary units used in the game) towards punishing one 
or more of their group members. The amount punishers put in is multiplied by a 
certain amount before it is subtracted from the punishee’s account (Fehr & Gächter, 
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2000, 2002). Usually this leads to high and stable levels of cooperation (Balliet, 
Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011).5 
It is important to note that when the PGG is expanded with punishment, the 
game is qualitatively changed and a new Nash equilibrium is now to fully contribute 
to the public pot (Binmore & Shaked, 2010). The same goes for including rewards 
for cooperating (Milinski & Rockenbach, 2012): the monetary incentives in the game 
are changed and the rational solutions change with it. In these cases participants in 
the laboratory still only have one factor to maximise: money. However, when other 
elements are introduced to the PGG, like communication for example, there are two 
factors to maximise: money and social relations. Usually a psychological term is 
used to explain this effect, such as social norms, or morality, inequity aversion, or 
the “warm glow” of giving (see Chaudhuri, 2011). In fact, it might be more in line 
with economic game theory and evolutionary biology to see it as the choice to 
maximise social relations, instead of money. Maximising social relations makes 
biological sense: social relations are at the heart of our species (Richerson & Boyd, 
1999), more so than in other gregarious primate species (Tomasello, 2010). In fact, 
chimpanzees seem not to maximise social relations at all, only seeking benefit to 
themselves in terms of food items (Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007). Of course the 
                                                                
5 The role of punishment in the evolution of the human-typical strong, wide-spread cooperation is still hotly 
debated (Hilbe & Traulsen, 2012; e.g. Powers, Taylor, & Bryson, 2012; Rand, Armao Iv, Nakamaru, & Ohtsuki, 
2010; for a review see Sigmund, 2007). It is usually thought that punishment must have evolved in order for 
widespread cooperation to exist. However, the idea that cooperation cannot evolve in a world of selfish 
individuals comes from analytical models, where often researchers who do not include structure (space or social 
networks) in their models find that individuals who cooperate or punish suffer detrimental fitness consequences, 
thus leaving the world full of free-riders. Importantly, researchers who do include space find that cooperation can 
evolve (Boerlijst & Hogeweg, 1991; Nowak & Highfield, 2011). In a social network model, Rand, Arbesman and 
Christakis (2011) show that if groups are held constant or are shuffled at random cooperation breaks down, but if 
individuals get to choose who to work with (reconnecting in the network) cooperation remains high. Effectively 
this leads to creating loners, individuals who do not contribute to or receive anything from the pot (Brandt, 
Hauert, & Sigmund, 2006; Fowler, 2005). In real life it might be more cost-effective to punish by exclusion 
rather than punish at a cost, and indeed it has been found that hunter/gatherers do not punish much, they just 
switch partners (Baumard, 2010). Laboratory PGG experiments show that free-riders may lead to people exiting 
the group (Yamagishi, 1988). The threat of exclusion from the group (Cinyabuguma, Page, & Putterman, 2006) 
or even negative feedback (Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, & Villeval, 2003) leads low contributors to increase their 
contributions. These findings suggest the possibility that the evolution of cooperation is not completely 
dependent on costly punishment, and at least part of it could evolve through punishment by social exclusion. 
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PGG in the laboratory is not the same as it is in real life where we see constant 
evidence of contributions to public goods (Ostrom, 2000). Indeed, if we understand 
that in real life it is not only money being maximised but other things that are 
important to different people (comfort, health, social relations, time) we can see why 
the game is again different, and again analysis would predict different strategies.  
PGG and cultural dimensions 
As already mentioned, behaviour in the PGG may be influenced by the 
cultural background of the participants, particularly when participants have no 
previous experience of the PGG (Binmore & Shaked, 2010; Henrich, et al., 2005). 
When dividing up 16 subject pools into Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) 6 cultural 
regions, Gächter, Herrmann and Thöni (2010) found significant differences in 
contributions in the PGG without punishment (Figure 2). Without punishment, all 
contributions decline, except for those in Athens, and in Arabic speaking cities 
Muscat and Riyadh. The pattern holds up when punishment is introduced: 
contributions rise significantly higher than in the non-punishment condition, yet no 
increase is observed in Muscat and Riyadh, Athens and also Istanbul (the latter two 
are both in the southern European cultural region). The authors offer no explanation 
for where these differences come from, but merely note that they exist. 
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Figure 2: Cross-cultural differences in contributions in the PGG without 
(N-condition) and with (P-condition) punishment. Cultural regions are 
Inglehart & Baker’s (2000) regions. From: (Gächter, et al., 2010) 
Further cultural differences in the PGG have also been found with other 
countries. Participants from Colombia contributed on average a little more than 
participants from Vietnam, but both countries showed equal numbers of conditional 
co-operators (see below), and fewer free-riders than in Western societies 
(Martinsson, Pham-Khanh, & Villegas-Palacio, 2013). British participants 
contributed significantly more than Italian participants (Finocchiaro Castro, 2008). 
Comparing people from the US and Czech Republic it was found that Czechs 
contribute significantly more to the pot than Americans do (Anderson, DiTraglia, & 
Gerlach, 2011). Another finding was that Russians contributed significantly less than 
Swiss people, punished more (including anti-social punishment, which is the 
punishing of people who contribute, Cinyabuguma, et al., 2006) and expected to be 
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punished more (Gächter & Herrmann, 2009). This finding was verified for a large 
Russian participant pool including young and old participants (Gächter & Herrmann, 
2011). In this PGG, average contributions to the pot were slightly lower than was 
found in earlier studies. Interestingly, including punishment did not increase 
contributions, because next to punishing of free-riders participants also substantially 
engaged in anti-social punishment, older participants more so than young ones 
(Gächter & Herrmann, 2011). Again, these differences might not only exist between, 
but also within societies. Within the city of Cape Town, South Africa, large 
differences in contribution and punishment behaviours were found between students 
from white and black secondary schools, and the level of punishment was strongly 
related to the level of trust (Kocher, Martinsson, & Visser, 2012). 
As already briefly mentioned, one interesting behaviour that varies cross-
culturally is anti-social punishment, which is the punishing of people who behave 
cooperatively (Cinyabuguma, et al., 2006; Nikiforakis, 2008). Usually these are low-
contributors retaliating against high-contributors who have punished them earlier in 
the game. This seems to have a detrimental effect: groups with more anti-social 
punishment consequently contributed less to the group pot, leading to lower profits 
for the players. In a large-scale study, anti-social punishment was found to vary 
strongly across societies, more so than punishment of free-riding (Herrmann, Thöni, 
& Gächter, 2008). It was also found that anti-social punishment, but not punishment 
of free-riders, correlated negatively to IDV, Mas, GDP, Trust (totals of WVS 
questions such as “most people can be trusted”), and Civic Duty (total of WVS 
questions such as “cheating on taxes if you have a chance”). Anti-social punishment 
increased with PD and UAI (Herrmann, et al., 2008, supporting material). 
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Behaviour in the PGG has not only been investigated in modern societies but 
also in small-scale ones such as the pastoralist Orma and the crop farming 
Machiguenga (e.g. Henrich, et al., 2005). In a one-round set-up it was found that in 
five out of six small-scale societies individuals contributed much more than 
expected, while students in Michigan mostly did not contribute (as is usually the 
case in large-scale societies, Henrich, et al., 2005). A recent study of the fishing and 
reindeer-herding peoples in Kamchatka, Russia, found extraordinarily high 
contributions: 97% of endowments was contributed to the public pot (Gerkey, 2013). 
In the only large-scale within society study to date, namely of 16 villages of one 
Central Indian peoples, it was found that variation in contributions was just as large 
as previously found between societies, and was mostly dependent on demography 
(Lamba & Mace, 2011). 
PGG and personality 
Despite groups mostly behaving in predictable patterns varying with game 
set-up, participants preferentially use individually differing strategies while playing 
the PGG (Kurzban & Houser, 2005). The strategies most often observed are 
cooperation (fully contributing), defection (free-riding) and conditional cooperation: 
contributing approximately as much as group members or a little less. By far the 
majority of people play the conditional cooperation strategy (Fischbacher, Gächter, 
& Fehr, 2001; Isaac, et al., 1994). Participants choose to do this both in hypothetical 
cases and in actual games where they can earn money (Chaudhuri, 2011). The group 
composition of people who play these different strategies has a strong impact on the 
outcome of the game (Gächter & Christian, 2005): when a group has no free-riders 
full cooperation can be sustained even without any additions to the PGG (Kurzban & 
Houser, 2005). 
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With people consistently choosing the same strategy it would make sense that 
their personalities are also consistent. Indeed some effects of personality have been 
found. For instance, high Machiavellian people consistently contribute slightly less 
than their group members, and earn more than low Machiavellian people (Czibor & 
Bereczkei, 2012). Machiavellian people are characterised by being rational, self-
interested and manipulative, and their game play is argued to be led by a strong 
monitoring of other’s play behaviour in the group. This concurs with the finding that 
people who are high self-monitoring are more likely to be conditional co-operators 
than people who are low self-monitors (Kurzban & Houser, 2001), as has been found 
for the same game with only two people (Boone, De Brabander, & van 
Witteloostuijn, 1999). 
In terms of the Five Factor Model, it would be reasonable to expect that 
people high in Agreeableness and Extraversion would be high co-operators, while 
Neurotic people would be low co-operators (Kurzban & Houser, 2001). Since high 
Machiavellian people score low on Agreeableness and Conscientiousness (Paulhus 
& Williams, 2002) we could also expect these correlations. In one repeated measures 
experiment it was found that participants who (mostly) played the conditional 
cooperation strategy, scored significantly higher in Agreeableness than participants 
who (mostly) played the free-riding strategy. There were no differences for any of 
the other personality dimensions. Furthermore, participant’s preference for a strategy 
was stable over a time period of 5 months (Volk, Thöni, & Ruigrok, 2011, 2012). 
Hilbig, Zettler, & Heydasch (2012) showed that the personality factors 
Honesty-Humility and – to a lesser extent – Agreeableness correlate positively with 
contributions. These two factors are part of the personality model HEXACO (see 
section 2.3.4) and the two factors are together comparative to Agreeableness in the 
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Five Factor model by McCrae and Costa (1987). Moreover, these participants were 
high contributors in both punishment and non-punishment conditions. A picture is 
starting to emerge that Agreeableness, or the propensity to accommodate rather than 
antagonise, is a strong predictor for contributions in the PGG. 
A small number of studies have investigated personality differences when it 
comes to punishment behaviour. In a study using a hypothetical scenario based on a 
PGG, it was found that participants’ Agreeableness correlated negatively with anger 
towards the transgressor, a desire to punish, a desire for a high penalty and the 
willingness to pay a fee for punishment of the transgressor. Other personality 
dimensions correlated with only one or two of these factors, and people with low 
Agreeableness had the strongest motivation to punish (Roberts, Vakirtzis, 
Kristjansdottir, & Havlicek, 2013).6 
2.3.6 Conclusion: Relationships between dimensions and gaps 
Here I have reviewed some major domains in culturally variable cognition, 
traits and behaviour, and explored links between these domains. Some factors seem 
to cluster together, such as high IDV, low PD, high analytic cognitive mode, and 
looseness of norm following (connected through independent self-construal). 
Interesting connections to this cluster might also be high GDP, high SES and low 
anti-social punishment in the PGG. Another interesting group of factors surrounds 
high Agreeableness, which may be a fruitful avenue for further research. These 
factors are high contributions and low punishment in the PGG, and low UAI and 
Mas. These clusters may be interesting starting points for investigating the 
possibility of synthesis among dimensions. A summary can be found in Table 1.  
                                                                
6 Though this is an interesting finding, note that the internal consistency of the personality questionnaire’s 
Cronbach α’s were very low (between .11 and .67). Considering both the inconsistency of the very short 
questionnaire (2 questions per item) and the set-up of the experiment using a cover story instead of a real PGG, 
this study is worth repeating with improvements. 
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Table 1: Links between culturally diverging human cognitions, traits and 
behaviours. 
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2.4 THEORIES FOR THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURALLY VARIABLE 
COGNITION 
In this section I will discuss several hypotheses for the evolution of some of 
the described cultural dimensions. It is not in itself very remarkable that differences 
between human societies do exist, since other species have differences between 
populations as well; chimpanzees (van de Waal & Whiten, 2012), goats (Briefer & 
McElligott, 2012), etc. Traits in any large group consisting of evolving parts – which 
do not move around too much – would be expected to eventually end up showing 
localised differences just by chance, comparable to genetic diversity as a result of 
isolation-by-distance (Novembre, et al., 2008; Rosenberg, et al., 2005). However, the 
cultural variation documented in the previous sections appears to exhibit at least 
some degree of structure and systematic patterning, beyond that expected purely by 
chance. In this section I discuss three hypotheses that have been proposed for the 
origin of cultural differences: the ecocultural hypothesis, the parasite-threat 
hypothesis and the ecological variability hypothesis. First I will describe the different 
processes which may play a part in the evolution of culture. Findings are discussed 
in the concluding section. 
2.4.1 Possible explanations for cultural differences 
Cultural differences between human societies could be underpinned by 
several processes: they may be caused by genetic differences between populations, 
they may be evoked by the environment in which that society lives, they may be the 
result of cultural transmission and evolution, or they may result from a mix of one or 
more of these processes. 
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Genetic basis for cultural differences 
One argument for genes being the basis for cultural differences might be that 
genes for culturally diverging traits have been found. For instance, there is a 
polymorphic region of the serotonin transporter gene, 5-HTTLPR, that has a short 
(S) or a long (L) allele version that is linked to elements of negative affect (e.g. 
Caspi, et al., 2003; Gonda, et al., 2006; Munafo, Brown, & Hariri, 2009; Sen, 
Burmeister, & Ghosh, 2004). Carriers of the L allele have been found to focus on 
positive affective information and selectively ignore negative information, while S 
carriers tend to focus on the negative information (Fox, Ridgewell, & Ashwin, 
2009). The distribution of these alleles has been found to vary across the world: there 
are more S allele carriers in East Asia than in Western countries (Gelernter, 
Kranzler, & Cubells, 1997; Nakamura, et al., 1997), giving rise to a field of research 
investigating the connection between this gene and others, and cultural constructs 
such as individualism and collectivism (Chiao, Hariri, et al., 2010; Way & 
Lieberman, 2010). 
However, despite genetic differences between cultures, studies on 
immigration show that people can adjust given enough time, or crucially, the right 
timing. As discussed in section 2.3.3, three generations are enough for families to 
assimilate into the host culture (Heine & Lehman, 2004). The period of 
developmental sensitivity for learning culture is also evidence against a genetic basis 
for cultural differences: children can adjust well to their host culture if they 
immigrated before the age of 15, and even better if they immigrated before the age of 
9 (Cheung, et al., 2011; Minoura, 1992). 
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Environment + individual learning 
Cultural differences could also be individual responses to the environment or 
ecology that a person finds themselves in. The assumption is that an individual 
learns appropriate behaviour through association, which will vary under different 
conditions. No distinction between non-social and social learning is made (Mesoudi, 
2011). The learning responses to which individuals have access are assumed to be 
encoded genetically, and different environmental conditions evoke different 
genetically encoded responses. Individuals share phenotypic plasticity that has itself 
evolved genetically. Cultural differences then arise because of different 
environments, which shape the population’s phenotypic responses in different ways 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Tooby and Cosmides use the analogy of a jukebox to 
illustrate this idea of ‘evoked culture’. Imagine several identical jukeboxes each 
playing a different song in response to different ‘environmental’ inputs (the different 
people who chose different songs). Each jukebox is theoretically capable of playing 
any song in its repertoire (analogous to an individual’s genetic repertoire of all 
possible behaviours), but variation is generated because of different environmental 
inputs triggering different pre-encoded inputs. 
Even if we ignore the complex question of what constitutes the 
‘environment’ in modern societies – ecology, SES, the technosphere – at a minimum 
this hypothesis predicts that small-scale populations that live in close connection to 
their ecology are predicted to exhibit these varying phenotypic responses to different 
environmental conditions. As it happens, they do not: even within the same 
environment, two populations can develop completely different cultural traits 
(Hewlett, De Silvestri, & Guglielmino, 2002), while populations that live in 
completely different environments can have similar cultures, such as Brits and 
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Australians. Individual learning in response to environmental conditions cannot be 
the only explanation to differing cultures (Mesoudi, 2011) although they may play a 
role (Nettle, 2009). 
Cultural evolution 
Like genomes, culture evolves: it has the prerequisites of variation, selection 
and inheritance (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland, 2004). Cultural evolution can be 
studied through understanding the micro-level processes of cultural transmission 
(who copies what from whom), mutation (how novel traits emerge) and selection 
(why certain traits are favoured over other traits) and connecting these micro-level 
processes to macro-level patterns in time and space (Mesoudi, 2011). For example, 
the pathway that transmission takes is important for the speed of change for the 
cultural trait. Vertical transmission (from parent to offspring) will lead to slow 
changes, if any, while horizontal transmission (learning from others of the same 
generation) can lead to fads and fashions (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). Also 
the cognitive biases humans display when learning information can shape cultural 
evolution. For instance, people copy traits and behaviours of prestigious individuals 
more readily than of others (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), as is evident in advertising 
using celebrities (Stallen, et al., 2010). Besides a bias for who to learn from, there 
can also be a bias for what to learn: people transmit social information like gossip 
more easily than non-social information, e.g. the spread of fire in a dry environment 
(Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006). Cultural transmission biases such as these are 
often studied under controlled conditions in the lab, allowing researchers to precisely 
measure and quantify those biases (e.g. Caldwell & Millen, 2008; Kempe, Lycett, & 
Mesoudi, 2012). 
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Macroevolutionary patterns are studied by adapting evolutionary methods 
from biology and adjusting them for cultural studies. For instance, phylogenetic 
methods that biologists use to study speciation, in cultural studies can be used to 
reconstruct the evolution of cultural artefacts, languages and behavioural practices. 
For instance, using phylogenetic analysis it was found that it is much more likely for 
a cattle-keeping society to be patrilineal than matrilineal, indicating a connection 
between the two traits (Holden & Mace, 2003). Other studies have used phylogenetic 
methods to reconstruct the evolutionary histories of languages (Pagel, 2009) and 
projectile technology (O'Brien, Darwent, & Lyman, 2001). 
Gene-culture co-evolution 
In a mix of some of the above, gene-culture coevolution, or dual inheritance 
theory, posits that human genes and cultures both influence each other. Natural 
selection may lead to different cultures emerging in different ecosystems; 
conversely, culture may modify or generate selection pressures on genes, and thus 
drive genetic evolution (Laland & Brown, 2002). 
The most famous result of the field is that of the co-evolution of dairy 
farming and lactose tolerance, where it was found that the cultural trait of rearing 
cattle for dairy emerged first, which then gave rise to the spread of the human gene 
for digesting lactose second, not the other way around as was previously thought 
(Holden & Mace, 1997). Recently a large number of genes that have recently 
undergone rapid evolution have been implicated for gene-culture co-evolution 
(Laland, Odling-Smee, & Myles, 2010). Among the functions of these genes are 
alcohol metabolism, pathogen response, hot or cold tolerance, and brain function and 
development. 
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Although it is not always necessary to strictly adhere to one or another of 
these schools of thought on the potential origins of cultural variation, it is useful in 
understanding implicit assumptions when thinking about the evolution of culturally 
variable cognitions. 
2.4.2 The ecocultural hypothesis 
The ecocultural hypothesis concerns the question of how Western and East 
Asian cultures came to differ in analytic and holistic modes of thinking. The 
hypothesis states that contemporary modes of thought have their origin in social 
systems in culturally ancestral societies reinforcing independence of the self from 
others (ancient Greece) or interdependence of the self with others (ancient China; 
Nisbett, 2003). Specifically, ancient China had fertile grounds which favoured 
agriculture. This requires people to be sedentary and form strong bonds within their 
community, especially where concerted farming was necessary. Additionally, parts 
of China needed collectively maintained irrigation systems which were under 
centralised rule. These factors led Chinese people to focus on the group and 
relationships: a holistic mode of thought. The mountains of ancient Greece, on the 
other hand, did not lend themselves to agriculture, so hunting, herding, fishing and 
trade7 were the means of acquiring subsistence. No strong cooperation was required 
for these activities, leading the Greeks to focus on separate objects and categories: an 
analytic cognition. The analytic and holistic modes of thought then persisted 
throughout the ages from ancient Greece to contemporary Western societies and 
from ancient China to contemporary East Asian societies. Besides these reasons 
Nisbett also states that it might not necessesarily be ecology that determines 
cognition, but that in fact modern entrepreneurship might well give rise to an 
                                                                
7 “(and -let’s be frank- piracy)” (Nisbett, 2003, p.34) 
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analytic mode, while a close-knit religious community would foster holism. Other 
types of work that require people to be independent should also should lead to 
analyticism, as evidenced by hunter-gatherers and people in industrial societies who 
indeed are more analytical than farming peoples (Nisbett, 2003, p. 43). In fact, 
Nisbett writes, towards the end of the Middle Ages, farming activities in Europe 
increased which arguably may have made people more holistic until about the 15th 
century when trade brought on a renewed age of individualism (Nisbett, 2003).8 
This hypothesis is a descendent of an earlier hypothesis regarding cognitive 
styles, in which analyticism and holism are called field-independent and field-
dependent cognition, respectively (e.g. Witkin & Goodenough, 1977, 1981). Witkin 
and Goodenough (1981) argued that farming societies would have stronger 
conformity, and would therefore be more field dependent (holistic), because “stress 
on conformity discourages the development of separate autonomous functioning” 
(pp. 89). Their argument was based on the observation that in general 
hunter/gatherers were nomadic, consumed their food immediately, had loose societal 
rules,9 relatively few social roles, and little centralised authority. For farmers it was 
observed that they were sedentary, had tight rules, many social roles and centralized 
authority, because there was a vital need to regulate people’s food intake to ensure 
there was enough food left between harvest seasons. Therefore the child-rearing 
practices in hunter/gatherer societies were focused on autonomy and self-reliance, 
while those in farming societies were focused on obedience and compliance. Many 
studies found the same for subsistence societies (Berry, 1966; Berry, 1967). Much 
                                                                
8 Recently Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama, & Nisbett (2010) have argued against inheritance of cognitive styles 
from Aristotle or Confucius, but since this is one single paper among many we continue to investigate the 
ecocultural hypothesis. 
9 Witkin & Goodenough (1981) make an explicit link to Pelto’s (1968) study, and incorporate tightness/looseness 
into their theory: sedentary farming → tightness → conformity → field-dependence. Contemporary scientist 
Michele Gelfand who works on tightness/looseness mentions field-(in)dependence in only one paper without 
making explicitly clear how she sees the relation (Gelfand, et al., 2006), and does not discuss analyticism/holism 
anywhere else, to the best of my knowledge. 
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evidence was also found for the link between societal style and cognitive style: 
hunter/gatherers were found to have a field-independent (analytic) style, while 
agricultural groups were found to have a field-dependent (holistic) style (Witkin & 
Goodenough, 1981). More supporting evidence comes from a contemporary study: 
in one region in Turkey it was found that solitary working herders were more 
analytic (field-independent) than cooperatively working farmers and fishermen 
(Uskul, et al., 2008). 
The hypotheses developed for subsistence peoples were not meant for 
modern societies, even though many instances in modern societies had been found 
where there was a link between societal pressure to conform and field-dependency or 
holism (e.g. between Mexican and American children, Mexican-American and 
Anglo-American adults, or Israeli Jews of Middle-Eastern or Western heritage). 
However, unlike Nisbett (2003), Witkin and Goodenough (1981) made especially 
clear that they thought in modern societies the driving factor is the recent level of 
conformity, and not the ancestral niche in the ecosystem. They also note that “A 
common finding in [non-subsistence level groups] is that the experience of education 
is related to field independence, particularly as manifested in cognitive restructuring 
skills. … We have another indication here that particular training experiences may 
contribute to the development of field independence” (Witkin & Goodenough, 1981, 
footnote 6, p. 96). It is clear that in the cognitive mode of modern societies, Witkin 
and colleagues ascribed a large role to child-rearing practices. 
Therefore, it seems that Nisbett’s major contribution to the theory was the 
idea that cognitive style developed while a society was still subsistence based, and 
then transmitted intact through the ages until the present modern society. This can 
probably be seen as a mix of evoked culture and cultural evolution (see Section 
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2.4.1), where initial differences arise as responses to subsistence or social structure, 
and are then transmitted down generations via cultural transmission. It is slightly 
unclear what Nisbett sees as the method of transmission, but most probably he would 
assign it to cultural systems of thought; Confucianism in East Asia and Greek 
philosophy in Europe (and consequently the Americas and Australia). The 
assumption then is that the transmission of cognitive style for over 2000 years has 
been relatively stable, with continuity of cognitive style from ancient Greece and 
ancient China to the present day West and East respectively. However, the 
assumption of continuity has not been tested, while if it were to be disproven it 
would have great consequences for our understanding of human cultural variability. 
As such it is due for rigorous investigation. 
2.4.3 The pathogen-stress hypothesis 
Recently a new theory for the evolution of individualism and collectivism has 
been proposed, based on pathogen-stress (Fincher & Thornhill, 2012; Murray, 
Schaller, & Suedfeld, 2013; Thornhill, Fincher, & Aran, 2009). Proponents of this 
hypothesis argue that the propensity of humans to avoid pathogens leads to in-group 
assortative sociality. This includes strong emphasis on bonds with (extended) family 
and commitment to a religion, while avoiding members of the out-group 
(xenophobia) who may harbour novel pathogens to which one does not have 
immunity. When investigating 98 countries for pathogen load (Fincher, Thornhill, 
Murray, & Schaller, 2008), it was found the prevalence of 9 different pathogens 
(leishmanias, trypanosomes, malaria, schistosomes, filariae, leprosy, dengue, typhus 
and tuberculosis) correlated negatively with individualism and positively with 
collectivism. The historical prevalence of these pathogens showed the same pattern 
(except for tuberculosis for which there was no historical data, therefore the authors 
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substituted with contemporary data). Because the correlation also exists with 
historical pathogen prevalence, it is concluded that past pathogen threat has selected 
for a more in-group focused, out-group shy cultural style: collectivism. The authors 
suspect that humans have evolved a developmental plasticity for the level of 
individualism or collectivism which is cued by the pathogen load encountered in the 
environment (Fincher, et al., 2008). This would therefore be an example of evoked 
culture (see Section 2.4.1). 
Chiao and Blizinsky (2010) propose a genetic basis for the link between 
pathogen-threat and individualism/collectivism: that of the serotonin transporter gene 
(5-HTTLPR) introduced in section 2.4.1. The authors’ hypothesis is that the S allele 
for the gene and collectivism co-evolved in response to increased pathogen-threat. A 
positive relationship was found between S-allele prevalence and collectivism (but 
none of the other dimensions from Hofstede’s model), but these two factors correlate 
negatively with anxiety and mood disorders as reported by the World Health 
Organisation. The authors conclude that collectivism must be an ‘anti-psychopathy’ 
buffer against the negative effects of the S-allele. This can be seen as a case of gene-
culture coevolution (see Section 2.4.1), with the cultural trait of collectivism 
responding to genetic variation in serotonin transporter function. 
The pathogen prevalence hypothesis is based on the well-researched 
behavioural immune system, for which there exists strong evidence in both humans 
(e.g. Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003) and other species (e.g. Evans, et al., 2006). 
The behavioural immune system is an evolved adaptive mechanism to avoid disease 
from pathogens, consisting of the emotion of disgust and management behaviour or 
hygiene (reviewed in Schaller & Park, 2011). In humans it is old (Curtis, 2007) and 
universal (Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 2004; Curtis, de Barra, & Aunger, 2011). 
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Nevertheless, there are differences between individuals: participants scoring high on 
Extraversion and Openness to experience scored low on germ aversion (Duncan, 
Schaller, & Park, 2009), and societies that historically have had low levels of the 9 
pathogens described above also had higher mean levels of Extraversion and 
Openness (Schaller & Murray, 2008). 
Priming experiments have shown that being cued for pathogens activates the 
behavioural immune system, and results in avoidance behaviour of others that seem 
anomalous, including people who are disabled, obese, elderly or even foreign 
(reviewed in Schaller & Park, 2011). When people’s immune system is temporarily 
suppressed, their ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes increase, also temporarily. 
These findings suggest that the behavioural immune system is flexible, and not 
static. 
Therefore for a social structure which allows individuals to interact with in-
group members and exclude out-group members to evolve primarily due to parasite 
stress, this would have to be based on the priming effects, and on not being able to 
discern in a stranger anomalies that are just because of the unfamiliarity of the face, 
or anomalies because of illness. This could have led to a collectivist social system 
that was passed down through the generations, and while still in a pathogen rich 
environment, it would retain its adaptive function. However, if at some point there 
are no longer cues of parasites in the daily environments of people – because of 
improved health care, infrastructure, or hygiene regulation – given the demonstrated 
flexibility of the behavioural immune system, collectivism could potentially switch 
to individualism. If cultures do change over time, then is should be made explicitly 
clear over which period in history the historical pathogen load is measured, since that 
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would be of vital importance to the hypothesis. To the best of my knowledge a time 
period is not reported in the papers (Fincher, et al., 2008; Murray & Schaller, 2010). 
If change over time is possible (which is the case if indeed humans have 
developmental plasticity for individualism or collectivism cued by pathogen load in 
the environment, Fincher, et al., 2008), then that environment in contemporary 
Western countries would be one of high GDP, and thus good health care and 
hygienic environment. The unique effect of GDP on collectivism that was found in 
addition to the unique effect of parasite stress (Fincher, et al., 2008) should then be 
given more weight than it is at the moment. The cognitive mechanism would be easy 
to account for: people in high GDP countries do not have to be so fearful of 
infections, and thus of out-group members, because they know that if they get ill, the 
high quality medical care in their country can probably cure them. 
Furthermore, the causality of the relationships is not established, and could 
be in the opposite direction of what proponents of the theory suggest. Recently it was 
found that social stress in female macaques influenced gene expression of their 
immune system (Tung, et al., 2012). When the hierarchy of the macaques was 
experimentally manipulated, it was found that their immune system response 
predicted with 80% accuracy what their rank in the test group was. This means that 
social stress may cause increased susceptibility to pathogens, while it was 
traditionally thought to be the other way around – that disease-prone individuals 
would end up low in the hierarchy (Tung, et al., 2012). For the pathogen-hypothesis 
theory this could imply that a strong focus on the group, humility and service - or for 
that matter a strict (as opposed to flexible) social hierarchy in which there are many 
subordinates, may have come first (collectivism), and the increased activation of the 
behavioural immune system followed. 
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2.4.4 Cultural adaptations to environmental variability 
The last hypothesis I will discuss here is based on ecological differences, 
combined with cultural evolutionary theory (Chang, et al., 2011). This hypothesis 
proposes that during the Pleistocene and earlier, in the East African rift valley where 
humans evolved, genetic evolution drove the development of human cognition. After 
the migration out of Africa, when humans colonised the globe, cultural evolution 
started to play a role in matching behaviour to these new environments and cultural 
differences like the ones we see today emerged. 
Human cognition as it evolved early in the history of our species can be 
described as being in two systems (though this is a shorthand; in reality things are 
more complex). System 1 is automatic, fast, intuitive and effortless while system 2 is 
slow, monitoring, controlling and effortful. The first is good for ducking a ball, the 
second for solving maths equations (Kahneman, 2011). Chang et al. (2011) argue 
that in stable environments system 1 is selected for, and modules of dedicated 
intelligence will arise, while in variable environments more plasticity is required 
which favours system 2 and leads to higher generalised intelligence. The Pleistocene 
saw increasing climatic variability which had evolutionary consequences for the 
fauna, and gave rise to the human species (deMenocal, 2004) with system 2 
cognitive abilities. 
After leaving Africa, the human species spread across the globe, 
encountering environments that varied in their variability. At low latitudes (close to 
the equator) the amount of sunlight hitting the Earth’s surface is stable throughout 
the year, but because of the Earth’s tilted axis yearly variability in sunlight increases 
with latitude which causes temperature changes over the year. Therefore, Europe 
which lies between 36 to 63 degrees latitude has more seasonality, thus a more 
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variable climate, than China at 18 to 45 degrees. This means that Europe’s rainfall 
and temperature are more variable and have more extremes than in China, but it also 
has resulted in a higher occurrence of ice and snowstorms, earthquakes, and severe 
winters. 
In highly variable environments it is adaptive to use individual learning, 
while in stable environments people should use social learning. Because individual 
learning comes at a cost due to trial and error, social learning in a stable environment 
will secure the right information to be learned at a lower cost. In a variable 
environment information learned from others can be outdated because the 
environment has changed, so a little trial and error might lead to better results 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005). This is what happens at the individual level (McElreath, 
et al., 2005; Mesoudi, 2008) and the group level (Henrich & Boyd, 1998). Therefore, 
based on their environments alone, Europeans would be expected to have developed 
preferences for individual learning while Chinese would be expected to prefer social 
learning. 
Chang et al. (2011) demonstrate that variability can be found both in 
environment and in the realm of social interaction. Politically, China has had a 
centralised government for much longer than Europe. Migration has been higher in 
Europe than in China due to ever-changing frontier zones and commercial trade 
freedom. Both the frequency and duration of warfare has been higher in Europe than 
in China. Methods of acquiring subsistence also differ between Europe and China: 
China has more agriculture than Europe, both in percentage of the population and in 
character (responsibility is shared among the family). Europe on the other hand has 
more trade and division of labour, and agriculture quickly became a trade as well. 
Chang et al. (2011) further discuss pathogen load as an environmental factor that can 
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lead to differing cultures. In stable environments more pathogens are able to survive 
than in variable environments. Consequently, pathogen load is inversely related to 
latitude and thus higher in China than in Europe. Pathogen threat from the 
environment may be an independent drive for social as opposed to individual 
learning, because trial-and-error entails too much risk of illness or death. 
The differences in variability being ubiquitous, the effects have influenced 
other related areas of cognition as well. Derived from social vs. individual learning, 
two self-systems have emerged: dependent and independent self-construal. The 
cultural differences in individual traits and social systems feed back into each other 
and have co-evolved. Chang et al. (2011) conclude by saying that cultures will 
continue to be influenced by environmental change versus stability, but that with the 
onset of global sharing of information cultures will probably become more similar. 
2.4.5 Conclusions 
All three hypotheses described above are more or less based on the ecological 
niche human populations inhabited at some point in time. In the ecocultural and the 
parasite-threat hypotheses timescales are not clearly defined which makes it difficult 
to establish origins and rates of change, which in the environmental variability 
hypothesis is better explained, though still not clearly enough. The ecocultural 
hypothesis is purely based on individual learning in the local environment, and the 
question of transmission of the learned constructs after leaving the environment is 
largely neglected. The pathogen threat hypothesis suggests a plastic genetic basis for 
dealing with an environmental factor, and is unclear about what is meant by 
‘historical’. Chiao and Blizinsky seem to suggest a genetic basis for collectivism, 
which is selected for by pathogen stress. The ecological variability hypothesis takes 
care to explain both the origin and continued cueing of cultural mode in appropriate 
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time scales, and explicitly mentions a feedback process between individuals and 
social system, thus avoiding the problem of pre- and post-modern societies. 
However, none of the hypotheses involve populations other than those from 
the West and East Asia. Admittedly, Western cultures have been quite dominant in at 
least the last few centuries or so, and East Asian cultures are very different from our 
own, so that this contrast piques interest is to be expected. Nevertheless, African and 
Arabic societies are also very old and have very interesting features, which could be 
enormously informative. That psychological studies neglect these populations is 
understandable given the difficulty of finding experimental subjects. However, when 
it comes to developing evolutionary theories more care should be taken to account 
for the whole of the human species, not just a few populations (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the first two hypotheses, developed by Western 
scientists, analysed and focused on a single cause with a linear process, while the 
Hong Kong based scientists developed a holistic approach that included feedback 
between individuals and social systems.  
2.5 POINTS OF CONSIDERATION FOR MOVING FORWARD  
Discussion of the present work 
In this effort I have left some often discussed general limitations in the 
respective literatures to the end, because they apply to all hypotheses. For instance, 
the ecological fallacy: the problem of extrapolating from group traits to individual 
traits. Sometimes constructs correspond between the level of the individual and the 
group, such as personality in terms of the Big Five and IQ (aggregate properties), but 
sometimes the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (emergent properties) (Na, et 
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al., 2010). This problem can be circumvented if we take care to use the appropriate 
measure at each level of research. For instance, when investigating interactions 
between nations, using country-level differences suffice (e.g. cultural artefact data). 
But when we look at national policies we need within-country measures for different 
bands of SES and other cultural sublevels. For aggregate properties mapping 
findings from one level to the next could be easy (personalities found in student 
populations predict means of societies, given intrinsic maturation and SES effects) 
but for emergent properties this will be more difficult. It might be possible to learn 
how to take existing data from questionnaires and map findings onto other levels 
through investigating the emergent effects of interaction patterns on the lower level. 
 
Despite some omissions, I believe the study of the diversity of human 
cultures benefits from the synthetic approach presented in this chapter. By 
investigating broad connections between different lines of research we might be able 
to find the underlying variables and greatly reduce the number of parameters we 
have to work with when making models of human cultural behaviour. While this 
approach would not be appropriate for studies at a finer level, for the goal of 
investigating the species as a whole it is necessary to take a distant vantage point. 
Considering cross-cultural psychology 
In the first part of this chapter many links were found, though some tentative 
by being based on conceptual comparison only. Most links have been established 
through correlational analysis only but since they conceptually also make sense they 
are worth investigation. The most salient cluster consists of high IDV, low PD, high 
analytic cognitive mode, and looseness of norm following (connected through 
independent self-construal), high GDP, high SES and low anti-social punishment in 
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the PGG. Another interesting group that might be a second cluster is high 
Agreeableness, high contributions and low punishment in the PGG, and low UAI 
and Mas. 
Often researchers claim that their dimension is different from another 
dimension, usually on statistical grounds. However, since most dimensions are tested 
with questionnaires asking different questions, phrased in different ways and tested 
on different populations, it cannot be ruled out that some questionnaires are tapping 
into the same underlying construct. It is possible that different pictures have been 
formed because the object of investigation has been held up to the light in different 
angles. As discussed in the introduction, there is a need for unity in the social 
sciences, which includes taking an evolutionary approach. For cultural psychology to 
enter stage 2 and discover why cultural variation exists in its present state (Heine & 
Norenzayan, 2006), more robust and rigorous hypothesis building is necessary. 
Considering evolutionary hypotheses for human culture 
In the second part of this chapter different evolutionary hypotheses for the 
origin and persistence of cultural variation in cognition were discussed. The common 
argument was that differing cultures constitute responses to differing ecosystems. 
One problem is that the question of timescales is not appropriately addressed. How 
long did it take for humans to develop responses to different ecologies, and how 
were cultural traits transmitted throughout human history up to the present? How 
flexible and changeable are cultures? These questions have to be answered if a solid 
theory for the evolution of cultural differences is to be developed. 
The need for investigating temporal change in cultures has been discussed 
before now (e.g. Oyserman, et al., 2002). Hofstede has been criticised for not 
investigating change over time (Kirkman, et al., 2006) and where he has, he has 
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concluded that the observed changes were too small to say a country had changed in 
any meaningful way (Hofstede, 2001, p. 36). Like other studies on cultural change 
over time, this study only looked back a few decades or so (Butzer, 2012; Cooper & 
Denner, 1998; Hamamura, 2012; Inglehart, 1971; Rogler, 2002; Tang & Koveos, 
2008; Trzesniewski & Donnellan, 2010). Researchers are rightly wary not to 
extrapolate into the past from research over a few decades, since the last century has 
seen modernisation with an unprecedented increase in population size, which has had 
many consequences. Some work stands out for being more rigorous and informative, 
for example Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) study of change over time (Figure 3) and 
within-culture differences (Figure 4). By comparing change and within-cultural 
differences one can get a better overview of the trajectories cultures are taking, and 
find the non-random manner of change that needs to be explained with evolutionary 
theory. 
Even though we do not know the pace of cultural evolution, we can glean 
some insight from a few studies. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
developmentally sensitive period for learning culture is before the age of 14.5, and is 
strongest before the age of 9 (Cheung, et al., 2011; Minoura, 1992). Witkin and 
colleagues discussed the importance of child-rearing practices and argued that it was 
important in both pre-modern and modern societies (see section 2.4.2). A study I 
have not yet discussed shows a relationship between societal economic practices, 
developmental period and cultural cognitions. Greenfield, Maynard and Childs 
(2003) tested change over time in a small-scale Zinacantec Maya community in 
Mexico. A transition in this society’s culture was found to have coincided with the 
transition from a subsistence agriculture-based society in 1969/70, to a money-based 
commercial society in 1991 and 1993. Before the transition, girls were taught to 
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weave textiles in a scaffolding way, marked by obedience and a lack of trial-and-
error learning. Only four traditional patterns were used in textile weaving. After the 
transition, girls learned to weave in a more independent way and much more 
innovation in textile patterns was found (Greenfield, et al., 2003). A picture starts 
emerging that cultures can change in a generational timeframe. If a population’s 
children at a young age experience different societal, social or cultural demands from 
what generations before them experienced, they will grow up thinking in a different 
pattern than the generation before them and their collective influence on their culture 
could appear as shifted measurements on cultural dimensions. 
If this is true and it turns out that cultures indeed are changeable and not 
static, then the question of what constitutes ‘environment’ in modern society should 
be answered. Undoubtedly environment shaped the cultural practices of its first 
human inhabitants and has been a driving force in the evolution of our cultures. 
However, if individuals can be primed for culture, then we also have to consider the 
current life-situation of people, in terms of GDP and SES. GDP predicts and possibly 
even determines life-expectancy, child-mortality, and the birth rate. SES is important 
for health and social stress. These are all biologically relevant factors and should be 
expected to have an influence on human culture. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have argued that we need to know more of the connections 
between different cultural constructs, in order to reduce the number of parameters. 
This is necessary if we want to build analytical models of human cultural diversity. 
Models are useful for testing evolutionary hypotheses, and for predicting welcome 
and unwelcome changes when manipulating one factor rather than another. This will 
be important for public policy making in the future. For hypothesising about the 
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evolution of culture it is necessary to take into account cultural patterns from other 
world regions than the West and East Asia, to include more cultural dimensions like 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance, and to study temporal change. Ecology 
cannot be the sole source for cultural differences but where it is a major factor other 
factors besides arable land and pathogens should be taken into account. For instance, 
food crops differ dramatically across world regions, which, if shown to influence the 
endocrine system could have important consequences for social behaviour and thus 
culture. These considerations can help advance stage 2 inquiry into cultural 
psychology.  
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Figure 3: Change over time (1981–98) in Inglehart’s (1997) dimensions 
traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression (see section 
2.3.3). From: Inglehart and Baker (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Within-country variation of Inglehart’s (1997) dimensions 
traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression (see section 
2.3.3).From: Inglehart and Baker (2000)                             . 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DYNAMIC CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF 
TWO COGNITIVE STYLES – EVIDENCE FROM  
ART HISTORY 
3.1 ABSTRACT 
Previous studies have shown that analytic-holistic cognitive variation may be 
reflected in art, with analytic cognition favouring a greater emphasis on single, focal 
individuals in portraits than holistic cognition, and holistic cognition favouring 
higher horizons and a more global overview in landscape paintings than analytic 
cognition. Here I use this finding to explore historical change in cognition, by 
analysing the temporal dynamics of artistic style from the 15th century to the present 
in the Netherlands, England and Germany. This novel historical method can be used 
to test hypotheses that analytic-holistic cognitive styles originated in ancient 
Greece/ancient China respectively (predicting no or little change over the last 600 
years), and/or have their origins in herding vs. farming, respectively (predicting an 
increase in analytic cognition as the proportion of the population in Europe involved 
in farming has decreased). Variation in painting style can also provide a measure of 
social norm following (tightness-looseness), which again has been claimed to have 
been historically constant. Contrary to these hypotheses, I find that paintings indicate 
these European countries were initially relatively analytic, before dropping to highly 
holistic styles in the 17th and 18th centuries (comparable to contemporary East Asian 
paintings), before increasing to present day analytic styles. It is suggested that this 
drop to holistic levels coincided with particularly intense warfare, tying holistic 
cognition in Western Europe to threat of violence. In addition, variation in painting 
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styles appears to have increased over time, indicating a relatively recent origin for 
looseness in European countries rather than historical constancy. 
3.2 INTRODUCTION 
Numerous studies have shown systematic cognitive differences between East 
Asian and Western people, with East Asians typically showing more attention to 
contextual relations between objects and individuals, i.e. holistic cognition, and 
Westerners attending more to focal objects or individuals independently of context, 
i.e. analytic cognition (Goh, et al., 2010; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Nisbett, et al., 
2001). Much of the research investigating analytic/holistic cognitive styles has been 
laboratory-based (see section 2.3.1), but recently several studies have shown 
corresponding differences in external cultural products (Masuda, et al., 2008), which 
have been found to have larger effect sizes than psychological measures do (Morling 
& Lamoreaux, 2008). 
Analytic/holistic cognitive differences have been found in visual 
representations as well. Masuda et al. (2008) investigated East Asian and Western 
visual art collected from museums in these respective areas. Based on previous 
findings it was expected that portraits originating from analytic cultures would be 
predisposed to focus on subject and neglect surroundings, while portraits made in 
holistic cultures were expected to give a large role to surroundings in order to depict 
the subject in relation to their context. Therefore a prediction was made that in 
Western portraits the face would take up a larger area of the portrait than East Asian 
portraits would. The prediction was found to be true: Western portraits devoted more 
space to a single focal individual (at 15% of the total painting) than East Asian 
portraits (at 4%). The same pattern was found in a laboratory study asking students 
to make portrait photographs: Westerners took pictures with larger faces than did 
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East Asians (10% and 3%, respectively, Masuda, et al., 2008). Facebook profile 
pictures concurred this finding: Western profile pictures emphasise faces more than 
Asian profile pictures do (13% and 9%, respectively, Huang & Park, 2012). 
Next to portraits, visual art depicting landscapes have also been found to 
differ along an analytic/holistic divide. Western landscapes were predicted to 
represent the view one person could have of their surroundings and thus to be 
painted in perspective. On the other hand, East Asian landscapes were predicted to 
be painted with a group perspective in mind by taking a bird’s eye view and 
incorporate important elements in the landscape, regardless of whether or not one 
person could see these elements from one place in the landscape. In paintings with 
perspective the horizon height will be lower than in paintings from a bird’s eye view, 
so therefore the height of the horizon should be lower in Western paintings than in 
East Asian art. This was indeed found with paintings collected in museums: East 
Asian landscapes had higher horizons (at 56% of the total height of the painting) 
than Western landscapes (at 39%, Masuda, et al., 2008). Laboratory studies where 
students drew a landscape picture showed the same difference: Westerners drew 
significantly lower horizons (at 56.37%) than East Asians (at 67.16%). 
A related finding is that East Asians include a larger number of items in an 
image than Westerners, based on their preference for more contextual information 
(2008). This was not measured in the museum collections but East Asian students in 
the laboratory did draw significantly more additional items in their landscapes than 
Western students did (10.72 items vs. 6.19 items, respectively). In cultural studies on 
web design the same difference has been found, where Chinese websites include 
more banners, buttons and colours, and less white space than American websites (Lo 
& Gong, 2005). In addition to the previously mentioned bird’s eye view, the 
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preference for additional objects could be another reason for East Asian images to 
have high horizons: these leave much room for additional objects in the landscape. 
These findings raise the possibility of art as a window into the cognition of 
people from the past, whose cognition obviously cannot be assessed directly. In this 
study we use art to measure changes in cognitive style from the 15th century to the 
present in three Western countries with rich artistic histories: the Netherlands, 
England and Germany. In these countries large quantities of art from about the 15th 
century onwards have been well preserved, documented and digitalised and therefore 
make an ideal proxy for studying temporal changes in cognitive style. While Masuda 
et al. (2008) compare the means of centuries of Western and East Asian art without 
regards for when it was made, here we will specifically investigate time series of 
dated art. 
Using this method we will test the ecocultural hypothesis set out in section 
2.4.2, which argued that the type of acquiring subsistence typical in ancient China 
and ancient Greece, farming or herding respectively, led to a type of social relations 
(interdependent or independent), which led to either holistic cognition in ancient 
China and its cultural offspring, or analytic cognition in ancient Greece and its 
descendants (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, et al., 2001). Some evidence for the association 
between farming and herding on the one hand, and analytic and holistic cognition on 
the other hand, has been found in a contemporary population in Turkey (Uskul, et al., 
2008). However, this contemporary link only offers supportive evidence for the 
origin of analytic/holistic cognition as set out by the eco-cultural hypothesis, not for 
transmission into contemporary non-herding and non-farming societies. 
With regards to Western European countries, two conflicting predictions can 
be derived from the eco-cultural hypothesis. The first is that Western European 
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countries inherited their culture directly and unchanged from ancient Greece, and 
thus have consistently had an analytic mode of cognition throughout time. Therefore 
all three countries’ portraits should show consistently large faces compared to the 
surface of the portrait, and its landscape art should show consistently low horizons. 
(Figure 5: Predictions for analyticism and holism in Western Europe, leading up to 
the present day.) The second prediction is that Western European countries went 
through a transition from holistic to analytic cognition at some point in the past, 
since farming has been the main mode of acquiring subsistence in the past, implying 
a holistic cognitive mode, while contemporary Western European countries have an 
analytic style (Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009). 
It is estimated that by 500 AD Western Europe was populated with 
settlements of farmers and stock breeders, though animal husbandry was not yet 
practiced very much. People may have supplemented their diet with occasional 
hunting but the crops they grew were their primary source of food. Until 1150 
Western Europeans were thus partially self-sufficient (direct agricultural 
consumption), and only traded excess produce. After 1150 there was a marked 
increase in the amount of products people bought at markets instead of growing it 
themselves (indirect agricultural consumption) but it is only from about 1850 that the 
total male working population that worked in agricultural production dropped to less 
than 50%10 (Slicher van Bath, 1963). In 2002 the percentage of people working in 
agriculture in Western Europe was only a few per cent (the Netherlands 3%, United 
                                                                
10 One could argue that animal husbandry is a form of herding and therefore agriculture cannot be seen as 
farming. However, animals were a vital part of the farm because of the manure necessary for plant feed, and most 
farms would have a system where both crops and livestock were present (Slicher van Bath, 1963). Commercially 
rearing sheep for wool as was common in England may have been more akin to herding or trading (Black, 1997). 
DYNAMIC CHANGE OF COGNITIVE STYLES IN ART 
77 
 
Kingdom 1.4%, Germany 2.5%; Gapminder, 2011).11 In the same year the 
percentage of workforce in agriculture in China was 44.1%, similar to the number in 
Western Europe around 1850. If China is holistic because of the prevalence of 
agricultural workers, then Western Europe up to 1850 should show high levels of 
holistic cognition as well. Therefore, based on farming as a driving force for holistic 
cognitive mode, portraits should start out with small faces compared to the frame and 
face size should increase until the present. Landscapes should start out having high 
horizons, which should become lower as we near the present (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Predictions for analyticism and holism in Western Europe, 
leading up to the present day. 
Our historical dataset can also be used to explore temporal dynamics in 
another cultural dimension: in how strictly people keep to social norms (Gelfand, 
2012, see section 2.3.2). Recently a large study measured tightness/looseness for 33 
countries (Gelfand, et al., 2011). Correlating their 33 country scores on this 
dimension to several historical and ecological factors, Gelfand et al. (2011) then 
                                                                
11 This number is the percentage of the working population active in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. 
Separate data for these indicators is to the best of my knowledge not available for all four countries. However, 
subcategories do not seem to make much difference: of the total number of people working in agriculture, fishing 
only made up .38% in the UK in 2004, in Germany .65% in 2002, and in the Netherlands 1.57% in 2000 
(www.laborsta.ilo.org).  
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found a positive correlation between tightness and population densities in 1500 and 
2000 and territorial threat from their neighbours during the period 1918-2001 
(controlled for GNP), all cases in which there is strong dependency on the group. 
The underlying assumption in this work is that the level of tightness-
looseness in a society is a static trait, as evidenced by the authors’ correlating 
population density of the year 1500 and threat from neighbouring states over the last 
century to present day questionnaire measurements. The second aim of this study is 
to test whether the dimension of tightness/looseness is static or dynamic over time, 
by using the art. Cultural artefacts are found to vary along this dimension, for 
example in the accuracy of public clocks where tight societies also had a higher 
percentage of accurate time giving than loose societies (Gelfand et al. 2011, 
supplement). The same should go for norms in art: people in a culture with tight 
norm following should produce images that fall within a narrow range of variation. 
On the other hand artists in a loose society should vary widely around the norm 
(Gelfand, et al., 2006). According to this principle we use the six datasets of art for 
the Netherlands, England and Germany, and analyse the range of variation per type 
of measurement (area of the face compared to the frame, and relative height of the 
horizon) for each of these time series. If the construct is static, all three countries 
should show a consistent amount of variation in art throughout time. If the construct 
is dynamic, we should see significant differences in the amount of variation. Note 
that our measurement differs markedly from Gelfand et al.’s (2011) measurement, in 
that Gelfand et al.’s study measured the participants’ perceived norms within a 
country, while our method taps into what people actually do with a norm. 
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3.3 METHODS 
3.3.1 Collection 
Portraits and landscapes were selected online from renowned online 
databases. For Dutch portraits we used Web Gallery of Art (WGA) , the Netherlands 
Institute for Art History (or Rijksbureau for Kunsthistorisch Documentatie, RKD) , 
and the top results of the 21st Atelier Competition which was determined by 4000 
visitors and an expert jury (CODA) . For Dutch landscapes we used the WGA, the 
Frans Hals museum (FHM) and the RKD, where also physical databases were 
consulted. For English portraits we used the National Portrait Gallery (NPG) , and 
Bridgeman art, culture & history images. For English landscapes we used the NPG, 
Bridgeman, RKD, WGA and the Royal Academy of Arts (RAA) . For German 
portraits we used the NPG, Bridgeman, RKD, Bildindex der Kunst und Achitektur, 
The Museum of Modern Art (MoMa), and Saatchi Gallery (2012) . For German 
landscapes we used Bridgeman, Bildindex, RKD, WGA and the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art. 
Portraits were selected by searching for the key word ‘portrait’ (or in Dutch 
‘portret’, in German ‘Porträt’); and the nationality of each country. Portraits had to 
show only one person (although a non-descript baby was allowed) and had to be 
dated to an accuracy of within 5 years. Excluded were miniatures; panels belonging 
to a larger set; and pieces described as being fashioned after another. Only the first 
appropriate piece per artist that came up in the database was selected. Roughly 10 
paintings per 25 years were gathered. This resulted in 205 Dutch portraits (1430-
2010), 197 English portraits (1527-2010) and 227 German portraits (1383-2012). 
Landscapes were selected by searching for the respective nationality, and for 
as much as possible by selecting images marked as being of the genre ‘landscape’. 
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Images had to show an unobstructed horizon line at least 1/3rd of the width of the 
painting and had to be dated to an accuracy of within 5 years. Excluded were foreign 
landscapes including those of the Italianised era, images depicting religious figures 
in heaven, and pieces described as being fashioned after another. Only the first 
appropriate piece per artist that came up in the database was selected. Roughly 10 
landscapes per 25 years were gathered. This resulted in 208 Dutch landscapes (1435-
2011), 190 English landscapes (1434-2008) and 231 German landscapes (1410-
2012). 
Four of the time series start at about the same time, between 1410 and 1435, 
but English portraits start only in 1527 while German portraits start a little earlier in 
1383. The differences in starts of the time series are an unavoidable artefact of this 
study because we are restricted by the conservation and availability of pictures. The 
earlier periods of our time series do not include many paintings that have ‘portrait’ or 
‘landscape’ as a genre because these genres did not develop until the sixteenth or 
seventeenth century. We decided not to restrict our searches exclusively to these 
genres because for any picture the reasoning behind measuring the face-to-frame and 
the relative horizon height are still the same: to estimate the choice of the artist for 
which and how much information to include. For this same reason we included 
different types of art (representations): paintings, etchings and drawings. Different 
techniques of representations should not interfere with the choice to include 
information and indeed, Masuda et al. (2008) and Huang & Park (2012) find the 
same cultural differences for different types of media. 
3.3.2 Analyses 
Following the face-to-frame ratio method of Masuda et al. (2008), in each 
portrait the area of the face was determined by measuring the distance from the chin 
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to the top of the head, including hair or hat, and the longest horizontal distance 
across the face, excluding hair or hat. The frame area was measured from the inner 
border of the frame. The face-to-frame ratio is calculated as (face length * face 
width)/(frame length * frame width). In each landscape the relative horizon height 
was determined by measuring the distance from the lower edge of the painting to the 
horizon height, divided by the total height of the painting. In the case of a sloping 
horizon the slope was drawn across the painting and the average horizon height was 
used. 
Regression analysis was used to find out if there was any change over time. 
For analysing looseness/tightness in our data we used twenty images from around 
the particularly high or low periods and calculated the differences in range of ratios 
per period. For this measure we first calculated the mean ratio of the period, and then 
determined the absolute difference between each ratio in the period and its mean 
ratio. Kruskal-Wallis tests showed if there were significant differences between 
periods, and if so post-hoc analyses using a non-parametric analogue to the Tukey 
test (Zar, 1999, p. 223) showed which period was different. 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 Dutch portraits 
Face-to-frame ratio. The overall mean ratio for the Dutch portraits is 11.77% 
(M = .1177, SD = .1251). Regression analysis shows that the best fit is a quadratic 
model (F(2, 202) = 31.37, R2 = .24, p < .0005, Figure 6), with a high initial ratio 
dropping to a vertex minimum of .0541 (the face covering 5.41% of the total area) 
around the year 1715, followed by an increase to the present day. To further visualise 
the change over time sets of 20 portraits from three periods are depicted in Figure 7. 
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These are the earliest measured period (M = .1240, SD = .1049), the middle period 
around 1715 (M = .0538, SD = .0507), and the last period (M = .2712, SD = .2565). 
Figure 6: Change over time in face-to-frame ratio for Dutch portraits, 
indicative of changes in cognitive style. A high face-to-frame ratio 
indicates a more analytic cognitive style typical of modern Western 
people, and a low face-to-frame ratio indicates a holistic cognitive style 
typical of modern East Asian people. The line represents the best-fit 
quadratic model specified in the text. 
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Figure 7: Visualisation of face-to-frame ratios in Dutch portraits. Periods 
encompass 20 portraits from the earliest measured time (period 1), the 
last measured time (period 3), and around the lowest point found (period 
2). Error bars represent minimum and maximum values. 
Variation. The periods have significantly different ranges of variations (χ2(2, 
N = 60) = 32.08, p < .0005, Figure 8). Post-hoc analyses show that the last period has 
a significantly larger range of ratios (M = .1996, SD = .1546) than both the first 
period (M = .0763, SD = .0698; q∞,3 = 4.62, p < .01) and second period (M = .0336, 
SD = .0372; q∞,3 = 7.98, p < .001), and the second period has a significantly smaller 
range of ratios than the first period (q∞,3 = 3.35, p < .05). 
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Figure 8: Dutch portraits in period 3 differ significantly more from their 
mean than portraits in periods 1 and 2. Portraits in period 2 differ 
significantly less from their mean than portraits in period 1. Error bars 
represent minimum and maximum values. 
3.4.2 English portraits 
Face-to-frame ratio. The overall mean ratio for the English portraits is 
10.09% (M = .1009, SD = .1256). Regression analysis shows that the best fit is a 
quadratic model (F(2,194) = 7.921, R2 = .075, p < .0001, Figure 9), with a high 
initial ratio dropping to a vertex minimum of .0683 (the face covering 6.83% of the 
total area) around the year 1703, followed by an increase to the present day. To 
further visualise the change over time sets of 20 portraits from three periods are 
depicted in Figure 10. These are the earliest measured period (M = .1015, SD = 
.0553), the middle period around 1703 (M = .0499, SD = .0354), and the last period 
(M = .2024, SD = .2806). 
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Figure 9: Change over time in face-to-frame ratio for English portraits, 
indicative of changes in cognitive style. A high face-to-frame ratio 
indicates a more analytic cognitive style typical of modern Western 
people, and a low face-to-frame ratio indicates a holistic cognitive style 
typical of modern East Asian people. The line represents the best-fit 
quadratic model specified in the text. 
Figure 10: Visualisation of face-to-frame ratios in English portraits. 
Periods encompass 20 portraits from the earliest measured time (period 
1), the last measured time (period 3), and around the lowest point found 
(period 2). Error bars represent minimum and maximum values. 
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Variation. The periods had significantly different ranges of variations (χ2(2, 
N = 60) = 37.93, p < .0005, Figure 11). Post-hoc analyses show that the last period 
(M = .2024, SD = .2806) has a significantly larger range of ratios than both the first 
period (M = .1015 , SD = .0553; q∞,3 = 7.26, p < .05) and second period (M = 
.0499, SD = .0354; q∞,3 = 4.15, p < .01). 
Figure 11: English portraits in period 3 differ significantly more from 
their mean than portraits in periods 1 and 2. The middle of the boxplot is 
the mean difference from the mean of the period ratios. Error bars 
represent minimum and maximum values. 
3.4.3 German portraits 
Face-to-frame ratio. The overall mean ratio for the German portraits is 
11.07% (M = .1107, SD = .1227). Regression analysis shows that the best fit is a 
quadratic model (F(2,224) = 9.886, R2 = .081, p < .0001, Figure 12), with a high 
initial ratio dropping to a vertex minimum of .0789 (the face covering 7.89% of the 
total area) around the year 1617 followed by an increase to the present day. To 
further visualise the change over time sets of 20 portraits from three periods are 
depicted in Figure 13. These are the earliest measured period (M = .0828, SD = 
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.1069), the middle period around 1617 (M = .0587, SD = .0459), and the last period 
(M = .1720, SD = .1629). 
Figure 12: Change over time in face-to-frame ratio for German portraits, 
indicative of changes in cognitive style. A high face-to-frame ratio 
indicates a more analytic cognitive style typical of modern Western 
people, and a low face-to-frame ratio indicates a holistic cognitive style 
typical of modern East Asian people. The line represents the best-fit 
quadratic model specified in the text. 
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Figure 13: Visualisation of face-to-frame ratios in German portraits. 
Periods encompass 20 portraits from the earliest measured time (period 
1), the last measured time (period 3), and around the lowest point found 
(period 2). Error bars represent minimum and maximum values. 
Variation. The periods have significantly different ranges of variations (χ2(2, 
N = 60) = 19.68, p < .0005, Figure 14). Post-hoc analysis show that the last period 
has a significantly larger range of ratios (M = .1275, SD = .0971) than the second 
period (M = .0325, SD = .0316; q∞,3 = 6.22, p < .001), and the first period (M = 
.0727, SD = .0766) has a significantly larger range of ratios than the second period 
(q∞,3 = 3.314, p < .05). There is no significant difference between the range of ratios 
of the first and last periods. 
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Figure 14: German portraits in period 2 differ significantly less from their 
mean than portraits in periods 1 and 3. The middle of the boxplot is the 
mean difference from the mean of the period ratios. Error bars represent 
minimum and maximum values. 
3.4.4 Dutch landscapes 
Relative horizon height. The overall mean of the relative horizon height for 
landscape paintings was 50.32% (M = .5032, SD = .2215). Following the same 
methods as for portraits, regression analysis shows best fit to be a quadratic model 
(F(2, 204) = 61.47, R2 = .376, p < .0001, Figure 15), with a high initial ratio dropping 
to a vertex minimum of .3707 (the horizon at 37.07% of the total height of the 
painting) around the year 1800, followed by an increase to the present day. To 
further visualise the change over time sets of 20 portraits from three periods are 
depicted in Figure 16. These are the earliest measured period (M = .8039, SD = 
.0907), the middle period around 1800 (M = .2960, SD = .0787), and the last period 
(M = .5164, SD = .1833). 
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Figure 15 Change over time in relative horizon height for Dutch 
landscapes, indicative of changes in cognitive style. Values are depicted 
in reverse order to indicate analyticism at the top and holism at the 
bottom. A low relative horizon height indicates a more analytic cognitive 
style typical of modern Western people, and a high relative horizon 
height indicates a holistic cognitive style typical of modern East Asian 
people. The line represents the best-fit quadratic model specified in the 
text. 
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Figure 16: Visualisation of relative horizon heights in Dutch landscapes. 
Periods encompass 20 portraits from the earliest measured time (period 
1), the last measured time (period 3), and around the lowest point found 
(period 2). Error bars represent minimum and maximum values. 
Variation. The periods have significantly different ranges of variations (χ2(2, 
N = 60) = 21.65, p < .0005, Figure 17). Post-hoc analyses show that the last period 
has a significantly larger range of ratios (M = .1651, SD = .0701) than both the first 
period (M = .0666, SD = .0596; q∞,3 = 5.45, p < .001) and second period (M = 
.0590, SD = .0504; q∞,3 = 5.92, p < .001). The first and second periods do not show 
a significant difference in range. 
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Figure 17: Dutch landscapes in period 3 differ significantly more from 
their mean than landscapes in periods 1 and 3. Error bars represent 
minimum and maximum values. 
3.4.5 English landscapes 
Relative horizon height. The overall mean of the relative horizon height for 
English landscape paintings was 54.93% (M = 54.93, SD = .2149). Regression 
analysis shows the best fit to be a quadratic model (F(2,187) = 7.085, R2 = .070, p < 
.001, Figure 18), with a high initial ratio dropping to a vertex minimum of .4915 (the 
horizon at 49.15% of the total height of the painting) around the year 1743, followed 
by an increase to the present day. To further visualise the change over time sets of 20 
portraits from three periods are depicted in Figure 19. These are the earliest 
measured period (M = .5968, SD = .2236), the middle period around 1743 (M = 
.4977, SD = .1766), and the last period (M = .6163, SD = .2086). 
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Figure 18: Change over time in relative horizon height for English 
landscapes, which shows no significant change in cognitive style. Values 
are represented in reverse order to indicate analyticism at the top and 
holism at the bottom. Contrary to expectation, relative horizon height is 
consistently as high as has been measured before for East Asian art. The 
line represents the best-fit quadratic model specified in the text. 
Figure 19: Visualisation of the relative horizon heights in English 
landscapes. Periods encompass 20 portraits from the earliest measured 
time (period 1), the last measured time (period 3), and around the lowest 
point found (period 2). Error bars represent minimum and maximum 
values. 
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Variation There are small differences in the range of ratios per period which 
are not significantly different (χ2(2, N = 60) = .961, p = .62, Figure 20). The same 
pattern as in other cases occur where the second period (M = .1382, SD = .1053) has 
the lowest value compared to the first period (M = .1785, SD = .1284) and the last 
period (M = .1671, SD = .1189.) 
Figure 20: English landscapes show no significantly different variations. 
The middle of the boxplot is the mean difference from the mean of the 
period ratios. Error bars represent minimum and maximum values. 
3.4.6 German landscapes 
Relative horizon height. The overall mean of the relative horizon height for 
German landscape paintings was 60.19% (M = .6019, SD = .1954). The best fit is a 
quadratic model (F(2,231) = 14.320, R2 = .110, p < .0001, Figure 21), with a high 
initial ratio dropping to a vertex minimum of 0.5435 (the horizon at 54.35% of the 
total height of the painting) around the year 1815, followed by an increase to the 
present day. To further visualise the change over time sets of 20 portraits from three 
periods are depicted in Figure 22. These are the earliest measured period (M = .6895, 
DYNAMIC CHANGE OF COGNITIVE STYLES IN ART 
95 
 
SD = .2263), the middle period around 1815 (M = .5295, SD = .1723), and the last 
period (M = .6150, SD = .2331). 
Figure 21: Change over time in relative horizon height for German 
landscapes, which shows no significant change in cognitive style. Values 
are depicted in reverse order to indicate analyticism at the top and holism 
at the bottom. Contrary to expectation, relative horizon height is 
consistently as high as has been measured before for East Asian art. The 
line represents the best-fit quadratic model specified in the text. 
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Figure 22: Visualisation of the relative horizon heights in German 
landscapes. Periods encompass 20 portraits from the earliest measured 
time (period 1), the last measured time (period 3), and around the lowest 
point found (period 2). Error bars represent minimum and maximum 
values. 
Variation. The periods have significantly different ranges of variations (χ2(2, 
N = 60) = 7.437, p < .05, Figure 23). Post-hoc analysis show that the last period has 
a significantly larger range of ratios (M = .2071, SD = .0958) than second period (M 
= .1217, SD = .1187; q∞,3 = 3.83, p < .05). The first period (M = .1835, SD = .1257) 
does not show a significant difference in range from either second or last period, but 
a similar pattern is again upheld where the range is larger than in the second period. 
DYNAMIC CHANGE OF COGNITIVE STYLES IN ART 
97 
 
Figure 23: German landscapes in period 3 differ significantly more from 
their mean than landscapes in period 2. The middle of the boxplot is the 
mean difference from the mean of the period ratios. Error bars represent 
minimum and maximum values. 
Although no statistical analysis was possible, Figure 24 and Table 2 compare 
Masuda et al’s (2008) findings for portraits with those from the present study. 
Comparing these it appears that portraits in the middle periods of all three countries 
are more like what Masuda et al (2008) found for East Asian portraits than for 
Western ones, while all three countries show contemporary face-to-frame ratios 
more alike Masuda et al’s (2008) findings for Western art. For landscapes (Figure 25 
and Table 3) the comparison results in a different view: with the exception of the 
middle period in Dutch landscapes, all periods show a relative horizon height more 
comparable with East Asian than with Western measures. 
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Figure 24: Comparison of Masuda et al’s (2008) findings for Western 
(14.65%, dashed line) and East Asian (4.28%, uninterrupted line) 
portraits from museums, and the findings for the Dutch (D), English (E) 
and German (G) first (1), middle (2) and last (3) periods. Error bars 
represent minimum and maximum values. 
Table 2: Comparison of Masuda et al’s (2008) findings for Western and 
East Asian portrait paintings from museums, and the relevant findings for 
the Dutch, English and German timelines. Underscored = typical Western 
ratios, bold = typical East Asian ratios. *x = significant difference with 
period x. 
Portraits  
Western museums 
(Masuda et al 2008) 
14.65 
East Asian museums 
(Masuda et al 2008) 
4.28 
Dutch mean 11.77 
Dutch change in time 12.40*2 5.38*1,3 27.12*2 
English mean 10.09 
English change in time 10.15*2 4.99*1 20.24 
German mean 11.07 
German change in time 8.28 5.87*3 17.20*2 
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Figure 25: Comparison of Masuda et al’s (2008) findings for Western 
(38.83%, dashed line) and East Asian (56.15%, uninterrupted line) 
landscapes from museums, and the findings for the Dutch (D), English 
(E) and German (G) first (1), middle (2) and last (3) periods. Error bars 
represent minimum and maximum values. 
Table 3: Comparison of Masuda et al’s (2008) findings for Western and 
East Asian landscape paintings from museums, and the relevant findings 
for the Dutch, English and German timelines. Underscored = typical 
Western ratios, bold = typical East Asian ratios. *,x = significant 
difference with period x. 
Landscapes  
Western museums 
(Masuda et al 2008) 
38.83 
East Asian museums 
(Masuda et al 2008) 
56.15 
Dutch mean 50.32 
Dutch change in time 80.39*2,3 29.60*2,3 51.64*1,2 
English mean 54.93 
English change in 
time 
59.68 49.77 59.68 
German mean 60.19 
German change in 
time 
68.95 52.95 61.50 
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A summary of ranges of ratios and significant differences between them can 
be found in Table 4, which shows that the most often found pattern is a significant 
increase in range size from the middle period to the last period. 
Table 4: Summary of ranges of ratios for portraits and landscapes, for all 
three measured  periods. The relative position of the number indicates the 
width of the range.         p<.05;          p<.01;          p<.001.  
Series Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Dutch Portraits 
  
.1996 
.0763 
  
 .0336  
English Portraits 
  
.2024 
.1015   
 .0499  
German Portraits 
 
 
.1275 
.0727 
  
 .0325  
Dutch landscapes 
  
.1651 
.0666   
 .0590  
English landscapes 
  .1671 
.1785   
 .1382  
German landscapes 
 
 
.2071 
.1835   
 .1217  
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3.5 DISCUSSION 
3.5.1 Findings for analytic/holistic cognition 
As expected for all three countries the means of the face-to-frame ratios are 
in line with the mean Western face-to-frame ratio found in museums by Masuda et 
al. (2008), rather than with the mean East Asian face-to-frame ratio, (Netherlands 
11.77%, England 10.09%, Germany 11.07%, Western 14.65%, East Asian 4.28%, 
Table 2). 
The face-to-frame ratios for portraits in the Netherlands show a high initial 
ratio (12.40%), which drop until the early 18th century where they become 
significantly lower (5.38%), after which follows a rise until present day when levels 
are significantly higher than in the early 18th century (27.12%). In English portraits 
we see a similar pattern where the initial ratio is fairly high (10.15%), drops until a 
low point in the early 18th century when ratios are significantly lower than before 
(4.99%), followed by a rise until high face-to-frame ratios of contemporary art 
(20.24%) but this rise nonetheless does not result in a significant difference between 
middle and last period. German portraits show a slightly different pattern, with a 
relatively low initial ratio (8.28%), followed by a slight non-significant decrease to 
the early 17th century (5.83%), but then ratios climb up until a significant increase in 
ratios is reached (17.20%). In sum, for all three countries the face-to-frame ratio 
starts out at high or intermediate values indicating relatively analytic or intermediate 
cognition, then dips to a low point around the 17th to 18th century indicating holistic 
cognition, before increasing to high and analytic present day values. 
Contrary to expectation in all three countries the mean relative horizon height 
over time was more comparable to what Masuda et al. (2008) found for East Asian 
paintings than to findings for Western paintings (the Netherlands 50.32%, England 
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54.93%, Germany 60.19%, East Asian 56.15%, Western 38.83%, Table 3). The 
relative horizon height for landscapes in the Netherlands started very high (80.39%), 
then dropped significantly until the late 18th/early 19th century (29.60%), followed by 
a rise until current day levels (51.64%) which are significantly higher than the 
middle period but significantly lower than the earliest period. Conversely, relative 
horizon heights for England and Germany show no significant changes and are 
consistently high throughout time. 
The relative horizon heights in the pictures collected in this project do not 
match what has been found for Western paintings by Masuda et al. (2008), but 
instead show a high level of holism. These findings are not in line with the literature 
where Western societies have been found to be analytic, and are also not in line with 
what was found in the face-to-frame ratio in the portraits. As will be confirmed in the 
following two chapters (Chapters 4 and 5), it appears that the relative horizon height 
is not a good measure for historical analyticism/holism, and therefore we will not 
take results into consideration. Two possible causes for the discrepancy come to 
mind. The first is that it may be due to the fact that the relative horizon height is a 
proxy for a proxy: it indicates perspective taking vs. bird’s eye view, which indicates 
the possible inclusion of more or less additional information. Since in Chapters 4 and 
5 the relative horizon height does not correlate with the number of additional objects, 
this is likely not an appropriate line of reasoning. For instance, even with a very low 
horizon, there may be additional items above the horizon as well: birds, clouds, 
planes, etc. Even though we controlled for deities in the sky, Masuda et al. (2008) 
may not have controlled for this in their museum paintings, though their laboratory 
study does show lower horizons for Western students as well. Also there may be 
other factors that determine the height of the horizon other than the need to get 
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objects into a painting or perspective taking, such as an appreciation for land as the 
basis for life. The second cause might be the method of selection intrinsic to the 
historical study. Masuda selected Western paintings from museum websites by 
searching on the key word ‘landscape’. Landscape painting as a genre developed in 
the Netherlands in the 17th century during the Golden Age and the style spread to 
other countries after that time. Searching on the key word ‘landscape’ may thus have 
led Masuda to find paintings in the genre ‘landscape’, with a bias for after the 17th 
century. Because we made time series going back as far as we could, we selected 
paintings according to the spirit of the method: where we could see a horizon, based 
on the argument that a higher horizon comes from taking a birds-eye view and 
including elements in the landscape that cannot be seen together from the ground, 
which is thought to be a mark of holistic cognition. A lower horizon leaves little 
space for additional information which shows an analytic cognition. By this 
reasoning it should not have mattered that we included paintings of any genre 
showing a horizon. The discrepancy indicates that the meaning of a horizon is not 
pinned down precisely. 
The significant changes in face-to-frame ratio over time reject the first 
hypothesis and show that Western analyticism has not been consistently maintained 
since ancient Greek times, but shows a rather more dynamic pattern. The second 
hypothesis stated that when farming was prevalent holistic cognition would have 
been the standard, which changed to analyticism once farming decreased (Nisbett & 
Masuda, 2003). The data also do not support this hypothesis since initially, while 
agriculture and especially growing crops were the common means of acquiring 
subsistence, the face-to-frame ratios for the Netherlands and England start off 
significantly higher (more analytical) than in the middle period, not lower or equally 
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low (Slicher van Bath, 1963). However, the German data from the earliest period 
does start out low, remains low and only become recognisably Western in recent 
times, which does support the hypothesis. 
3.5.2 Findings for tightness/looseness 
The data also reject the hypothesis that the level of tightness/looseness is 
maintained consistently throughout time. Since the landscape series gave such 
anomalous findings I only consider the portrait series here. In the three portrait 
series, we find the same pattern: intermediate variation in the first period, little 
variation in the middle period and large variation in the last period (Table 4). All 
three datasets show significantly larger ranges of variation for contemporary work 
than for images from the middle periods. In Dutch and German portraits the first 
period also shows significantly larger ranges than the middle period, but not in the 
English portraits. In Dutch and English portraits the earliest period also shows a 
significantly smaller range than in the last period, but this is not the case for German 
portraits. The consistent differences between the middle and last periods across all 
three countries indicate a relatively recent change in all three societies from tightness 
to looseness, showing that tightness/looseness, like analytic/holistic cognition, is 
dynamic and not static in terms of centuries. 
3.5.3 Methodological issues 
Some methodological issues should be discussed. It is possible that 
unforeseen biases have influenced our data in some way, for example the curators of 
the databases we consulted may have chosen to include some works or genres rather 
than others. However if this is the case it will have been unintentional: none of the 
databases made any artistic preference explicitly clear. Additionally we took care to 
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select pictures systematically: we checked each website for any sorting of work 
when giving search results. When we found a sorting method (for example, 
presentation in alphabetic order) we made sure to skip pages and even out selection 
as much as possible. 
Another way our data may have been influenced is that paintings may have 
been destroyed or altered for some reason, without us knowing about it. However, 
the databases from which we collected our paintings were websites used by art 
critics and historians and it was stated whether illustrations on their websites were 
details of originals, or if they had been cropped. Furthermore, for destruction or 
alteration to have an influence on our data it would have to be systematic, not 
incidental, destruction or alteration of a specific style or period of paintings, but not 
of other styles or periods of paintings, which seems unlikely. If at any point in time 
such a deliberate attempt would have been undertaken, we would assume that those 
doing the adjusting would change art in a uniform fashion according to some ideal. 
This would have made art more uniform, while we see that it continuously changes 
over time.  
The last question is whether an artists’ style represents cognition of the 
general population. Artists’ personalities were found to differ from non-artists in 
having higher scores on neuroticism (measured with Eysenck scale, Götz & Götz, 
1979). This should not be a reason for discrediting the present study since most 
findings in psychology are based on populations that may arguably not be like the 
rest of society, like students (Henrich, et al., 2010), other academics (Schwartz, 
1994), or IBM employees (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, et al., 2010). Furthermore 
Masuda et al. (2008) measured images from both artists and students, and found the 
same pattern, though admittedly with slightly different values. Besides that, 
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successful artists have a clientele to satisfy, who may be individuals contracting 
them, or buyers from the public. It would therefore be logical that artists have at least 
some sense of what is generally popular among the public. 
3.5.4 Historical analysis in view of the data 
Here it has been shown that analytic/holistic cognition and 
tightness/looseness are dynamic and not static, and that dependence on farming is 
not likely to be a key factor. These time series suggest that during the middle periods 
people were more holistic and had tighter norms than at present, and to a lesser 
extent than the first periods. Several factors have been indicated in the literature to 
differ between tight and loose societies (see section 2.3.2) and some (though not with 
any statistical analysis) between analytic and holistic cognition societies (see section 
2.3.1). From Gelfand et al.’s (2011, supplement) list of correlates with 
tightness/looseness, one factor stands out as being saliently relevant to our data: the 
number of threats from neighbouring nations for integration and annexation, or 
territorial threats, from 1918-2001, which was found to be significantly higher for 
tighter than looser nations. 
Questions about the effect on cultural constructs under territorial threat have 
also arisen from the novel research program of historical dynamics (Turchin, 2008), 
which aims to mathematically capture major patterns in history with models derived 
from population genetics. This research program would be helped by insight and 
measurements on what is called asabiya: ‘group feeling’, or the capacity for 
collective action that plays a central role in the formation of socially coherent groups 
(Turchin, 2003). Asabiya comes from “social intercourse, friendly association, long 
familiarity, and companionship” (Ibn Khaldun, in Turchin, 2003, p. 39). In the 
context of a group facing out-group threat, it produces “the ability to defend oneself, 
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to offer opposition, to protect oneself, and to press one’s claims”, which enables a 
group to maintain autonomy (Ibn Khaldun, in Turchin, 2009, p. 195). It includes a 
strong inward looking attitude or preference for in-group members over out-group 
members. Conceptually, several cultural constructs could be related to the in-group 
preference in asabiya, such as collectivism (which Turchin, 2003 mentions), 
egalitarianism, holism, tightness, civic participation, etc. Indeed, war, inter-group 
competition and violence have been shown to induce greater pro-sociality towards 
the in-group as opposed to the out-group. In the case of civil war in Sierra Leone, 
individuals who experienced personal loss and trauma, post-war showed increased 
participation in voting and public goods (Bellows & Miguel, 2009). Further evidence 
for increased pro-sociality in Sierra Leone was found through economic games 
(Bauer, Cassar, Chytilova, & Henrich, 2013), which showed that more affected 
people were more egalitarian towards the in-group and more selfish towards the out-
group, than less-affected people. The same was found with participants from 
Georgia, which had recently been in an inter-state war with Russia (thereby also 
showing that there is no difference in effects in these areas between civil war and 
inter-state war) (Bauer, et al., 2013). The civil war in Burundi has also had similar 
effects, where more affected individuals show increased altruism towards their in-
group, and also are more risk-seeking and have higher discount rates (Voors, et al., 
2012). Further interesting and important findings are that there is a developmental 
period, between the ages of 7 and 20, where war trauma has a lasting pro-sociality 
effect (Bauer, et al., 2013). Also war often does not have detrimental economic 
consequences for the country, but rather there is a rapid post-war catch-up growth, as 
predicted by economic models (see Bellows & Miguel, 2009). 
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This growing body of work indicates increased asabiya when experiencing 
war. That war has been a major theme in Western Europe is clear, and although it 
may not singularly explain why analytic/holistic cognition and tightness/looseness 
changed so dramatically, it may have been an important factor. Following Plaut, et 
al. (2012), who in tandem with their empirical work presented short historical 
analyses of Boston and San Francisco to indicate long-standing cultural differences 
in conformity, I here present a short analysis of each country’s history of war as 
relevant to our data. 
Before the fifteenth century the Netherlands was a loose collection of 
counties, which nevertheless showed community through building the waterworks 
which were needed as protection against the sea (Blom & Lamberts, 1999). The 
period from the mid 16th to the mid 18th century was marked by war; first was the 80 
Year War (1568–1648) against Catholic Spanish suppressors, set on by the rise of 
Protestantism. Even though a war was being fought, the first half of the 17th century 
brought prosperity, mainly due to colonisation and the innovation of joint stock 
companies. Mid 17th century the war against Spain was won, after which three wars 
were subsequently fought against France leaving the country in debt and diminished 
in power and wealth in the 18th century (Blom & Lamberts, 1999). Under threat of 
yet another war against France, in 1748 the counties are unified into one country and 
kingdom. Fierce nationalism and increased pauperism marked society. From 1780 
onwards, politics started to become more and more recognizable in the contemporary 
situation, and from this time onwards Dutch culture is similar to modern Dutch 
culture. The coming period saw no wars on home territory, but the Dutch had 
colonies which it occupied by force. In World War I the Netherlands was neutral and 
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did not see much violence, but in World War II (1939-45) the country was occupied 
and lost 2.3% of its population (Blom & Lamberts, 1999). 
England before the 19th century was continuously involved in war, though 
very few were fought on home territory. Conflicts were with France over territory, 
with Spain over religion, and with the Netherlands over rivalry in colonising South 
Asia. The Civil War (1642-51) with Scotland and Ireland however had an enormous 
popular involvement, and did take place much on English soil, seeing unprecedented 
levels of hostilities. Over the course of this war 180.000 English died, and 1 in 4 
Englishmen served in the conflicts (Black, 1997). In 1707 England and Scotland 
unified into the Kingdom of Great Britain. Post-war during the 18th century morality 
and etiquette were strongly present in society. After the civil war no others were 
fought on English soil although many were fought abroad. Despite losing North 
America in 1783 Great Britain gains top position in terms of colonies. The Industrial 
Revolution (approx. 1780-1840) started in Great Britain, or rather in England, 
because it had several advantages over other countries: it already had a commercially 
minded agriculture system—with a few large landowners employing people and 
producing mainly for market, for private gain—instead of having subsistence 
economy. This produced higher yields and thus could feed more non-farming people 
who were then a readily available workforce for the rising industry (Hobsbawm, 
1962). Although Great Britain’s involvement in both World Wars did not include 
battles on home territory, 2.19% of the population was lost in WWI, and 400.000 
people (0.94%) in WWII (Weinberg, 1994). 
Germany has had a remarkable history in the sense that many historians have 
asked the question of why Germany became unified ‘too late’, or at least much later 
than other European countries. “The Germans retained the ability to feel as a nation 
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but did not acquire the capacity to act as a state” (Balfour, 1992, p. 1). For most of its 
history it was the centre of the Holy Roman Empire (962-1806) though this was only 
in name, since mostly it was a gathering of principalities, duchies and other smaller 
units, under control by their own rulers. Around the 14th century these towns 
perpetually feuded with each other (Fulbrook, 1990). From the mid 15th to the mid 
17th century there were periodic peasants’ revolts, including those following from 
Martin Luther’s theses in 1517, calling for people to take personal responsibility in 
their faith. The Thirty Years War (1618–1648) which involved many other European 
countries was fought initially over religion, and later over power and rule. An 
estimated 20 to 33% of the total German population died and much farm land was 
lost because of the scorched earth technique. After the war ended in 1648, some 
historians estimate that it took the Germans a century to get back to pre-war levels, 
while England was rapidly expanding. Germany is finally united in 1871 but in the 
following century waged most horrific wars on its neighbours, losing 3.82% in WWI 
and over 4 million (7.9-10%) of its population in WWII (Weinberg, 1994). 
These histories show territorial war was certainly an integral part of life 
during the periods of both holism and tightness. The Netherlands saw strong holism 
and tightness around the early 18th century, which coincides with unification after 
two centuries of war. England’s period of strong holism and tightness was around 
the same time, early 18th century, which also coincides with a unification event and 
follows a massively deadly decade long war on home territory, and continuous war 
with neighbouring countries. Germany’s most holistic period was in the early 17th 
century, during which also a bloody war on own territory was fought. However, 
Germany’s delayed unification only took place in 1871, and Germany shows lower 
levels of analytic/holistic cognition than England or the Netherlands. Although not a 
DYNAMIC CHANGE OF COGNITIVE STYLES IN ART 
111 
 
perfect fit, the data presented here shows connections to long periods of war that is 
fought at home or close to home. Given the recent studies on the effects of war on 
pro-sociality, I believe what is seen here expressed in holism and tightness, might be 
increased asabiya as a consequence of war. However, obviously the view on history 
given here is skewed and more sophisticated historical analysis should test this 
hypothesis to exclude other possible historical factors, but this is beyond the scope of 
the current thesis. Further future work should also include investigating the history 
of art in East Asian countries to validate the methods presented here. 
3.5.5 Conclusions 
In conclusion, here we have presented a novel method of investigating 
cognitive mode over time. It has shown that the cultural constructs of 
analytic/holistic cognitive mode and tightness/looseness are not static throughout 
time, but dynamic. Possible roads of inquiry for why these changes occurred should 
be sought with extreme inter-group conflict: war. This view is supported by an 
increasing number of studies discovering inter-personal and inter-group conflict 
strongly influence psychological constructs in humans. Future work should also 
include investigating the history of art in East Asian countries to validate the 
methods presented here.
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CHAPTER 4: MORE AGREEABLE PEOPLE PREFER LARGER 
FACES - PERSONALITY AND ANALYTIC/HOLISTIC MODE 
4.1 ABSTRACT  
Based on society-level findings, the relationship between personality in terms 
of the Big Five dimensions, and markers of analytic/holistic cognitive mode found in 
pictures is tested on the individual level. Positive correlations are predicted between 
Extraversion, and face-to-frame ratio and number of additional items, while negative 
correlation is predicted between Extraversion and relative horizon height. No 
evidence for these relationships is found, but instead Agreeableness correlates 
positively with face-to-frame ratio. Because on a society-level Agreeableness 
correlates with UAI and Mas, and not with IDV, this finding implicates that the 
suggested relationship between analytic/holistic cognition and IDV might be 
premature. 
4.2 INTRODUCTION 
Studies of analytic/holistic cognitive mode show consistent differences 
between people from Western and East Asian countries, where Westerners use an 
analytic mode and focus on elements and categories, and East Asians use a holistic 
mode and focus on context and relationships between the parts (see section 2.3.1). In 
art this difference has also been shown: in a study of portrait and landscape paintings 
in museums, Masuda et al. (2008) found that Western portraits show significantly 
larger faces in relation to the frame than East Asian portraits, and that East Asian 
landscapes show higher horizons than Western landscapes. This pattern was 
reproduced in the laboratory: Western students who made a portrait photograph 
zoomed in more than East Asian students, and drew a lower horizon height in a 
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landscape drawing than East Asian students (Masuda, et al., 2008). Chapter 3 found 
similar means for contemporary Western portraits (though results for landscapes did 
not match the earlier work). Masuda et al. (2008) explained this and similar 
cognitive differences between East Asian and Western culture with the construct of 
analytic/holistic cognition: analytic Western painters place greater emphasis on the 
single focal individual in portraits and so make that individual relatively larger, 
whereas holistic East Asian portrait painters place greater emphasis on background 
contextual information so make the focal individual relatively smaller. Similarly, 
holistic East Asian landscape artists paint high horizons which allow more objects 
and individuals to be included in the painting, compared to analytic Western 
landscape artists. 
The question remains how these findings relate to the rest of the findings in 
cultural psychology. In section 2.3.6 I identified two loosely integrated clusters of 
cultural constructs that are apparent at this time: the first was a cluster of IDV, PD, 
analytic/holistic cognitive mode, and tightness/looseness (both which might be 
connected through self-construal); the second was a less defined cluster of 
Agreeableness, high contributions and low punishment in the PGG, and low UAI 
and Mas. Here I investigate the possibility that these clusters are interconnected 
through investigating if there is a link between analytic/holistic mode which occurs 
only in the first cluster, and Big Five personality which only occurs in the second 
cluster. Analytic/holistic mode of thought has been said to be related to IDV (Ishii, 
2013), underpinned by self-construal (Gardner, et al., 1999; Kühnen, et al., 2001; 
Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002), where analytic mode, high IDV and independent self-
construal form one end of the scale, and holistic mode, low IDV and interdependent 
self-construal the other. IDV has been found to correlate with Extraversion (with 
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coefficient r = .64) and not with any of the other personality dimensions (Hofstede & 
McCrae, 2004). Therefore a link may be expected where Extraversion correlates 
positively with analytic mode of thought. Here I test this link on participants in a 
laboratory, who will fill out a commonly used personality questionnaire, take a 
portrait photograph and draw a landscape picture. 
The cultural differences in personality and Hofstede’s dimensions were found 
on the group-level (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004), while we predict the relationship 
between extraversion and analytic cognition at an individual-level. Correlations 
between groups do not always predict correlations within groups (Na, et al., 2010) 
and so we cannot assume that individuals possess the combination of traits their 
culture does. Nevertheless, Masuda et al. (2008) verified their museum findings with 
student participants tested in the laboratory, making the link between East Asians 
and holistic mode, and Westerners and analytic mode, clear on an individual level. 
Also, society-wide differences in terms of the Big Five correspond to individual-
level differences, making personality an aggregate factor, not an emergent factor 
(meaning the group characteristic is the total of its parts, not more than the sum of its 
parts, McCrae, Terracciano, & 79 members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures 
Project, 2005a). 
Further support for the validity of our question comes from the field of art 
psychology. This field has extensively studied the relationship between art 
preferences and personality, albeit based on art movements and not on specific 
measurable details as I investigate in the present study. One large-scale investigation 
(Chamorro-Premuzic, Reimers, Hsu, & Ahmetoglu, 2009) found that on an 
individual level, people who scored higher on Extraversion preferred cubism over 
other styles, and people that scored higher on Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, 
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and lower on Openness to experience, tended to prefer impressionism over cubism, 
renaissance art and Japanese art (Chamorro-Premuzic, et al., 2009). Although it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate it further, if these art movements differ 
in the measures investigated by Masuda et al. (2008) this could be an interesting 
crossover.12 Since this study was done on an individual level, the current study is 
justified in testing it at that same level. 
Conceptually one could imagine these factors being related at the 
interpersonal level. Individualistic societies emphasise personal uniqueness, which 
could be expressed at an interpersonal level as extraversion, which facilitates the 
expression of that uniqueness to others, and could therefore be expressed in paintings 
as a focus on the individual face to the exclusion of contextual objects. Collectivist 
societies value similarity in behaviour and the de-emphasis of personal uniqueness, 
which could reduce extraversion at an interpersonal level and thus decrease the 
interest in individually unique faces/individuals within art. This would predict, 
therefore, a hitherto undemonstrated relationship between Extraversion and 
preference for analytic aspects in art: more extraverted people should prefer pictures 
with larger faces, which is more typical of analytic societies. 
4.3 METHODS 
4.3.1 Participants 
Sixty undergraduate students from Queen Mary, University of London took 
part in this study (12 male, 48 female), who were paid £4 for 30 minutes of their 
                                                                
12 Some elements of these art styles are somewhat reminiscent of the current topic of investigation: renaissance 
art is very rich in detail and has many additional items which is a feature of holistic cognition, while cubism is 
more abstract than the other art styles which chimes with analytic cognition. On the other hand, cubism is also 
marked by multiple perspectives, which would match holism, and the Japanese style of ukiyo-e woodblock prints 
is praised for its simplicity, presumably not including many additional items in the scenes which is not expected 
for an East Asian society. It would be an interesting venture to investigate if and how these movements differ in 
terms of face-to-frame ratio, relative horizon height and number of additional items.  
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time. Participants were from different cultural backgrounds and we asked in which 
country they lived up to the age of 14. Forty-three were from the UK, 2 were from 
Poland, one participant each was from the countries Austria, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Russia and South Korea, and 10 had moved countries before the age of 14. Ages 
ranged from 18 to 22 (mean = 18.91, SD = 1.097). Per session up to 6 participants 
took part. This study was approved by the Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee, 
reference QMREC2011-5. 
4.3.2 Materials 
A print copy of the NEO-IPIP Questionnaire was used (Goldberg; Goldberg, 
et al., 2006, Appendix I), which evaluates personality in terms of the Big Five 
dimensions: Intellect/Imagination, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness 
and Emotional Stability. It comprises of 100 questions which are answered on a 5-
point Likert scale. A portrait of one of the two experimenters was taken with a Sony 
camera with a zoom function, at a distance of 2.75 metres which was marked in tape 
on the floor. Landscapes were drawn on an A4 paper with a thick black frame around 
the outer edges, leaving an area of 25.7 cm x 17.1 cm for the drawing, as is also used 
in Appendix II. Elements that had to be included were at least a house, a tree, a river, 
a person and a horizon. In this drawing the horizon height and number of additional 
items was measured. 
4.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were received in the computer lab and allocated to a cubicle. The 
questionnaire was filled out on paper in the cubicle, and participants were taken to a 
nearby location to take the picture and draw a landscape. The experimenter showed 
each participant individually how to use the camera’s zoom function, after which the 
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participant was asked to “take a photograph” of the experimenter at a marked 
distance of 2.75 metres. When a participant asked how they should take the 
photograph or draw the landscape, the reply was “in any way you want”. Each 
picture task had a time limit of 5 minutes and the questionnaire was set for 15 
minutes. Per session, half the group would start with the questionnaire while the 
other half were taken away to make the pictures. While one of the picture subgroup 
was taking the photograph, the other participants would draw the landscape. The 
order in which tasks were done was randomised, as was the allocation of computers 
and which of the two experimenters took participants away or observed the 
questionnaire. 
4.3.4 Analysis 
Following the face-to-frame ratio method of Masuda et al. (2008), in each 
photograph the area of the face was determined by measuring the distance from the 
chin to the top of the head, including hair, and the longest horizontal distance across 
the face, excluding hair. The frame area was measured from the inner border of the 
frame. The face-to-frame ratio is calculated as (face length * face width)/(frame 
length * frame width). The horizon height in the landscape drawing was measured by 
drawing a straight line through the horizon so that the area of land above the line 
approximately equalled the area of air under the line, and then the mean distance 
from the bottom border to the line was measured. The number of additional items 
was counted. An additional item was any extra element that we did not specify as a 
requirement. Groups of connected items were counted as one item (e.g. a group of 
clouds), but loose individual items were counted as one item each (e.g. loose clouds 
dispersed along the sky). For the personality questionnaire all questions were reverse 
scored where necessary and summed per factor. 
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Data for most variables were normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilks tests 
resulting in p >= .05). Transforming the data for additional items and Agreeableness 
(square-root transformations) and the face-to-frame ratio (log transformation) 
resulted in normal distributions (Shapiro-Wilks tests p >= .05). Both transformed and 
raw data are reported in this analysis. The cultural background data showed too little 
variability for statistical analysis, and will not be analysed. 
4.4 RESULTS 
Analysis shows that Extraversion does not correlate with any of the picture 
measures (face-to-frame ratio: Pearson: r = .116, N = 60, p = .376, Figure 26; 
untransformed data: Spearman: rs = .178, N = 60, p =.174; horizon height: Pearson: r 
= -.01, N = 58, p =.94, Figure 27; untransformed data: Spearman: rs = -.01, N = 58, p 
=.94; additional items: Pearson: r = -.03, N = 58, p .821, Figure 28; untransformed 
data: Spearman: rs = -.145, N = 58, p .276).  
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Figure 26: No significant correlation between Extraversion and Face-to-
Frame ratio 
 
Figure 27: No significant correlation between Extraversion and relative 
horizon height. 
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Figure 28: No significant correlation between Extraversion and additional 
items 
Agreeableness correlates with the face-to-frame ratio (Pearson: r = .330, N = 
60, p < .01; untransformed data Spearman: rs = .276, N = 60, p < .05, Figure 29) but 
not with either of the other picture measures. None of the other personality factors 
(Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability or Intellect/Imagination) correlate with any 
of the picture measures. 
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Figure 29: Significant and positive correlation between Agreeableness 
and face-to-frame ratio 
Some effects are found that are not central to the hypothesis. As expected, 
among the primary DVs the face-to-frame ratio is negatively correlated to the 
number of additional items (r = -.268, N = 58, p < .05; untransformed data: rs =-.236, 
N = 58, p = .074). However, contrary to expectation, horizon height does not 
correlate with the face-to-frame ratio (r = .091, N = 58, p = .496; untransformed data: 
rs = .001, N = 58, p = .995) or the number of additional items (r = .019, N = 58, p = 
.887; untransformed data: rs = .007, N = 58, p = .958). 
There were some sex differences. Males drew significantly higher horizons 
than females (males: M = .748, SD = .155; females: M = .630, SD = .171; Levene’s 
test: F = .677, p = .414; independent samples t-test: t56 = 2.167, p < .05). Males also 
scored significantly higher on Emotional Stability (males: M = 70.083, SD = 8.480; 
females: M = 56.229, SD = 13.869; Levene’s test: F = 4.595, p < .05; independent 
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samples t-test (equal variances not assumed): t27.7 = 4.381, p < .001). Controlling for 
sex did not result in any changes in the above findings; there were no effects except 
for a relation between Agreeableness and the face-to-frame ratio. Sex was not a 
predictor for the face-to-frame ratio (F1,58 = .014, R2 = 0, p = .906), while adding 
Agreeableness significantly improves prediction (R2change = .110, F = 3.543, p < 
.035). 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
We hypothesised that on an individual level analytic cognition would 
positively correlate with Extraversion, leading people who score higher on 
Extraversion to make pictures with larger faces, and draw landscapes with lower 
horizons and fewer additional items, than people who score lower on Extraversion. 
We did not find support for this hypothesis: Extraversion in our participants did not 
correlate with the face-to-frame ratio, relative horizon height, or number of 
additional items. That we find no support for our hypothesis might mean that 
analyticism in pictures and individualism occur together at the group-level, but not at 
the individual level (Na et al. 2010). That would make this link a cultural one, 
meaning it is not a by-product of cross-cultural differences in personality types, 
rather factors in the cultural environment of individuals influence this phenomenon 
most. Surprisingly, instead of a link between Extraversion and proxies of analytic 
cognition, we found a link between Agreeableness and the face-to-frame ratio (but 
not with the other two proxies). Participants scoring high on Agreeableness 
photographed larger faces than participants with low Agreeableness scores. 
It is possible that this relationship is spurious given the multiple correlations 
run and the lack of a specific a priori prediction relating to Agreeableness, resulting 
in a Type I error. It is also possible that the lack of correlation found with 
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Extraversion is due to a Type II error, although the fact that the effect sizes are much 
smaller than those for Agreeableness is an indication of Agreeableness’ greater 
importance. Further replications with larger and more diverse participant samples are 
needed to determine the robustness of these effects. Future studies might also use a 
range of measures of analytic-holistic cognition, beyond the picture tasks used here.  
It is also possible that the link between Agreeableness and the face-to-frame 
ratio is due to another factor besides a cultural one. Several links are imaginable: if 
highly Agreeable people take a deep interest in other people, they might want to 
focus on faces more than people who score low on Agreeableness. Also: if highly 
Agreeable people are more focused on pleasing the experimenter than low Agreeable 
people, the high Agreeable people may have taken the instruction for the zoom 
function as an indicator that they were expected to zoom in (although we were 
consistent in setting the zoom level back to the middle for each participant). These 
reasons for a link between Agreeableness and a high face-to-frame ratio cannot with 
certainty be excluded. However, this would mean that the assumptions underlying 
the cultural differences found in the face-to-frame ratio would be incorrect, and 
analytic-holistic cognition is not the main determiner of the face-to-frame ratio, but 
Agreeableness is. 
Assuming that the previous literature is correct in considering the face-to-
frame ratio as a proxy for analytic-holistic cognition, and that the found correlation is 
robust, we can speculate on its basis. Agreeableness has no relationship with IDV, 
but correlates negatively with the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) and 
Masculinity/Femininity (Mas, Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). If the level of analyticism 
in portraits is related to the level of Agreeableness, one conclusion might be that the 
level of analyticism in pictures is not linked to IDV, but to UAI or Mas. Previous 
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research on analyticism in pictures by Masuda and colleagues (2008) was only 
implicitly linked to IDV (Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008) which they themselves have 
carefully avoided doing (Ji, et al., 2000; Kitayama, et al., 2003; Masuda, et al., 2008; 
Miyamoto, et al., 2006; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003). It is possible that IDV explains 
the differences in cognitive mode between Western and East Asian societies, but too 
few countries have been investigated to exclude explanation in terms of UAI or Mas. 
The relationship between cognitive mode and Hofstede’s dimensions should be 
further elucidated by comparing levels of analytic/holistic cognition in countries 
specifically chosen to contrast on the range of IDV versus the range of UAI and Mas. 
A recent finding by Jackson, Thoemmes, Jonkmann, Lüdtke, and Trautwein 
(2012) links the present study to findings in Chapter 3. These researchers measured 
personality in young German men over a period of six years, and found that people 
who went through military service were significantly less Agreeable than people 
who had served in a civil function. There was a self-selection effect where those who 
opted for military service scored slightly lower in Agreeableness than others at the 
beginning of the measured time period. This difference between the young men in 
military and in civilian service was much increased after service had ended, and 
persisted for the duration of the study, which was 5 years. This concurs with the 
results in this chapter and Chapter 3: people lower in Agreeableness made pictures 
with smaller faces, and smaller faces co-occur with long periods of war. Assuming 
these findings are not spurious, what the portraits series might represent is the effect 
of war on Agreeableness, which may have slowly decreased in the population as an 
increasing number of people experience war.  
Another connection between the present study and Chapter 3 exists. 
Although not directly measured, Hofstede, et al. (2010) discuss war in relation to 
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UAI mediated by anxiety and stress levels. UAI correlates strongly to anxiety and 
stress (Hofstede, 2001,p. 182). Although UAI has not been measured for change over 
time, time series of anxiety and stress do exist. The countries in which WWII was 
fought showed elevated stress and anxiety levels during the war (Hofstede, et al., 
2010, pp. 232-234). Although high UAI and Mas both co-occur with xenophobia and 
nationalism (Hofstede, 2001, pp. 175-176 and 196 ), relating to war UAI probably 
has a larger role than Mas (Hofstede, et al., 2010). 
The lack of correlation between the face-to-frame ratio and relative horizon 
height that was found here adds to the result from Chapter 3, where a similar 
discrepancy between the two measures was found. Since in both studies the results 
for the face-to-frame ratios are in line with the literature it seems that the relative 
horizon height is not a good proxy for analytic/holistic cognitive mode. This view is 
further supported by results in the next chapter (Chapter 5). 
In conclusion, no evidence was found for the inferred group-level 
relationship between Extraversion and analytic cognition in pictures to occur at the 
individual-level, but a relationship was found between Agreeableness and the face-
to-frame ratio in pictures. On the group-level Agreeableness is related to UAI and 
Mas, but not to IDV (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). Findings for cultural differences in 
face-to-frame ratios in the literature could be explained by IDV, UAI and Mas, 
depending on the exact countries measured. Therefore the conclusion is drawn that 
the assumed relationship between analytic/holistic cognition and IDV may be 
premature, and specifically links with UAI and Mas should be investigated. This 
alternative explanation for analytic/holistic cognition reinforces assertions from the 
field that other dimensions besides IDV should be given more thought (Kirkman, et 
al., 2006; Tsui, et al., 2007).
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CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECT OF EXPERIMENTALLY INDUCED 
COOPERATION ON COGNITIVE MODE 
5.1 ABSTRACT 
The ecocultural hypothesis predicts that working alone induces an analytic 
cognitive mode, while working together induces a holistic cognitive mode. Here I 
test this prediction by priming participants either with working together in a group in 
a public goods game (PGG) or with working alone in a multi-armed bandit game 
(MAB). While previous studies have successfully primed cognition, this is the first 
attempt to use priming to test a specific hypothesis for the origin of analytic and 
holistic cognition, and the first use of economic games as primes. Shifts in cognitive 
mode are tested with three tasks before and after playing the game. Cognitive mode 
has been proposed to be underpinned by self-construal, so in addition participants 
completed two tasks that measure self-construal. No changes in cognitive mode were 
detected. Self-construal did not change in the cooperative condition, but in the 
solitary condition independent self-construal increased significantly as predicted. In 
conclusion, this experiment does not support the ecocultural hypothesis for the origin 
of culturally variable cognition. However, the use of economic games may have been 
a confounding factor, since priming for money increases independence, thereby 
negating any effects in the cooperative condition and increasing any effects in the 
solitary condition. 
5.2 INTRODUCTION 
The ecocultural hypothesis posits that the differences in contemporary modes 
of thought observed between Western and East Asian societies have their origin in 
the ecological niche in the distant past (Nisbett, 2003; for an in-depth discussion of 
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the ecocultural hypothesis see section 2.4.2). The hypothesis proposes a series of 
factors interlinked in a causal chain, as follows. In regions with land suitable for 
farming, farming will become the major means of subsistence. That makes people (i) 
sedentary because they need to tend their fields and storage barns and (ii) 
interdependent because of the large amount of work on the farm that needs to be 
completed collectively. Being sedentary means prolonged physical proximity, which 
leads to the establishment of close-knit social networks. The development of a tight 
social network may be helped by, or maybe even primarily caused by, being 
interdependent because of the large work-load. This social network makes people 
pay more attention to one’s group-members, and induces other collectivistic 
elements of cognition, like being focused on relationships between things and people 
and seeing the whole instead of its parts. Of course, sharing work and being 
interdependent might also foster a focus on relationships, or prioritizing for the good 
of the group. Some evidence for this theory has been found: in an area in Turkey, 
farmers were more holistic than solitary fishermen (Uskul, et al., 2008). In summary, 
the theory is that working alone fosters analytic cognition, while working together 
fosters holistic cognition. 
Some factors have been found to influence cognitive mode in a very direct 
fashion, through priming. For instance, priming with culturally relevant information 
such as street scene images or language induces change in cognitive mode, as does 
priming with socially relevant information such as social power (see section 2.3.1). 
These factors are constantly present in the environment and therefore have to be 
assumed to continuously reinforce cognitive mode. If working alone or together is 
responsible for cognitive mode, it should have as much influence as these other 
factors, if not more. Therefore I here use a priming paradigm to experimentally test if 
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cognitive mode can be changed on an individual level through type of work: that 
which requires cooperation or work that is done alone. As primes economic games 
are used, which have proven to be powerful tools for understanding and 
manipulating social interactions. To the best of my knowledge using economic 
games as primes is novel. 
In the cooperative condition participants play a public goods game with 
punishment (PGG, see section 2.3.5), in which participants are tempted to defect, 
while the best long-term result would come from cooperating (Ostrom, 1998). With 
punishment, people typically maintain high levels of cooperation. In the solitary 
condition participants play a multi-armed bandit (MAB), which is played with no 
interaction with others. Both games are cast in a relevant food gathering scenario: 
collective farming in the PGG and solitary fishing in the MAB. According to the 
ecocultural hypothesis, participants should show a shift towards more holistic mind 
sets when cooperating, and a shift towards more analytic mind sets when playing 
solitarily. 
To gauge participants’ cognitive mode three measurements are used that have 
been found to effectively show a difference between East Asians and Westerners. 
Appendix II presents the tasks as they were given to participants. (1) Categorizing 
task (Ji, et al., 2004; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984): participants have to group a 
word with one of two others, and briefly explain their choice. For example: “Dog. To 
which does this word belong most: A. Cat, or B. Bone”. East Asians were found to 
predominantly choose on thematic grounds through focusing on relationships while 
Westerners choose mostly on taxonomic grounds, focusing on categories. (2) Portrait 
choosing task (Masuda, et al., 2008): participants have to choose their preferred 
portrait photograph from a set of four, which differ in the ratio of subject to 
EFFECT OF COOPERATION ON COGNITIVE MODE 
129 
 
background. East Asians choose mostly a small subject while Westerners choose a 
large subject. (3) Landscape drawing task (Masuda, et al., 2008): participants are 
asked to draw a landscape with at least a person, a house, a tree, a river and a 
horizon, within the frame on the paper given to them. East Asians generally draw a 
higher horizon and include more extra items than do Westerners. 
In addition in(ter)dependent self-construal is tested since this has also been 
shown to differ between East Asians and Westerners (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), 
and has been argued to underpin mode of thought. In the fourth task I make use of 
work by Gardner, et al. (1999), who asked participants to circle all pronouns in a 
short narrative. Texts with only singular pronouns (e.g. “I”) induced participants to 
report higher independent self-construal and individualistic values, while texts with 
only plural pronouns (e.g. “we”) induced higher interdependent self-construal and 
collectivistic values. Here this task was modified to measure self-construal before 
and after playing the game. Participants were asked to think of a recent social 
occasion, and describe it in five sentences. The number of plural compared to 
singular pronouns used indicates the participant’s in(ter)dependent self-construal. 
The fifth and last task measures self-construal in a direct manner, using a 
questionnaire (Grace & Cramer, 2003; Singelis, 1994), in which participants are 
asked to rate their values related to in(ter)dependence on a sliding scale, for example: 
“It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group”. 
In summary, it is predicted that the solitary prime (the Multi-Armed Bandit 
game) will cause participants’ cognition to become more analytic and less holistic, 
and their self-construal more independent and less interdependent, and the collective 
action prime (the Public Goods Game) will have the reverse effect. 
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5.3 METHODS 
5.3.1 Design 
A 2x2 mixed design was adopted where the within-participant factor was 
priming (before vs. after) and the between-participant factor was condition 
(cooperative vs. solitary). The dependent variables were the answers on the five 
cultural tasks before and after playing the game. It was predicted that participants in 
the cooperative condition would shift their answers towards more holistic mode and 
increased interdependent self-construal, while participants in the solitary condition 
would shift towards a more analytic mode and increased independent self-construal. 
5.3.2 Materials 
The five tasks were presented in separate paper booklets (Appendix II). Tasks 
before and after playing the game were changed in content to prevent participants 
from automatically filling in answers (versions 1 and 2 in Appendix II). Ten trios of 
words for the categorization tasks were adapted from Markman and Hutchinson 
(1984) and in addition I asked for a brief explanation of the participants’ choice, to 
check if the reasoning indeed was based on thematic or taxonomic grounds (e.g., 
‘dog’ may have been paired to ‘cat’ instead of ‘bone’, which might seem like a 
taxonomic or analytic choice, while the participant was thinking of the thematic or 
holistic reason: ‘the dog chases the cat’). In the task after the game, ten different trios 
of words were used. In the portrait choosing task, five sets of portrait pictures were 
manipulated in Photoshop to have a person appear in different sizes in a background. 
Face-to-frame ratios were taken from Masuda, et al. (2008). After the game, persons 
and backgrounds were presented in different combinations. In the pronouns task 
participants were asked to think of a recent social occasion which they enjoyed, and 
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describe what happened in five sentences. Participants had 5 lines for their 
description and different examples before and after the game were given with equal 
numbers of singular and plural pronouns. In the landscape drawing task participants 
were presented with an A4 paper with a 1 inch black frame. Participants were asked 
to draw a landscape including at least a barn, a tree, a cow, a road and a horizon, or 
at least a house, a tree, a river, a person and a horizon. There were checkboxes in the 
lower left hand corner to remind participants of what to draw. For the values 
questionnaire, questions from Singelis’ (1994) independent and interdependent self-
construal questionnaire were used. This questionnaire had twelve questions in both 
the interdependent and independent categories. Grace and Cramer (2003) re-analysed 
the questions with factor analysis and found that eight questions (four out of each 
category) clustered into a third group which they interpreted as relating to hierarchy 
(similar to power distance in Hofstede, 2001). This third group also showed a 
significant sex-difference; therefore we did not use these questions. Questions were 
answered on an X-point Likert scale with extremes “I completely agree” to “I 
completely disagree”. Half the questions were given before the task, the other half 
after the task. 
The parameters for the PGG were adjusted for different group sizes (Table 5, 
for screenshots of the PGG see Appendix III). Participants were told they were 
farmers who had enough seed to plant twenty acres of land per season (endowment 
E). They had to decide whether to plant seeds in their private land, or to plant it in 
the communal land. The communal land has the benefit of shared responsibilities 
and therefore yielded more crop per acre planted than did the private land 
(multiplication factor b). They could punish each other for not planting enough seeds 
in the communal area (punishment P). Each unit of their crop they put towards 
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punishing another was multiplied by three (punishment multiplication factor Pmf). 
Participants could see in each round how many units of seed other players had 
planted in the communal land, but they could not identify other players and were told 
the order in which contributions were presented changed between seasons. Players 
could see the history of their scores in a table on the right hand side of the screen. 
The game lasted for 10 seasons, but to avoid a change of tactics in the final round 
participants were told they would play between 8 and 12 seasons, depending on how 
much time was left. 
Table 5: Parameters in the public goods game. 
Group size 
 
Endowment 
 
Multiplication 
factor 
 
Punishment 
 
Multiplication 
factor 
punishment 
Conversion 
rate 
N E B P Pmf (pence/unit) 
3 20 1.5 0-10 3 1.5  
4 30 2 0-15 3 0.8 
5 20 2.5 0-10 3 1 
 
In the multi-armed bandit game (MAB) participants were told they were 
fishermen and they had to catch fish every day to feed their family and sell on the 
market (for screenshots of the MAB see Appendix IV). There were four rivers: 
North, South, East and West, only one river per day could be fished from. The 
quality of the rivers changed: on any day, there was only one river that delivered 
large catches (between 5 and 9 fish) while the other three delivered only between 2 
and 6 fish. On average a river would remain high yielding for five days in a row. 
After that the river would be depleted and another river would become the high 
yielding one. Every day the family needed to eat 3 fish, and the remaining number of 
fish would be sold against 1.25 pence per fish. At the end of 120 days the total profit 
of fishing was the participants’ reward. Participants received all information in the 
instruction. Both games were coded and presented in Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
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5.3.3 Participants 
Eighty-four participants took part in this study (68 female, 16 male). Data 
from two participants were discarded because more than one task was unfinished, 
leaving 41 participants in the cooperative condition and 41 in the solitary condition. 
Ages ranged from 17 to 38 (mean = 19.58, SD = 2.829). Per session 3 to 5 
participants took part. Participants were asked to sign up as a group and therefore 
knew each other. All participants were students at Queen Mary University of 
London, most of which were bachelor students. Participants were paid between £4 
and £10, depending on their score in the computer game. This study was approved 
by the Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee, reference QMREC2010/56. 
5.3.4 Procedure 
Upon entering the laboratory participants were allocated to a computer 
divided by a screen. Participants answered some background questions, gave their 
consent and filled out the five tasks in the paper booklet for which they had 10 
minutes. Then they read an introduction to the computer game which included 
questions to check their understanding of the game. After checking that everyone 
could produce the right answers 2 practice rounds were played, followed by the 
rounds in which money could be made. After the game was finished, the second set 
of five tasks was filled out in the paper booklet which also took 10 minutes. Then 
participants were debriefed, paid and were free to leave. Sessions did not exceed one 
hour. 
5.3.5 Coding 
Besides a relative score, the pronouns task and values questionnaire also gave 
independent scores for each cognitive mode because scoring high on one mode does 
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not exclude a high score on the other mode. For these tasks I tested for a difference 
in each separate mode, and the relative score, before and after the game. In all tasks a 
higher score means a higher level of holistic cognition or interdependent self-
construal, except for the measures singular pronouns and independent self-construal 
where a higher score indicates higher analytic cognition and independence. 
In the categorizing task the variable was the number of thematic choices. In 
the picture choosing task the variable was the mean of choice in the five sets of 
pictures, where each face size was given a number (smallest face = 4, largest face = 
1). In the pronouns task the variable was the ratio of plural to singular pronouns. For 
the horizon height, a line was drawn through the horizon that approximately had as 
much surface area under it as above it. The variable was the mean height of this line 
relative to the height of the drawing field. For the number of additional items all 
extra items except the obligatory ones were counted separately, except for groups of 
very simply drawn items, such as flocks of v-shaped birds and grass dispersed 
throughout the drawing. In the values questionnaire, the variable was the ratio of 
mean score on interdependent items to the mean score on independent items. 
Some participants failed to do all tasks. The horizon height task was most 
often unfinished. One missing task was accepted, but data for two participants were 
excluded because they did not complete 2 or 3 tasks. 
5.4 RESULTS 
Most data were non-normally distributed. Exceptions were in the cooperative 
condition the picture choosing task before playing the game, the number of 
additional items in the landscape drawing task, the separate measures in the 
pronouns task and the values questionnaire before and after playing the game 
(although not the ratios between the independent measures). Normally distributed 
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variables in the solitary condition were the picture choosing and horizon height 
tasks, and the independent measures for the values questionnaire, before and after 
playing the game. 
5.4.1 Main effects  
In the cooperative condition (Table 6), paired-samples t-tests and related-
samples Wilcoxon signed rank tests showed that in none of the tasks was there a 
significant difference in answer before and after playing the game. In the solitary 
condition (Table 7) there was a significant change in the independent self-construal 
items in the questionnaire before and after playing the game, indicating a shift from 
less to more independence as predicted (before: M = .30, SD = .13; after M = .35, 
SD = .14; t(39) = -2.150, p < .05, two-tailed). There was also a significant change in 
the ratio of plural to single pronouns used before and after playing the game, again in 
the predicted direction from less to more independence (before: M = 3.44, SD = 
4.55; after M = 1.25, SD = 1.30; z = -2.734, N – Ties = 38, p < .01 two-tailed). All 
other changes were non-significant. 
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Table 6: Differences in tasks before and after playing the game, 
cooperative condition. 
Cooperative condition 
T-tests  
 
Before 
M 
 
SD 
After 
M 
 
SD 
t df p (two-
tailed) 
Singular 
pronouns  
3.58 2.34 3.48 2.05 .218 39 .828 
Plural pronouns 
 
3.05 1.38 3.40 1.72 -1.110 39 .274 
Independent 
self-construal 
.32 .16 .31 .13 .542 40 .591 
Interdependent 
self-construal 
.41 .18 .41 .17 .279 40 .782 
Wilcoxon 
signed rank 
tests 
Before 
M 
 
SD 
After 
M 
 
SD 
z N-Ties p (two-
tailed) 
Categorisation 
 
5.83 2.90 5.46 2.74 -1.255 30 .210 
Picture 
choosing 
3.00 .65 2.93 .73 -.091 35 .928 
Horizon height 
 
.57 .18 .61 .18 -1.633 29 .103 
Additional 
items 
5.86 3.91 6.45 5.82 -.013 26 .990 
Pronouns Ratio 
  
2.77 3.34 1.58 1.68 -1.770 38 .077 
Self-construal 
ratio 
2.53 4.25 1.60 1.08 -.849 41 .396 
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Table 7: Difference in tasks before and after playing the game, solitary 
condition. 
Solitary condition  
T-tests  
 
Before 
M 
 
SD 
After 
M 
 
SD 
t df p (two-
tailed) 
Picture 
choosing 
2.93 .67 3.04 .57 -1.269 40 .212 
Horizon height 
 
.66 .17 .70 .17 -1.577 38 .123 
Independent 
self-construal 
.30 .13 .35 .14 -2.150 39 .038 
Interdependent 
self-construal 
.35 .15 .36 .17 -.167 39 .868 
Wilcoxon 
signed rank 
tests 
Before 
M 
 
SD 
After 
M 
 
SD 
z N-Ties p (two-
tailed) 
Categorisation 
 
6.90 2.00 6.49 2.15 -1.551 27 .121 
Additional 
Items 
5.05 3.71 6.50 4.86 -1.483 32 .138 
Pronouns Ratio 
 
3.44 4.55 1.25 1.30 -2.734 38 .006 
Singular 
pronouns  
3.17 2.38 3.37 2.19 -.237 36 .812 
Plural pronouns 
 
2.68 1.57 2.63 1.64 -.290 28 .772 
Self-construal 
ratio 
1.80 2.41 1.59 3.24 -1.290 40 .197 
 
For comparing the two conditions, the change in answers for tasks before and 
after the game was calculated (after score – before score), and compared, using 
independent-samples t-test and Mann-Whitney U tests. There were no significant 
differences in changes between conditions (Table 8). 
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Table 8: Difference in change after playing the game between 
cooperative and solitary condition. 
Cooperative vs. Solitary condition  
T-test  
 
Change coop cond Change sol 
cond 
t df p (two-
tailed) 
M SD M SD 
Independent 
self-construal 
.15 .17 -.05 .14 1.802 79 .075 
Mann-Whitney 
U tests 
Change coop cond Change sol 
cond 
U N p (two-
tailed) 
M SD M SD 
Categorisation -.37 2.42 -.32 1.89 822.50 82 .865 
Picture 
choosing 
.06 .63 -.10 .51 779.50 82 .569 
Horizon height .05 .139 .04 .16 551.50 69 .685 
Additional 
Items 
.59 6.45 1.45 4.25 470.50 67 .307 
Pronouns Ratio 
 
-1.20 3.91 -2.19 4.47 744 81 .473 
Singular 
pronouns  
.10 2.90 -.20 2.90 802 81 .864 
Plural 
pronouns 
 
-.35 1.99 .05 1.70 722 81 .345 
Self-construal 
ratio 
-.94 1.45 -.24 4.01 800 81 .850 
Interdependent 
self-construal 
.01 .22 -.00 .18 .806 81 .895 
 
5.4.2 Task concurrence 
To test if tasks measuring analytic vs. holistic cognition and in(ter)-
dependent self-construal tap into the same underlying construct, answers from all 
participants before playing the game (i.e. before participants were primed) were 
analysed. No variables were normally distributed except for the picture choosing 
task, relative horizon height, and answers to the self-construal questionnaire. Out of 
all five tasks before the game, only the picture choosing task was correlated to the 
ratio of plural to singular pronouns (rs = .252, N = 81, p < .05, two-tailed). For the 
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two tasks that could be split up in separate variables, the correlation between inter- 
and independent self-construal items was not significant (r = -194, N = 82, p = .081, 
two-tailed), but the correlation between singular and plural pronouns was significant 
(rs = -.304, N = 81, p < .01, two-tailed). None of the separate variables were 
correlated to any of the other tasks. 
5.4.3 Effects of earnings 
Earnings in the cooperative condition (M = 7.52, SD = .81) were significantly 
higher than in the solitary condition (M = 7.00, SD = .61; Levene’s test: F = .10.647, 
p < .005; Mann-Whitney U-test: U = 570, N1 = N2 = 41, p < .05, two-tailed). 
Controlling for the amount of money earned did not change the main results; there 
were no significant differences in change after playing the game between the 
cooperative and the solitary conditions. 
5.5 DISCUSSION 
In the cooperative condition there were no significant shifts in cognitive 
mode or self-construal after playing the game. In the solitary condition participants 
showed a significant increase in independence score in both self-construal tasks: they 
used significantly more singular pronouns relative to plural pronouns, and scored 
significantly higher on the independent items of the questionnaire but not lower on 
the interdependent items, or the ratio between the two. Between conditions there 
were no significant differences in change to any of the tasks. Overall, the present 
findings do not support the hypothesis: the type of work does not immediately 
influence analytic and holistic mode of thought. 
The study presented here indicates that working alone or together is not a 
priming factor in analytic or holistic cognition. Previous work has shown that 
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cognitive mode can be primed using culturally relevant information such as images 
of street scenes or language, and with socially relevant information such as social 
power (see section 2.3.1). This implies that the ecocultural hypothesis is incorrect (as 
also concluded in Chapter 3), since if other information has a greater capacity of 
changing cognitive mode than type of work has, then this other information will be a 
stronger driving force for the current cognitive mode. Previous studies finding type 
of work to co-occur with cognitive mode (i.e. Uskul, et al., 2008) have not shown 
causality of the factors, but only co-occurrence. Underlying causal factors such as 
language, street scene or social power may have been overlooked. 
However, it is possible that the use of economic games played via the 
computer may not have the same effect as playing a game face-to-face. From PGG 
experiments we know that cooperation increases when communication or reputation 
building is possible (see section 2.3.5). Moreover, priming for individualism and 
collectivism, or in(ter)dependent self-construal has been achieved using group vs. 
individual primes. For instance, in a face-to-face market game involving between-
group trading governed by rules vs. within-group trading based on reputations, 
Yamagishi and Suzuki (2010) found that the first condition increased independent 
self-construal, while the second condition increased interdependent self-construal. 
The difference with the present study may be that it dealt with direct contact which 
may make a qualitative difference to the process. On the other hand, Oyserman and 
Lee (2008) also describe effective primes using imagined groups. This raises the 
possibility that the PGG was not forceful enough in inducing cooperative behaviour 
because it failed to induce a real sense of ‘group’. Participants may have been 
frustrated by others not contributing enough to their liking, or by being punished. 
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This may have led them to want to exit the group, hindering successful priming of 
interdependence. 
The use of economic games as primes might have come with another 
confounding factor. In these games the goal is expressly to earn as much money as 
possible. Vohs, et al. (2006) showed that people primed for money showed increased 
independence in the form of self-sufficiency, expressed in the amount of help asked 
for and given, in terms of time, effort and money. This may have increased 
independency and independent self-construal in both conditions, negating any 
cooperative effect of the PGG and adding to any effect the MAB may have had. 
Although participants in the PGG earned significantly more money than participants 
in the MAB, controlling for the amount of money earned had no effect on shift of 
cognitive mode or self-construal. This indicates that if participants were accidentally 
primed for independence, the effect is due to the money based goal of the game and 
not to the amount of money earned. 
Besides testing the effect of priming, this experiment also lent itself to 
investigating whether tasks designed to tap into the same underlying construct of 
analytic or holistic cognitive mode, did exactly that. Answers given to the first three 
tasks before playing the game were expected to correlate with each other. Also 
independent self-construal was expected to correlate with an analytic mode, and 
interdependent self-construal with a holistic mode. Contrary to expectations there 
was no task concurrence, as has since been found (Na, et al., 2010). Again, as in 
Chapters 3 and 4, face-to-frame ratios in portraits and relative horizon heights in 
landscapes did not correlate, once more affirming that relative horizon heights are 
not good measures of analytic/holistic cognitive mode. However, a significant 
correlation was found between the picture choosing task (cognitive mode) and the 
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pronoun task (self-construal): participants that chose pictures with smaller faces used 
a higher ratio of plural to singular pronouns. Due to the large number of 
comparisons, it is possible that this significant result is a Type I error. It is also 
possible that the lack of evidence for the hypothesis is due to a Type II error, 
although increasing the sample size may not change the direction of effects which 
are not clearly in line with the hypothesis. Future studies with a larger and more 
diverse sample size could investigate if this effect was spurious. Assuming the effect 
is robust, this finding confirms that analytic/holistic cognitive mode and self-
construal are linked (Kühnen, et al., 2001; Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002). 
In the landscape drawings relative horizon height did not respond to the 
experimental procedure in this task. Given that in Chapters 3 and 4 it also did not 
show any of the expected effects leads to the conclusion that relative horizon height 
is not a good proxy for cognitive mode, for reasons also touched upon in Chapter 3: 
it aims to approximate the number of additional items, items which might also occur 
above the horizon, and other factors besides included items might also cause 
horizons to be drawn higher or lower. Moreover, the number of additional items also 
did not respond to the procedure here, as it did not in Chapter 4. Possibly some 
factors other than cognitive mode play a role in the choice for more or less items, 
such as time to waste before the experiment is over. 
In conclusion, the present experiment found that analytic and holistic 
cognition cannot be primed, or at least not with economic games, which does not 
support the ecocultural hypothesis. Playing a solitary multi-armed bandit game did 
increase participants’ independent self-construal. The three tasks for cognitive mode 
do not correspond with each other, as has been found since (Na, et al., 2010). 
Furthermore I find that, in concordance with findings in Chapters 3 and 4, relative 
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horizon heights and number of additional items in landscape drawings are not good 
proxies for cognitive mode. The picture choosing task was correlated to the ratio of 
plural to singular, which provides further support for the link between 
analytic/holistic cognitive mode and self-construal. Future studies could further 
investigate the role of work type in the ecocultural hypothesis by using games that 
do not rely on earning money.
CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEMS 
144 
 
CHAPTER 6: CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON PUBLIC GOODS 
PROBLEMS 
6.1 ABSTRACT 
Cultural variation in Public Goods Game (PGG) contributions has been 
detected, but not explained in terms of cultural dimensions. Using previously 
published data I find that cross-cultural variation in contribution rates in the PGG 
with punishment correlates significantly negatively with tax evasion, indicating that 
the PGG with punishment is indeed a good model for real-life tragedy of the 
commons situations. This indicates that findings from studies on cultural influences 
on the PGG can be informative for cultural studies on tax evasion, and vice versa. 
The common cultural denominator between the public goods dilemma in real-life 
and the laboratory is found to be uncertainty avoidance, as measured by the 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI). This gives rise to the hypothesis that in one-
shot PGGs without punishment, the lack of controllable circumstances (no agreed 
rules or leaders) leads people with high UAI to withhold contributions. This 
hypothesis is tested on an individual level in a series of one-shot PGGs without 
punishment, and comparison to two questionnaires. No correlations are found 
between both datasets. Obfuscating factors may have been the PGG set-up and 
choice of questionnaires. 
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6.2 STUDY 1: PGG AND TAXATION - CULTURAL RESPONSES TO PUBLIC 
GOODS PROBLEMS 
6.2.1 Introduction 
The Public Goods Game (PGG) was developed to study cooperation in 
humans (see section 2.3.5). Designed to mimic the tragedy of the commons, it 
concerns any situation in which it is less individually costly for a person in a group 
to take something from a common resource and to collectively risk depleting the 
resource, than it is to practice temperance (Hardin, 1968). In the PGG, players can 
choose to contribute any amount of their play money to a pot, which is multiplied 
and shared equally between all players, regardless of their contributions. 
Mathematical analysis predicts that not contributing any money to the pot is the best 
strategy because this leaves one with at minimum the endowment, and at maximum 
the endowment plus winnings from the group pot. This strategy is the Nash 
equilibrium which traditional economists call the rational strategy, but which may 
not be rational if one considers that people might maximise things other than 
earnings (as discussed in section 2.3.5). Indeed in experiments the majority of people 
do not follow the rational strategy: most start off cooperating and contributing 
something to the pot, but over time cooperation generally dwindles (Ledyard, 1995). 
When participants are given the extra option of punishing each other, i.e. paying a 
small fee to take a larger sum away from the person being punished, cooperation is 
generally maintained at high levels (Chaudhuri, 2011). 
Most PGG results have come from Western countries and only in recent 
times has data been published from other parts of the world. Cross-cultural 
comparison studies have found that the amount of cooperation and punishment 
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participants give varies between societies (see section 2.3.5): for instance US 
participants give relatively high contributions while participants in Greece contribute 
very little. In most societies free-riders are punished but in some societies such as 
Greece and Russia in addition high contributors are punished by people who 
contributed less than them, so called anti-social punishment (Gächter & Herrmann, 
2009; Herrmann, et al., 2008). 
Both punishment of free-riders and anti-social punishment have been found 
to be influenced by various cultural measurements as found by cross-cultural 
psychologists (Herrmann, et al., 2008). Anti-social punishment correlates negatively 
with Hofstede’s individualism (IDV, see section 2.3.3), and positively with 
uncertainty avoidance (UAI) and power distance (PD). These cultural dimensions 
seem to have a much stronger influence on anti-social punishment than on 
punishment of free-riders. On the latter, norms of civic cooperation seem to have a 
larger effect (Herrmann, et al., 2008 supporting material). 
In contrast, cross-cultural variation in contributions have been shown to exist 
(Gächter, et al., 2010), but conspicuously lacking in the field is an analysis of how 
contributions are influenced by specific cultural measures. Gächter, et al. (2010) 
concluded that when the PGG is played without punishment, contribution levels are 
more dependent on individual differences than on cultural regions cf. Inglehart and 
Baker (2000, see section 2.3.3). When punishment is added to the PGG, cultural 
influences on participants’ contributions increase five-fold (Gächter, et al., 2010). 
Then the researchers conclude that, on the basis of first round contributions being 
higher in the punishment condition than in the non-punishment condition, the 
awareness of punishment primes people to behave according to their cultural norms. 
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The question then is: how does culture influence contribution in the PGG? To 
answer this question I will draw from published PGG data, but also from a real-life 
tragedy of the commons situation: the tax system. More research using larger 
samples is available on cultural influences on tax paying and tax evasion, making it 
potentially a good resource for the current question. First I discuss and test the 
similarities of the tax system and the PGG. Second, to test which cultural dimensions 
influence both factors I draw from the literature on tax evasion and compare these 
measures to Hofstede’s dimensions. 
6.2.2 PGG contributions and tax evasion 
At least in Western Europe contemporary tax systems evolved out of single 
tax events to help rulers fund inter-state wars, among other functions (Blom & 
Lamberts, 1999; Braddick, 1996). This indicates that at the root of the system lies the 
same principle as in the PGG: group members are asked to contribute to fund a 
common goal, from which all members will benefit. However, there is a strong 
incentive to free-ride, or evade taxes;13 keeping one’s money and benefiting from the 
group effort. The tax system would break down were it not for strong punishments 
for tax-evasion, which is also seen in the PGG: when punishment is possible less 
free-riding takes place. Although the PGG and the tax system are different in the 
sense that in the PGG individuals punish free-riders, while in the contemporary tax 
system the state punishes free-riders, from the free-riders’ point of view the situation 
is the same: free-riding is followed by an increased chance of being punished. The 
contemporary tax system and the PGG played in the lab are similar in another way: a 
certain amount of anonymity. In both situations tax evaders and free-riders are fined 
                                                                
13 Tax evasion and avoidance should not be confused. Tax evasion concerns the illegal refraining of reporting 
otherwise legal income over which tax should be paid, while tax avoidance is the use of legal constructions to 
avoid paying taxes (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998), such as setting up a subsidiary in a foreign tax haven. 
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impersonally, which increases the amount of cheating people do. Non-anonymity is 
an important factor in both cases: it has been shown to increase contributions to 
public goods games in the lab (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Lamba & Mace, 2010), and in 
real life a mere picture of eyes on a wall can increase contributions to a common pot 
(Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006). If indeed the PGG correctly models the tragedy 
of the commons, its cross-cultural pattern should be similar to cross-cultural 
variation in tax-evasion. 
Here I test whether cross-cultural contributions in the PGG are the inverse of 
tax evasion in real life – since tax compliance should mirror PGG contributions, so 
tax evasion should be the same as withholding PGG contributions. For PGG data I 
use Herrmann, et al. (2008) data from the supplementary material (see Table 9). For 
tax evasion data I use Schneider’s (2004) measures as reported by Tsakumis, 
Curatola, and Porcano (2007). These measures are the estimate of all earnings from 
legal activities that are deliberately concealed from the authorities, as a percentage of 
GDP over the years 2000-2002. Table 9 lists measures for tax evasion and PGG 
contributions. 
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Table 9: Tax evasion measures (Schneider, 2004) and contributions in the 
public goods game (Herrmann, et al., 2008). N = game with no 
punishment, P = game with punishment option. 
 
  
First round 
contributions 
Mean 
contributions 
Country 
Tax evasion 
score 
N P N P 
Australia 13.97 8.2 7.8 4.8 14.1 
Belarus 49.27 12.8 11.8 10.5 12.9 
China 14.37 10.1 9.9 8 13.9 
Denmark 17.73 14.1 15.4 11.5 17.7 
Germany 16.37 10.9 12.1 9.2 14.5 
Greece 28.47 8.1 5.8 6.4 5.7 
Russia 47.43 10.8 10.8 9.9 11.8 
Saudi Arabia 19.07 8 6.1 7.6 6.9 
South Korea 28.13 8.3 9.7 7.9 14.7 
Switzerland 
StGallen 9.13 13.7 15 10.1 16.7 
Switzerland 
Zurich 9.13 12.1 13.2 9.3 16.2 
Turkey 33.2 8.9 6.5 5.4 7.1 
UK 12.47 10.9 11.3 7 15 
Ukraine 53.5 11 9.5 10.6 10.9 
US 8.6 13 16 9.3 18 
 
Correlation analysis (with .5 weighted cases for both Switzerland’s measures) 
shows that tax evasion measures correlate significantly negatively with PGG 
contributions when punishment is possible, but not when punishment is not possible 
(Table 10). 
Table 10: Contributions in the public goods game (Herrmann, et al., 
2008) and tax evasion measures (Schneider, 2004). N = game with no 
punishment, P = game with punishment option. Reported are Spearman r 
values. N = 15, namely Australia, Belarus, China, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Switzerland/StGallen, 
Switzerland/Zurich (both tax evasion measures for Switzerland), Turkey, 
UK Ukraine and US. Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.005. 
 
First round 
contributions 
Mean 
contributions 
  N P N P 
Tax Evasion -.286 -.542* .14 -.742** 
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This means that the higher the level of tax evasion in a country, the lower the 
level of contributions in the public goods game with punishment, but not without 
punishment. The PGG with punishment accurately models the real-life situation of 
taxation, while the PGG without punishment does not. Furthermore, first round 
contributions and mean of contributions show the same pattern in both conditions, 
suggesting that people start the game expecting the group to behave according to 
their experiences in real-life, as has been noted before (Binmore & Shaked, 2010; 
Henrich, et al., 2005). 
6.2.3 Cultural influences on the PGG and tax evasion 
Having shown the similarity in cross-cultural variation between contributions 
in the PGG and tax evasion, we can draw from the latter to better understand the 
former. Cultural influences on tax evasion have been studied in terms of Hofstede’s 
dimensions. Among 50 countries, Tsakumis, et al. (2007) found that several cultural 
measures relate to tax evasion (controlling for GNP): tax evasion correlates 
positively to uncertainty avoidance (UAI) and power distance (PD), and negatively 
to individualism (IDV) and masculinity (Mas). The authors explain these findings in 
the context of the tax system. People in high UAI countries dislike ambiguity and do 
not trust their governments to spend the taxes in the right way, thus to avoid the 
uncertainty of what their money will be used for they evade paying taxes. People in 
high IDV countries view written law as applying to everyone equally, while people 
in low IDV countries are more likely to exempt themselves or their in-group from 
the law; hence the negative relation between IDV and tax evasion. In high PD 
countries, people accept that high status individuals have privileges beyond those of 
low status people, among which the increasing of personal wealth. Thus tax evasion 
correlates positively with PD. In high Mas countries the strong emphasis on 
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performance and achievement comes with intolerance for breaking the law and 
strong punishment. Therefore there is a negative relationship between Mas and tax 
evasion (Tsakumis, et al., 2007). 
Richardson (2008) expands on this work by including three further country 
level variables; (i) the level of legal enforcement based on the rule of law, (ii) trust in 
the government and (iii) religiosity, as indexed by the World Bank (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2005) and the World Values Survey (WVS, 2006). Richardson 
(2008) found that tax evasion decreased with increased levels of law enforcement, 
trust in government, religiosity and IDV, and decreased levels of UAI. Contrary to 
Tsakumis, et al. (2007) he did not find any influences of PD and Mas. A further 
improvement on the previous study was that findings were robust for two alternative 
measures of tax evasion. 
To test if cultural dimensions have a similar influence on PGG contributions 
as on tax evasion, I analyse data for the 13 countries for which data is available in 
both sets (again with .5 weighted cases for Switzerland’s two measures). 
Correlational analysis shows that contributions in the punishment condition correlate 
significantly negatively with UAI and PD (Table 11). In the non-punishment 
condition, there is a significantly negative correlation with UAI only in the first 
round. Tax evasion in this sample shows the same pattern in relation to Hofstede’s 
dimensions as Tsakumis, et al. (2007) found in their larger sample, indicating that 
the selection of countries analysed here is representative of those authors’ larger 
selection. 
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Table 11: Correlations between contributions in the public goods game 
(Herrmann, et al., 2008), Hofstede dimensions (Hofstede, et al., 2010) 
and tax evasion (Schneider, 2004). N = game with no punishment, P = 
game with punishment. IDV = individualism, UAI = uncertainty 
avoidance, PD = power distance Mas = masculinity. Reported are 
Pearson r values, except for Tax evasion and Mas where Spearman rs 
values are reported. N = 13, namely Australia, China, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Russia, Saudi Arabia (Hofstede dimensions for Arab 
countries), South Korea, Switzerland/StGallen, Switzerland/Zurich (both 
Hofstede dimensions for German speaking Switzerland, each weighted 
.5), Turkey, UK and US. Significance levels: * p<.05, ** p<.01, 
***p<.005, a trend of p<.06. 
Hofstede dimensions 
No punishment With punishment Tax 
evasion rs 
1st 
round Mean 
1st 
round Mean 
IDV  .528  .108  .546  .568a -.675* 
UAI -.580* -.307 -.588* -.710**  .681* 
PD -.572a -.233 -.598* -.633*  .609* 
Mas rs  .316  .032  .318  .302 -.751*** 
 
In the PGG with punishment, participants in countries with higher UAI and 
higher PDI make lower contributions. Interestingly in that condition, participants’ 
first round contributions show the same effect, indicating that they start off playing 
according to expectations, as others have noted before (Binmore & Shaked, 2010; 
Henrich, et al., 2005). The mean contributions show the same pattern – even slightly 
stronger – indicating that there is no disintegration of the pattern as is usual without 
punishment, because participants use punishment to reinforce their countries’ norms 
during the game. 
In the PGG without punishment participants’ average contributions to the pot 
are not correlated with scores on their cultural dimensions. Nevertheless, first round 
contributions do correlate significantly negatively with UAI. This result indicates 
that participants start the game according to expectations based on their society’s 
culture in terms of UAI, but this effect disappears when the game proceeds. Most 
likely this occurs because of the lack of means to coerce fellow group members to 
behave according to norms. The original rational solution to the PGG comes back in 
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view: without any means of establishing or maintaining norms, contributions 
dwindle as predicted by the Nash equilibrium (Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995). 
6.2.4 Discussion 
Here I have shown that the PGG with punishment accurately models the tax 
system, which means that research on either topic can be informative for the other. 
The first study to date that investigates tax evasion in terms of Hofstede’s 
dimensions (Tsakumis, et al., 2007) found that tax evasion correlates positively with 
UAI and PDI, and negatively with IDV and Mas. A follow-up study (Richardson, 
2008) found the same effect for UAI and IDV, but not for PD and Mas. 
Analysing PGG data from Herrmann, et al. (2008) for Hofstede’s 
dimensions, I found the same pattern for UAI and PD in both first round and mean 
contributions in the punishment condition. This means that people start the game 
according to their cultural expectations, and are willing to enforce those expectations 
through punishment. Note that punishment does not vary much with cultural 
differences (Herrmann, et al., 2008), indicating that punishment is used in the same 
way across countries. I also found a correlation between UAI and first round 
contributions in the non-punishment condition, which indicates that UAI has a 
stronger impact on participants’ game behaviour than the other cultural dimensions. 
The small sample sizes in this study warrant a note on statistical power. The 
limiting factor was PGG data which has only been gathered in a small number of 
countries which increases the probability of a Type II error. The current method is 
only capable of detecting large effect sizes: I can only reliably detect effect sizes of r 
= .66 and higher for N = 15, and r = .70 for N = 13 (G*Power at a power of .80, 
Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; O'Keefe, 2007). The null-results might be 
spurious; future studies with PGG results from a larger number of countries will be 
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necessary. However, if the effect sizes would remain the same as found here when 
sample size would be increased, it is still clear that UAI has a larger effect on PGG 
contributions than the other dimensions do. 
Overall the literature and the data presented here suggest that, of Hofstede’s 
dimensions, the most stable influence of culture on public goods dilemmas is the 
level of UAI: the higher a country’s UAI, the less participants contribute to the 
public good. What might be the reason for this? The economists discussed here put 
the cause with the level of generalised trust which works both ways (Richardson, 
2008; Tsakumis, et al., 2007). The government does not trust the public and 
therefore imposes many laws and stipulations regarding everything including taxes. 
The public in turn finds the maze of rules confusing, the ambiguity of which entices 
them to evade taxes. Following the argument in the opposite direction; the public 
does not trust that the money collected by government will be used for worthy 
causes, and therefore is reluctant to pay taxes. 
Several findings support this argument. UAI correlates negatively with 
generalised trust (Hofstede, 2001, p. 159), and corresponds with high numbers of 
rules in society (Hofstede, 2001, p. 147). However, if one takes Hofstede’s own 
definitions (Hofstede, 2001, see section 2.3.3) we see that, as well as UAI correlating 
with a larger number of rules and laws, UAI also is paired with a higher need for 
morality, a higher belief in absolute truth and an intolerance for breaking the rules. 
Therefore the line of argument Tsakumis and Richardson present is not internally 
coherent: it invokes both high UAI’s intolerance for ambiguity and low UAI’s 
tolerance for breaking rules. 
Based on the similarity of both mathematical structure and real-life pattern I 
propose that the primary causal mechanism that determines both lack of 
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contributions in the PGG and the tax system is the intolerance of ambiguity. The 
public goods game is usually played with unknown others, at screened off desks in a 
laboratory. In the game itself there are no rules specifying appropriate or 
inappropriate behaviour and there is no leader, nor are there any means of 
establishing such through verbal or non-verbal communication. The lack of 
communication in the public goods game might be a cause for uncertainty; it is an 
ambiguous situation, which people from high UAI countries are uncomfortable with. 
The real world tax system is also opaque. Citizens send money to unknown others 
and lose control over it. There is no way of communicating directly about the goals 
towards which one’s money will be put. People in countries with high UAI should be 
expected to prefer having control over their money, which expressly does not mean 
they should want to keep it themselves, merely that they prefer to help others in a 
face-to-face, controlled way. For instance, they might be more focused on local 
networks of exchange, where known group-members exchange goods or services 
amongst themselves. 
6.3 STUDY 2: INDIVIDUAL-CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON PGG 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
6.3.1 Introduction 
From the literature study above I concluded that UAI was the most important 
factor in cross-cultural variance in contributions to the PGG. UAI expressed as a low 
tolerance for ambiguity can explain both real-world and laboratory based patterns in 
public goods dilemmas, because in both cases the lack of control over the future goal 
of money drives contributions down in countries with high UAI. 
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Here I test this hypothesis on the individual level in a repeated one-shot PGG 
without punishment, and two questionnaires that test the desire of control. This set-
up is chosen because in the literature study UAI was the only cultural variable that 
correlated with first round contributions in PGGs without punishment, which means 
that other cultural dimensions will not be confounding factors. Two questionnaires 
were used: (i) the Uncertainty Avoidance scale which is suitable for individuals 
(Jung & Kellaris, 2004, Appendix V). Sample items are: “I prefer structured 
situations to unstructured situations” and “I tend to get anxious easily when I don’t 
know an outcome”.  (ii) the Desirability of Control questionnaire (Burger & Cooper, 
1979, Appendix VI). Sample items are: “I prefer a job where I have a lot of control 
over what I do and when I do it” and “When I see a problem I prefer to do something 
about it rather than sit by and let it continue”. Some items are reverse scored. Both 
questionnaires are marked on a 7 point Likert-scale. 
6.3.2 Methods 
6.3.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 40 undergraduate psychology students at Queen Mary 
University of London. The experiment was set within a larger experiment as part of 
their course work. In addition to payment for the larger experiment, participants were 
paid their profit in the PGG. 
6.3.2.2 Materials 
The PGG consisted of 20 one-shot rounds, with changing random group 
compositions per round. Each player had his/her private account and each group of 4 
had a communal account. Endowment per round was 10 units which participants had 
to allocate to either their private pot or the public pot. Units in the private pots 
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counted directly to participants’ earnings, while units in the public pot were 
multiplied by 2 and shared equally among all 4 players. Players were able to see their 
profits per round in a table on the right hand side of the screen. The conversion rate 
was 25 pence per 100 units. The PGG was coded with Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Appendix VI shows screenshots for the PGG. Three questionnaires were filled in on 
paper: the Uncertainty Avoidance scale (Appendix V), the Desirability for Control 
scale (Appendix VI) and a third questionnaire: a Sense of Power scale that was not 
part of this experiment. 
6.3.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were received in the computer lab and allocated to a computer. 
Every other computer was left empty to decrease the possibility of participants 
communicating with each other. Participants received overall instructions and signed 
consent forms, and answered questions on cultural background: “In what country 
were you born?”, “In what country were you raised before the age of 14?”, “In what 
country were your parents born?”, “In what country were your grandparents born?”, 
“With which country do you identify most?”. Half the students filled out the 
questionnaires on paper before playing the PGG, the other half filled out the 
questionnaires after playing the PGG. Demographic questions were answered 
immediately after having played the PGG. After finishing the experiment, 
participants were paid, debriefed and free to leave. 
6.3.2.4 Analysis 
All data were normally distributed, except first round contributions (Shapiro-
Wilk tests p < .05). One participant left the study before filling out the 
questionnaires, leaving 39 participants. Three participants did not answer all items 
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for the Desirability of Control questionnaire, making it impossible to calculate the 
sum score and leading to exclusion from the analysis. Variation on the cultural 
background questions was not sufficient, thus these variables were omitted for 
analysis. Correlation analysis was used. 
6.3.3 Results 
The sum answers to the Uncertainty Avoidance scale did not correlate with 
either first round contributions in the PGG (rs = .072, N = 39, p =.661) or mean 
contributions (r = .14, N = 39, p = .394). Sum answers to the Desirability for Control 
questionnaire also did not correlate to either first round contributions (rs = .015, N = 
36, p = .929) or mean contributions in the PGG (r = -.03, N = 36, p = .851). There 
was a significant effect of experimental order, where participants who played the 
PGG before filling in the questionnaires scored significantly higher on the 
Desirability of Control scale (M = 94.714, SD = 15.519) than participants who filled 
in the questionnaires first (M = 85.182, SD = 10.996; Levene’s test: F = 2.588, p = 
.117; independent samples t-test: t34 = 2.159, p < .05). Controlling for experimental 
order did not result in any changes to the above results. 
6.3.4 Discussion 
The hypothesis was rejected: participants’ Uncertainty Avoidance score had 
no relation to their first round contributions or the mean of their contributions in the 
PGG. Their Desirability for Control score also had no relation with first round or 
mean contribution. These findings suggest that low tolerance for ambiguity has no 
impact whatsoever on contributions in a PGG without punishment. 
The implication of this finding is that the society-level correlation that was 
found in section 6.2 may only exist on the group-level, and may not exist on the 
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individual-level (Na, et al., 2010). Although some society-level variables are 
reducible to individual-level variables, such as personality, this is not always the case 
for other constructs, as for example for analytic/holistic cognitive mode (Na, et al., 
2010, see also Chapter 5). It is possible that one or all of the factors investigated here 
- economic (game) behaviour, UAI or the two questionnaire variables individual-
level UAI and Desirability of Control - are such constructs. 
Before drawing any conclusions however, is should be pointed out that this 
study has two important methodological issues. The first is that this study may suffer 
from a Type II error. The sample size in this experiment is rather low (39 
participants) giving rise to the possibility that the null findings are spurious. The set-
up used here would only have been able to reliably detect effect sizes of .43 and 
higher (G*Power, Faul, et al., 2009), while the highest effect size found here is .14. 
This means that future studies should use larger sample sizes to reliably exclude an 
effect of desirability of control or uncertainty avoidance on cooperation in the PGG.  
The second methodological issue is that the questionnaires might not be 
appropriate. The individual-level Uncertainty Avoidance scale has only been used by 
Jung and Kellaris (2004) and not others. The Desirability for Control questionnaire 
upon reflection is more on the topic of control over others, than on control over a 
situation; e.g. “I would prefer to be a leader rather than a follower”, “I consider 
myself to be generally more capable of handling situations than others are” and the 
reversed item “Others usually know what is best for me”. In hindsight, Matsumoto 
and Yoo (2006) recommend a number of questionnaires that correspond between 
individual and society level, one of which would have been more appropriate for the 
present study. 
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6.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the first part of this chapter I have examined cultural responses to public 
goods dilemmas, both in real-life situations (tax evasion) and laboratory based 
experiments (PGG). Literature study showed that the common denominator in both 
settings was UAI, where high UAI countries have high amounts of tax evasion and 
low amounts of contributions in PGGs with punishment. I hypothesised that the low 
tolerance of ambiguity in both cases leads to a reluctance to contribute to the public 
goods, because in both settings there is a lack of control; it is unclear beforehand 
what the fate of contributions will be. 
In the second part of this chapter I tested this hypothesis in a series of one-
shot PGGs without punishment, comparing contributions to answers on two 
questionnaires. Both sets of data showed no relation to each other, leading to the 
conclusion that it is not the lack of control or presence of ambiguity that influences 
the PGG. However, both the PGG set-up and the questionnaires may have been ill 
suited to answer this question. Improvements would include a larger sample size and 
more appropriate questionnaires. 
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CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
“So East is East and West is West – for the moment. But the 
twain may meet in one or other of two ways. West may get so 
frightened of East that it will give up thinking that boys and 
girls are for mass consumption and decide instead that 
they’re for cannon fodder and strengthening the state. 
Alternatively East may find itself under such pressure from 
the appliance-hungry masses who long to go Western, that it 
will have to change its mind and say that boys and girls are 
really for mass consumption. But that’s for the future.” 
Aldous Huxley, Island, 1962 
In his last novel written just before his death, Aldous Huxley incorporated 
many of the factors I have discussed in this thesis: a juxtaposition of West and East, 
elements of economy and war, child-rearing practices and relatively slow moving 
change in cultural attitudes. Half a century later we have gained a panoply of data on 
the content of culture, but little understanding of how, why and when cultures 
change, and indeed have only just started reporting that they change. 
The rates and patterns of change in cultures are of vital importance for an 
understanding of culture as an evolving system. In Chapter 2, I argued that 
knowledge of the evolution of culturally diverse psychological constructs will be of 
benefit for understanding human evolution as a whole, and for facilitating a future 
situation where most people in the world have a high and stable level of well-being. 
At this moment cultural psychology is mostly still in stage 1 of inquiry (Heine & 
Norenzayan, 2006) which involves the observation of cultural variation in 
psychological phenomena. The field is ready to go into stage 2 which considers how 
these differences arose. A necessity for inquiry in this phase is to greatly diminish 
the number of variables the social sciences have uncovered and find the most 
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parsimonious description of the system (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). Reducing the 
number of variables involves finding overlap and gaps between dimensions, which 
will aid the synthesis of the social sciences. Synthesis in some form or another has 
been called for by scientists across fields of research (Ariely & Norton, 2007; Gintis, 
2007; Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland, 2006; Wilson, 1998). Stage 2 inquiry in cultural 
psychology can then be greatly advanced by cultural evolution models (cf. Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). 
The goal of this thesis was to contribute to stage 2 inquiry in cross-cultural 
psychology. For this goal I have (i) identified overlap and gaps in a range of 
culturally variable psychological cognitions (Chapters 2, 4 and 6); and (ii) 
investigated temporal patterns of one cultural dimension: analytic/holistic mode of 
cognition (Chapters 3 and 5). 
In Chapter 2 I investigated several culturally variable psychological 
constructs for links and gaps, namely analytic/holistic cognition (Nisbett, et al., 
2001), tightness/looseness of norm following (Gelfand, et al., 2011), Hofstede’s 
multi-dimensional model (Hofstede, 2001), variation in personality (McCrae, 
Terracciano, & 78 members of the Personality Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005b), 
and one culturally variable behaviour not often considered by cultural psychologists: 
economic behaviour in the Public Goods Game (PGG, Gächter & Herrmann, 2009). 
I concluded that there seems to be a cluster surrounding high IDV; namely low PD, 
high analytic cognitive mode, and looseness of norm following (connected through 
independent self-construal), high GDP and low anti-social punishment in the PGG. 
A less clearly defined group of factors surrounded high Agreeableness, namely high 
contributions and low punishment in the PGG, and low UAI and Mas (Table 1). 
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In Chapter 3 I used a novel method to investigate temporal change in proxies 
of analytic/holistic mode of thought: portraits and landscapes, from the 15th century 
to the present day. For three countries, the Netherlands, England and Germany, I 
found the face-to-frame ratios and relative horizon heights in all three countries were 
dynamic, and not static over the centuries. This finding contradicts the patterns of 
cognition predicted by the ecocultural hypothesis (Nisbett, 2003), which therefore is 
not supported by this data. 
The same dynamic change was found in the variations in face-to-frame ratio 
and relative horizon height within shorter time periods, which I used as a proxy for 
tightness/looseness in norm following. This dimension has been discussed as if it 
were static, for example by correlating present day scores for countries to population 
densities in 1500 (Gelfand, et al., 2011). The change I found does not concur with 
this view; tightness/looseness is more dynamic than previously thought. 
Although all three proxies were more dynamic than expected, face-to-frame 
ratio and relative horizon height followed opposite trajectories: while the face-to-
frame ratio started high (analytic), dropped to a low point (holistic) and then rose 
again, the relative horizon height showed the opposite and started holistic, dropped 
to analytic and ended up with holistic cognition. Since Masuda, et al. (2008) found 
low horizon heights for contemporary Western societies, and in Chapter 4 I also 
found a discrepancy between portraits and landscapes, I concluded that horizon 
heights as I have analysed them in this thesis were not representative of 
analytic/holistic cognitive mode. 
Based on (selective) historical analysis, I concluded that the drop in analytic 
mode in the first half of the period under scrutiny corresponded with long periods of 
territorial war. A small number of studies investigate psychological change after 
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having experienced war, and find that stable change in in-group egalitarian cognition 
can occur if war was experienced within a developmental period of between 7 and 20 
years of age (Bauer, et al., 2013). This developmental period would account for the 
relatively slow change in culture, and the requirement of long durations of the 
periods of war to induce change. A new field of research on historical dynamics, or 
the evolution of states (Turchin, 2003) indicated that understanding the cultural 
psychological processes that go with state formation would advance understanding 
of historical dynamics. If the findings in this chapter are verified in future research 
this could be of value to the field of historical dynamics, as well as for cultural 
psychology. 
In Chapter 4 I investigated the link between analytic/holistic cognitive mode 
and personality. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the face-to-frame ratio in 
portraits, and relative horizon height and number of additional items in landscapes, 
have been suggested to be a marker in analytic/holistic cognitive mode, and have 
subsequently been found to differ significantly between Western and East Asian 
societies (Masuda, et al., 2008). Also differing between these world regions are 
Hofstede’s dimensions and aggregate personalities in terms of the Big Five 
dimensions. Dimensions of these last two constructs correlate with each other 
(Hofstede & McCrae, 2004), where IDV positively correlates with Extraversion (see 
Table 1). Since analytic cognitive mode and IDV have been argued to be closely 
related or even identical (Ishii, 2013), I hypothesised that individuals who prefer 
larger face-to-frame ratios in portraits, and lower relative horizon heights and fewer 
additional items in landscapes, would be more Extraverted than individuals who 
prefer the opposite. 
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In a laboratory experiment I found no evidence for this correlation, but 
instead found that participants who made portrait photographs with larger faces 
scored higher in Agreeableness. There were no relationships between any other 
factors. On a societal level Agreeableness correlates with Uncertainty Avoidance 
(UAI) and Masculinity/Femininity (Mas). Depending on exactly which societies are 
investigated, data that distinctly differs between the West and East Asia can be 
explained in terms of IDV, UAI and Mas. Assuming that this finding is not spurious 
(which future research will have to determine) then this might mean that 
analytic/holistic cognitive mode is linked to UAI or Mas rather than conventionally 
thought to IDV. 
One recent study provides a link to the findings in Chapter 4. Jackson, 
Thoemmes, Jonkmann, Lüdtke, and Trautwein (2012) found that young men who 
had experienced military training had persisting decreased levels of Agreeableness 
compared to young men who had done civil service instead. This might indicate that 
what the portrait series of Chapter 3 show is changing levels of Agreeableness with 
long periods of war. A further supporting link can be found between UAI and war. 
Hofstede, et al. (2010) discuss the feedback effect between war and UAI mediated 
by stress and anxiety levels, but do not discuss war and any of their other 
dimensions. 
Chapter 5 investigated a prediction made in the eco-cultural hypothesis: that 
working alone would induce analytic cognition, while working together would 
induce holistic cognition (Nisbett, 2003). I tested this prediction using economic 
experiments as primes: a PGG in the cooperative condition and a multi-armed bandit 
(MAB) in the solitary condition. Three tasks measured analytic/holistic mode of 
thought, namely a categorisation task measuring taxonomic vs. thematic choices (Ji, 
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et al., 2004), a portrait choosing task measuring the preferred face-to-frame ratio, a 
landscape drawing task measuring the relative horizon height and the number of 
additional items (Masuda, et al., 2008). Additionally I used two tasks that measure 
self-construal which has been argued to underpin analytic/holistic cognition: a short 
writing task measuring plural and singular pronouns (based on Gardner, et al., 1999), 
and a self-construal questionnaire (Singelis, 1994). To the best of my knowledge this 
is the first formal test of the ecocultural hypothesis in the laboratory, and the first 
time economic games have been used as primes. 
I found that participants who played the PGG did not shift in answers to the 
tasks before and after playing the game, but participants who played the multi-armed 
bandit (MAB) showed increased independent self-construal after playing the game. 
There was little task concurrence, showing that one individual does not have an 
overall analytic or holistic mind set, but rather that people who score high on some 
measures can score low on others, as has since been found (Na, et al., 2010). The 
only relationship found was between the face-to-frame ratio and the ratio of plural to 
singular pronouns, which affirms previous research indicating a link between 
analytic/holistic cognitive mode and self-construal (Kühnen, et al., 2001; Kühnen & 
Oyserman, 2002). 
An important methodological issue in this study was the nature of the 
economic games, which – in hindsight – conflicted with the function they should 
serve in the experiment. In these games the goal is to make money, but mention of 
money induces independence in the form of self-reliance in people (Vohs, et al., 
2006). Using economic games may have negated any effects the PGG might have 
had and added to any effects the MAB might have had. 
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Chapter 6, part 1 investigated cultural responses to public goods dilemmas 
both in the laboratory (PGG) and in real-life (the tax system). Through literature 
study I found between-country negative correlations between tax evasion and 
contributions in the PGG with punishment, but not in the PGG without punishment. I 
concluded that the PGG with punishment is a good model for tax-paying, and that 
the study of each can be informative for the other. Using Hofstede’s dimensions to 
investigate contributions in the PGG, I found that the common factor between 
cultural influences on the PGG and on tax evasion is UAI. Findings gave rise to the 
hypothesis that in one-shot PGGs without punishment, the lack of controlled 
circumstances (a lack of agreed rules or leadership) leads people with high UAI to 
withhold contributions. 
Chapter 6, part 2 investigated this hypothesis on an individual level in a 
series of one-shot PGGs without punishment, and comparison to two questionnaires: 
an individual-level UAI questionnaire (Jung & Kellaris, 2004) and the Desirability of 
Control scale (Burger & Cooper, 1979). No correlations were found between the 
variables. Methodological issues were the choice of questionnaires and the set-up of 
the PGG. Possibly the choice to exclude punishment from the PGG did not reflect 
the findings in part 1, and led to a breakdown of cooperation among participants who 
scored low on UAI, thus impairing any patterns that may have arisen otherwise. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from the work presented in this 
thesis. The first is that the temporal patterns of two cultural constructs, 
analytic/holistic cognition and tightness/looseness, were found to be dynamic in 
terms of centuries and not static, as has widely been assumed (Chapter 3). The 
second is that the ecocultural hypothesis has not been supported (Chapters 3 and 5). 
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Third, the face-to-frame ratio in portraits does not measure the same construct as the 
relative horizon height (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and the number of additional items 
(Chapters 4 and 5) in landscapes. Fourth, the PGG with punishment is a good model 
for a real-life tragedy of the commons: tax evasion (Chapter 6). 
The synthesising approach at the basis of this work has resulted in the 
advancement of the second, less clear, cluster I identified in section 2.3.6, that of 
high Agreeableness, PGG behaviour of high contributions and low punishment, and 
low UAI and Mas (Table 1). Taking the face-to-frame ratio in portraits as a proxy for 
analytic/holistic cognitive mode, I found links between Agreeableness and low face-
to-frame ratios (Chapter 4), between low face-to-frame ratios and increased 
interdependent self-construal (Chapter 5), and an implied connection between the 
increasingly low face-to-frame ratios during long periods of war (Chapter 3). Further 
supporting findings were found in the literature between military training and 
decreased Agreeableness (Jackson, et al., 2012), between war and high UAI 
(Hofstede, et al., 2010), and between high UAI and low Agreeableness (Hofstede & 
McCrae, 2004). Taken together the cluster surrounding Agreeableness is expanded 
and reinforced, and includes low Agreeableness, high UAI, holistic mode, 
interdependent self-construal, increased war, and possibly in-group egalitarianism in 
the PGG – though this depends on the assumption that in a regular PGG the lack of 
contrast between in- and out-group makes low Agreeableness participants 
uncooperative, while the added contrast brings out their in-group egalitarianism (cf. 
Bauer, et al., 2013). 
Linking back to the points made in section 2.5, I conclude that I achieved my 
goal of investigating at least some temporal patterns in culturally variable 
psychological constructs, and have used these to test evolutionary hypotheses 
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concerning these constructs. Based on the evidence I am compelled to conclude that 
cultures are changeable in terms of generations and not static over long periods of 
time. Therefore evolutionary hypotheses for cultural constructs should account for 
timescales and environment at the appropriate level: in terms of ecology and 
contemporary living environments. 
Another point I made in section 2.5 that I have not made any advances in is 
taking into account cultural patterns from world regions other than Western countries 
and East Asia. To address this point I included cultural background questions in the 
experiments of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 asking participants where they, their parents and 
grandparents were from, where they grew up until the age of 14 and with which 
country they identified most. Despite the broad cultural background of our East 
London students, the range of countries was never broad enough for statistical 
analysis. Only directed selection of participants for the required cultural backgrounds 
could have prevented this, which will be an interesting avenue for the future. 
A point from section 2.5 I did make progress on is giving more thought to 
cultural dimensions other than IDV. UAI has been a recurring factor and may be an 
interesting dimension for future investigation. UAI might be slightly different from 
Hofstede’s other dimensions, in that it does not necessarily require a group of other 
people to be apparent. An aversion to ambiguous situations could apply to non-social 
situations just as well as for social ones, for example in not knowing if there will be 
a good harvest, or being uncertain if an economic crisis will cease or not. 
Conversely, the other dimensions all are specifically social, even in the case of high 
IDV: being defined as not part of a group is still being defined in terms of sociality. 
Therefore a dimension such as UAI might be an aggregate variable, while IDV, PD 
and Mas might be emergent variables (see section 2.5). If so, possibilities for cross-
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species research open up: possibly UAI in animals could be translated as risk 
avoidance.14 Another aggregate human variable has preceded this path: human 
personality also has its parallel in animal studies (Bergmüller, Schürch, & Hamilton, 
2010; McNamara, Stephens, Dall, & Houston, 2009; Wolf, van Doorn, Leimar, & 
Weissing, 2007). Studying if UAI indeed is an aggregate factor, investigating its 
evolutionary origins and elucidating its knock-on effects on human culture could be 
an interesting future direction.  
More questions have also arisen from this thesis. As already mentioned the 
face-to-frame ratio and the relative horizon height did not show the same patterns. I 
concluded that, based on the correspondence of the portrait data with Masuda et al.’s 
(2008) findings, relative horizon height as I have assessed them here did not measure 
analytic/holistic cognitive mode. However, might the discrepancy between my data 
and that of Masuda et al. (2008) be because of the different countries in which data 
was gathered? Masuda et al. (2008) collected their data from the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art in the USA, which has a wide variety of Western countries across 
Europe and including the USA, Canada and Australia. My data exclusively hones in 
on the Netherlands, England and Germany. It is possible that the pattern unearthed 
here does represent these countries accurately, but that in the Western European 
countries but not in general, there is a schism in the construct of analytic/holistic 
cognitive mode. Further research could focus on this aspect and investigate the 
pattern of portraits and landscapes over time in other countries, such as other 
Western countries, East Asian countries but importantly also countries from other 
parts of the world that have so far been neglected in this line of research. 
                                                                
14 Of course in humans UAI is specifically not risk avoidance, as discussed in section 2.3.3, but since animals 
cannot calculate risk, any risk will translate to uncertainty. 
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Further future directions that may arise from this thesis could be the 
relationship between the cluster surrounding Agreeableness and its potential for 
measuring asabiya, or group-cohesiveness that is important in the formation of 
nations (Turchin, 2003). A connection here could on the one hand be fruitful for the 
field of historical dynamics, and on the other hand could further inform evolutionary 
hypotheses for cultural cognitive constructs. Turchin’s (2009) work has further 
interesting connections to that presented in this thesis: he presents a verbal model in 
which nomadic pastoralists and farming communities arise side-by-side but at some 
point start experiencing competition. Under competitive pressure nomads will be 
banded together on their own volition, while agriculturalists will experience more 
coercion. Aspects of this theory are reminiscent of work on field-(in)dependence or 
analytic/holistic cognition among primitive societies (see section 2.4.2). Exploring 
how the findings connect to Turchin’s work could be an interesting topic for future 
research. 
Summing up, the field of cultural psychology together with other areas in the 
social sciences have amassed a treasure trove of data on most everything in which 
humans differ across cultures. For building evolutionary theories on why these many 
facets of human cognitive culture exist, it is necessary to take a distant vantage point 
and search for patterns through space and time. The discovery of such patterns would 
greatly advance our understanding of the evolution of human culture. 
.
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APPENDIX I: IPIP-NEO-PI PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Questionnaire used in Chapter 4. From Goldberg, et al. (2006). 
How Accurately Can You Describe Yourself? 
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you 
honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your 
same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute 
confidence.  
Indicate for each statement whether it is 1. Very Inaccurate, 2. Moderately Inaccurate, 3. Neither 
Accurate Nor Inaccurate, 4. Moderately Accurate, or 5. Very Accurate as a description of yourself. 
 
1. Am the life of the party. О О О О О 
 
2. 
 
Insult people. О О О О О 
 
3. 
 
Am always prepared. О О О О О 
 
4. 
 
Get stressed out easily. О О О О О 
 
5. 
 
Have a rich vocabulary. О О О О О 
 
6. 
 
Often feel uncomfortable around 
others. О О О О О 
 
7. 
 
Am interested in people. О О О О О 
 
8. 
 
Leave my belongings around. О О О О О 
 
9. 
 
Am relaxed most of the time. О О О О О 
 
10. 
 
Have difficulty understanding 
abstract ideas. О О О О О 
 
Moderately 
Inaccurate 
Very 
Inaccurate 
Moderately 
Accurate 
Neither 
Accurate  
Nor 
Inaccurate 
Very 
Accurate 
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11. Feel comfortable around people. О О О О О 
 
12. 
 
Am not interested in other 
people's problems. О О О О О 
 
13. 
 
Pay attention to details. О О О О О 
 
14. 
 
Worry about things. О О О О О 
 
15. 
 
Have a vivid imagination. О О О О О 
 
16. 
 
Keep in the background. О О О О О 
 
17. 
 
Sympathize with others' feelings. О О О О О 
 
18. 
 
Make a mess of things. О О О О О 
 
19. 
 
Seldom feel blue. О О О О О 
 
20. 
 
Am not interested in abstract 
ideas. О О О О О 
              
21. Start conversations. О О О О О 
 
22. 
 
Feel little concern for others. О О О О О 
 
23. 
 
Get chores done right away. О О О О О 
 
24. 
 
Am easily disturbed. О О О О О 
 
25. 
 
Have excellent ideas. О О О О О 
 
26. 
 
Have little to say. О О О О О 
 
27. 
 
Have a soft heart. О О О О О 
 
28. 
 
Often forget to put things back 
in their proper place. О О О О О 
 
29. 
 
Am not easily bothered by 
things. О О О О О 
 
30. 
 
Do not have a good imagination. О О О О О 
              
31. Talk to a lot of different people 
at parties. О О О О О 
 
32. 
 
Am not really interested in 
others. О О О О О 
 
33. 
 
Like order. О О О О О 
 
34. 
 
Get upset easily. О О О О О 
 
35. 
 
Am quick to understand things. О О О О О 
 
36. 
 
Don't like to draw attention to 
myself. О О О О О 
 
37. 
 
Take time out for others. О О О О О 
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38. 
 
Shirk my duties. О О О О О 
 
39. 
 
Rarely get irritated. О О О О О 
 
40. 
 
Try to avoid complex people. О О О О О 
              
41. Don't mind being the centre of 
attention. О О О О О 
 
42. 
 
Am hard to get to know. О О О О О 
 
43. 
 
Follow a schedule. О О О О О 
 
44. 
 
Change my mood a lot. О О О О О 
 
45. 
 
Use difficult words. О О О О О 
 
46. 
 
Am quiet around strangers. О О О О О 
 
47. 
 
Feel others' emotions. О О О О О 
 
48. 
 
Neglect my duties. О О О О О 
 
49. 
 
Seldom get mad. О О О О О 
 
50. 
 
Have difficulty imagining things. О О О О О 
              
 
51. 
 
Make friends easily. О О О О О 
 
52. 
 
Am indifferent to the feelings of 
others. О О О О О 
 
53. 
 
Am exacting in my work. О О О О О 
 
54. 
 
Have frequent mood swings. О О О О О 
 
55. 
 
Spend time reflecting on things. О О О О О 
 
56. 
 
Find it difficult to approach 
others. О О О О О 
 
57. 
 
Make people feel at ease. О О О О О 
 
58. 
 
Waste my time. О О О О О 
 
59. 
 
Get irritated easily. О О О О О 
 
60. 
 
Avoid difficult reading material. О О О О О 
              
61. Take charge. О О О О О 
 
62. 
 
Inquire about others' well-being. О О О О О 
 
63. 
 
Do things according to a plan. О О О О О 
 
64. 
 
Often feel blue. О О О О О 
 
65. 
 
Am full of ideas. О О О О О 
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66. 
 
Don't talk a lot. О О О О О 
 
67. 
 
Know how to comfort others. О О О О О 
 
68. 
 
Do things in a half-way manner. О О О О О 
 
69. 
 
Get angry easily. О О О О О 
 
70. 
 
Will not probe deeply into a 
subject. О О О О О 
              
71. Know how to captivate people. О О О О О 
 
72. 
 
Love children. О О О О О 
 
73. 
 
Continue until everything is 
perfect. О О О О О 
 
74. 
 
Panic easily. О О О О О 
 
75. 
 
Carry the conversation to a 
higher level. О О О О О 
 
76. 
 
Bottle up my feelings. О О О О О 
 
77. 
 
Am on good terms with nearly 
everyone. О О О О О 
 
78. 
 
Find it difficult to get down to 
work. О О О О О 
 
79. 
 
Feel threatened easily. О О О О О 
 
80. 
 
Catch on to things quickly. О О О О О 
              
81. Feel at ease with people. О О О О О 
 
82. 
 
Have a good word for everyone. О О О О О 
 
83. 
 
Make plans and stick to them. О О О О О 
 
84. 
 
Get overwhelmed by emotions. О О О О О 
 
85. 
 
Can handle a lot of information. О О О О О 
 
86. 
 
Am a very private person. О О О О О 
 
87. 
 
Show my gratitude. О О О О О 
 
88. 
 
Leave a mess in my room. О О О О О 
 
89. 
 
Take offense easily. О О О О О 
 
90. 
 
Am good at many things. О О О О О 
              
91. Wait for others to lead the way. О О О О О 
 
92. 
 
Think of others first. О О О О О 
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93. 
 
Love order and regularity. О О О О О 
 
94. 
 
Get caught up in my problems. О О О О О 
 
95. 
 
Love to read challenging 
material. О О О О О 
 
96. 
 
Am skilled in handling social 
situations. О О О О О 
 
97. 
 
Love to help others. О О О О О 
 
98. 
 
Like to tidy up. О О О О О 
 
99. 
 
Grumble about things. О О О О О 
 
100. 
 
Love to think up new ways of 
doing things. О О О О О 
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APPENDIX II: FIVE TASKS IN TWO VERSIONS 
Tasks used in Chapter 5. Versions 1 and 2 were allocated randomly before or 
after playing the game. 
Version 1 
 
1. Which of the words belongs most to the first word? Please circle your choice and explain it 
very briefly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Choose between... Please explain... 
Dog Bone Cat  
Spider Web  Grasshopper  
Police car Van Policeman  
Tennis shoe Foot  Boot  
Labrador Poodle Dog food  
Birthday cake Present  Muffin  
Cow Pig Milk  
Ring Necklace Hand  
Cup Kettle  Glass  
Train Bus Tracks  
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2. Please indicate which of each four pictures you like best. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which picture do you prefer? A/B/C/D 
Which picture do you prefer? A/B/C/D 
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Which picture do you prefer? A/B/C/D 
Which picture do you prefer? A/B/C/D 
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Which picture do you prefer? A/B/C/D 
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3. Please think of a recent social occasion which you enjoyed, and describe what happened in 
five sentences.  
 
Example: 
1. Last weekend my friend and I decided to cook a meal.  
2. We chose a recipe that I didn’t know.  
3. It took us ages to find the right ingredients for our meal.  
4. We forgot to buy sugar, so we used sweeteners instead.  
5. I thought the dish was great, but my friend said it was terrible.     
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
 
 
4. On the next page, please draw a landscape including at least a barn, a tree, a cow, a road, and 
a horizon. You can draw more things if you want to. Please keep the paper horizontal with the 
arrow pointing down. 
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5. Please mark your answer to the following questions on the scale, for example: 
 
 
Ex: This instruction is clear 
 
 
 
 
 
This marking means you think the instruction completely clear. 
 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. My personal identity independent of others, is very important to me 
 
 
 
 
2. Having a lively imagination is important to me 
 
 
 
 
3.  I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I’m not happy with the group 
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4. I respect people who are modest about themselves 
 
 
 
 
5. Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument 
 
 
 
 
6. It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group 
 
 
 
 
7. I feel comfortable using someone’s first name soon after I meet them, even when they are 
much older than I am 
 
 
 
 
8. I am the same person at home that I am at school 
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Version 2 
1. Which of the words belongs most to the first word? Please circle your choice and explain 
it very briefly. 
 
 
 Choose between... Please explain... 
Pigeon Duck Nest  
Door  Key  Window  
Monkey Panda Banana  
Coat hanger Dress  Hook  
Cot Bed Baby  
Car Garage Bicycle  
Bee Flower  Ant  
Shampoo Hair  Conditioner  
Pen  Paper  Pencil  
Glove Scarf Hand  
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2. Please indicate which of each four pictures you like best. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which picture do you prefer? A/B/C/D 
Which picture do you prefer? A/B/C/D 
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Which picture do you prefer? A/B/C/D 
Which picture do you prefer? A/B/C/D 
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Which picture do you prefer? A/B/C/D 
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3. Please think of a recent social occasion which you enjoyed, and describe what happened 
in five sentences.  
 
Example: 
1 There was a movie that my friends and I wanted to see for some time. 
2 Last Sunday we went, and I got us all the tickets. 
3 We went for dinner before the movie. 
4 As we expected the movie was great and we had a good time. 
5 Because I had class the next morning I went home early. 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
 
 
4. On the next page, please draw a landscape including at least a house, a tree, a river, a 
person, and a horizon. You can draw more things if you want to. Please keep the paper 
horizontal with the arrow pointing down. 
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5. Please mark your answer to the following questions on the scale, for example: 
 
 
Ex: This instruction is clear 
 
 
 
 
 
This marking means you think the instruction completely clear. 
 
 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible 
 
 
 
 
2. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own 
accomplishments  
 
 
 
 
3.  Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
224 
 
4. I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I’ve just met 
 
 
 
 
5. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects 
 
 
 
 
6. I should take into consideration my parents’ advice when making education/career plans 
 
 
 
 
7. My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me 
 
 
 
 
8. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards 
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APPENDIX III: PGG WITH PUNISHMENT SCREENSHOTS 
 
The following are screenshots from the PGG with punishment as used in 
Chapter 5. In this - highly unlikely - scenario two participants are consistent full 
contributors of which one is a consistent punisher, and the third participant is a 
consistent free-rider. 
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APPENDIX IV: MAB SCREENSHOTS 
 
The following are screenshots from the MAB used in Chapter 5. 
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APPENDIX V: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL UAI QUESTIONNAIRE  
Questionnaire used in Chapter 6. From (Jung & Kellaris, 2004). 
 
Questionnaire 2 
 
Please rate each of the items shown below using the following scale: 
 
 
1 
Disagree 
Strongly 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Disagree a little 
4 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
5 
Agree a 
little 
6 
Agree 
7  
Agree 
Strongly 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I prefer structured situations to 
unstructured situations 
       
I prefer specific instructions to broad 
guidelines 
       
I tend to get anxious easily when I don’t 
know an outcome 
       
I feel stressful when I cannot predict 
consequences 
       
I would not take risks when an outcome 
cannot be predicted 
       
I believe that rules should not be broken 
for mere pragmatic reasons 
       
I don’t like ambiguous situations        
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX VI: DESIRABILITY OF CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Questionnaire used in Chapter 6. From Burger and Cooper (1979). 
 
 
Questionnaire 3 
 
Please rate each of the items shown below using the following scale: 
 
1 - The statement doesn’t apply to me at all 
2 – The statement usually doesn’t apply to me 
3 – Most often, the statement does not apply 
4 – I am unsure about whether or not the statement applies to me, or it applies 
to me about  
      half the time 
5 – The statement applies more often than not 
6 – The statement usually applies to me 
7 – The statement always applies to me 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I prefer a job where I have a lot of control 
over what I do and when I do it. 
       
I enjoy political participation because I 
want to have as much of a say in running 
government as possible. 
       
I try to avoid situations where someone 
else tells me what to do. 
       
I would prefer to be a leader rather than a 
follower. 
       
I enjoy being able to influence the actions 
of others. 
       
I am careful to check everything on a car 
before I leave for a long trip. 
       
Others usually know what is best for me.        
I enjoy making my own decisions.        
I enjoy having control over my own 
destiny. 
       
I would rather someone else took over 
the leadership role when I’m involved in a 
group project. 
       
Please continue overleaf 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
APPENDICES 
231 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I consider myself to be generally more 
capable of handling situations than others 
are. 
       
I’d rather run my own business and make 
my own mistakes than listen to someone 
else’s orders. 
       
I like to get a good idea of what a job is 
all about before I begin. 
       
When I see a problem I prefer to do 
something about it rather than sit by and 
let it continue. 
       
When it comes to orders, I would rather 
give them than receive them. 
       
I wish I could push many of life’s daily 
decisions off on someone else. 
       
When driving, I try to avoid putting 
myself in a situation where I could be hurt 
by someone else’s mistake. 
       
I prefer to avoid situations where 
someone else has to tell me what it is I 
should be doing. 
       
There are many situations in which I 
would prefer only one choice rather than 
having to make a decision. 
       
I like to wait and see if someone else is 
going to solve a problem so that I don’t 
have to be bothered by it. 
       
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX VII: PGG WITHOUT PUNISHMENT SCREENSHOTS 
 
The following are screenshots from the PGG without punishment as used in 
Chapter 6, in the case where three participants consistently fully contribute, and one 
participant consistently free-rides. 
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